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Abstract  
 
 
The role of marketing in social issues has grown over the last thirty years since Kotler 
himself introduced the concept (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971).  In the evolution of social 
marketing it has moved from being entirely marketing process orientated towards 
expanding its vision to other useful theories from the subject’s parent disciplines.  
Social dilemma theory, one such theory, evolved in the laboratories, computer 
programmes and field experiments of psychologists and economists.  In 1991 
marketers proposed the theory as an aid to understanding individual action in 
collective problems. The current study assesses the relevance of social dilemma 
theory for the marketing of water conservation behaviours in an emerging market.  As 
such, it seeks to establish if the key variables were present and what, if any, impact 
large cultural forces, such as individualism and collectivism have on individual 
conserving behaviour. 
 
Individualism and collectivism were studied at the personal level of idiocentrism and 
allocentrism and along the sub-dimensions of horizontal and vertical individualism 
and collectivism.  The interactions of these values on individual behaviour were 
studied, together with two key variables in social dilemma theory namely, perceived 
consumer effectiveness (PCE) and faith in others (FIO).  Individual perceptions of 
resource abundance and attitudes towards non-marketing solutions, such as a 
sanctioning system, were investigated. 
 
The study was conducted among 444 teenage learners at secondary schools in 
Gauteng.  A descriptive research design was used.  The study found that there was 
an interaction between social dilemma variables and individualism/collectivism which 
did have an impact on individual conserving behaviour.  Most, but not all 
relationships were verified.  Collectivists required higher levels of perceived 
consumer effectiveness in order to engage in conservation actions, while 
individualists needed a greater sense of the co-operation of others.  Faith in others 
and individualism/collectivism emerged as having a direct impact on consumer 
behaviour, while perceived consumer effectiveness was a moderator of the other 
variables and had no main, direct, effect on behaviour.  Water was thought of as an 
abundant resource and in little need of conservation.  Low income consumers 
favoured a sanctioning system to enforce compliance.  The implications of the study 
for marketing theory and practice are discussed. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
 
1.1. Overview of the Field of Study 
 
The current study seeks to explore and marry relationships found in social dilemma 
theory, the cultural constructs of individualism and collectivism and pro-
environmental consumer behaviours.  Unlike previous studies in these areas, it 
stems from a marketing angle and tests theory in an emerging African market.  Social 
marketing has developed into a flourishing area of study.  The field was defined by 
Hardin (1968) and pursued with vigour by psychologists and economists alike in the 
1980s and 1990s (for example, Liebrand, Messick & Wilke, 1992; Dawes & Messick, 
2002).  The last ten years have witnessed a greater stress on moving research out of 
psychological laboratories and econometric and computer modelling and into the real 
world.  The current investigation continues in the spirit of the contemporary trend.   It 
also seeks to strengthen social dilemma research by enhancing the progress of 
marketing into this area.  It will test the potential of social dilemma theory for 
marketing efforts in order to provide directives for future marketing driven water 
conservation. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Background to the Research 
 
Social dilemmas have been extensively studied in Psychology and Economics.  
These disciplines are two of the founding three disciplines of Marketing (Hastings & 
Saren, 2003).  The third being Sociology (Hastings & Saren, 2003) and this is the 
field that has contributed much to the understanding of individualism and collectivism.  
Thus the current research unites theory from each parent of Marketing.  
 
1.2.1. Social Dilemmas 
 
Social dilemmas are instances where group interests conflict with individual interests 
(Dawes, 1980).  These dilemmas have been explained after Hardin's (1968) 
metaphor of the "Tragedy of the Commons".  Herders sharing a common pasturage 
would be compelled through self-interest to increase their herds by one animal, as 
this would provide benefit with little cost to self.  Nevertheless, should all herders act 
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in this way, the commons would be destroyed and both the group and the individual 
herder would lose.  Social dilemmas have gained topicality recently as the world 
struggles to find solutions to dilemmas of the commons, such as global warming, 
pollution and use of electricity and water.   
 
Social dilemmas present individuals with the paradox that there is greater individual 
benefit from defection, but should all individuals defect, poorer outcomes for all result 
(Dawes & Messick, 2000).  The “individual” is termed as any decision making unit 
which shares a resource with others.  Large scale social dilemmas are situations 
where a community goal (such as environmental conservation) will only be achieved 
if all community members sacrifice (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  Most, if not all, 
community members would prefer to have all constituents sacrifice to preserve rather 
than forfeit the resource.  Co-operation is discouraged for two primary reasons: each 
individual member would have more resources if they did not sacrifice and if their 
individual sacrifice would not have any measurable influence on the achievement of 
the final goal (Wiener & Doescher, 1991, 1994; Dawes & Messick, 2000).   
 
Thus to a large degree, individual co-operation rests on perceived payoff.  Payoff is 
defined in terms of social (the impact the action has on reality) and non-social (the 
utility gained from simply acting in a pro-social manner) (Wiener & Doescher 1991).  
The conundrum stems from, firstly, the amount that the individual must sacrifice in 
order to positively impact the community good and secondly, the size of the 
community.  Large communities, where all members have access to community 
resources, may result in the individual perceiving little, if any, communal benefit from 
their own sacrifice (Van Lange, 1992).  A related concept is perceived consumer 
effectiveness (PCE), which is defined as the extent to which personal consumption 
activities contribute to the solution of the problem (Ellen, Wiener & Cobb-Walgren, 
1991; Berger & Corbin, 1992).  In other words, individuals are not simply cooperating 
because the cost is high but also because they believe that they can make a 
difference.  This echoes McCarty and Shrum’s (2001) findings that high internal locus 
of control positively impacts pro-environmental behaviour.  If the problem is large, 
PCE may be small.  Thus there is the problem of scale: the community will benefit 
only if sufficient numbers of the community sacrifice.  Hence the common finding in 
social dilemma research that small groups evidence greater degrees of co-operation 
than large groups (Wiener & Doescher, 1991). 
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Wiener and Doescher (1994) speculate that consumers caught in a social dilemma 
are motivated by more than self-interest and thus will co-operate voluntarily, 
especially when they believe that others will co-operate.  Thus co-operation is met 
with co-operation and defection is met with defection.  Sen, Gürhan-Canli and 
Morwitz (2001) add that expectations of overall co-operation could be based on 
reference group behaviour and, correspondingly, social norms.  Thus the two key 
areas for the current research are: firstly, the belief in individual effectiveness, 
measured by perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE), and, secondly, the belief that 
others will co-operate, possibly moderated by the degree of individualism and 
collectivism present in the target community, thus the social norms. 
 
Messick and Brewer (1983) define two main avenues to solving social dilemmas: 
either behaviourally or structurally.  Behavioural solutions induce co-operation for the 
sake of co-operation, whilst structural solutions involve changing the properties of the 
situation so that it is no longer a social dilemma.   
 
Behavioural solutions face three main barriers: first, the desire to avoid being a 
"sucker", where the resource is destroyed despite the individual’s sacrifice: thus the 
likelihood that the group’s goal will be achieved plays a large role here.  Second, self-
interest impedes individual action.  As Rothschild (1979) and Wiener and Doescher 
(1991) note it is the low benefit-cost ratio that obstructs individual action in solving 
many social marketing problems.  The value of co-operation must therefore be 
increased.  Third, mistrust of others, that is, the disbelief that others will co-operate, 
provides the final barrier.  Individuals are thus willing to conserve when others are, 
making the successful achievement of the final goal elusive if much co-operation is 
required (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  Thus it is here that the reference group 
provides the greatest influence. 
 
Structural solutions are realised by altering the payoffs, usually by restricting 
individual freedoms through legislation.  Legislation indicates that social marketing 
efforts have failed or not even been tried.  Marketers have not managed to “sell 
brotherhood” (Rothschild, 1979, p.11), however, group consent for the political act 
may need to be enlisted, thus the legislative solution may have to be “sold” to the 
group.  Thus the paramount barrier to structural solutions is the individual’s desire to 
maintain their freedom from restrictive laws that seek to control individual behaviour 
(Wiener & Doescher, 1991). 
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Societal change is affected by three main mechanisms: education, marketing and the 
law (Rothschild, 1999).  Social dilemma theory has been applied in all three.  The 
distinction between these lies in the nature of change, that is whether or not it is 
attitudinal or behavioural, and in whether or not the change is voluntary or coerced.  
Education aims for attitudinal change, which is voluntary; the law aims for 
behavioural change that is coerced; while marketing aims for voluntary behavioural 
change.  Rothschild (1999) criticised public behaviour management as too focussed 
on education and law and neglectful of marketing and the principles of exchange.  
The aim of social marketing is, therefore, to effect voluntary behavioural change 
through the application of relevant theory and marketing practice to societal issues.   
 
1.2.2. Individualism/Collectivism 
 
The dimensions of individualism and collectivism have a long history in the social 
sciences (Triandis, 1995).  These constructs are essentially a summation of an 
individual's desire to conform to a group and place group interests ahead of self-
interests juxtaposed against an individual's preference for being distinct from a group 
and treating self-interest as paramount (Triandis, 1989; Brewer, 1991; Triandis, 
1995).  The implications for social dilemma researchers are clear: individuals who 
value group interests above their own (collectivists) should be more cooperative.  
This has indeed been the case in studies conducted internationally (Gärling, 1999; 
Van Vugt, 2002, for instance). 
 
Individualism and collectivism are societal level constructs.  Much criticism has been 
levelled at labelling whole countries as 'collectivist' or 'individualist' as Hofstede did 
(Triandis, 1989; Voronov & Singer, 2002).  Moreover the constructs were not 
necessarily polar opposites; that is, an individual could have each to differing 
degrees (Brewer, 1991; Triandis, 1995, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Thus the new 
perspective evolved that these constructs were separate.  At an individual level they 
were termed allocentrism for collectivism and idiocentrism for individualism (Triandis, 
1989, 1995).  Allocentrism and idiocentrism have also been conceptualised in terms 
of individual orientation towards hierarchy, or what Hofstede termed "power distance" 
(Triandis, 1995).   
 
Societies and their individual members are either accepting of social distinctions or 
not.  The Swedes, for instance, strive for equality and do not desire status over 
others (Triandis, 1995).  The Americans, conversely, aim to be distinct, as they wish 
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to stand out from others (Triandis, 1995).  They quest for the "fifteen minutes of 
fame" that the Swedes shun.  Both Sweden and the US were termed "individualistic" 
by Hofstede in his business survey of IBM employees globally, thus there must be 
another dimension present to explain these differences.  Triandis (1989, 1995; 2001; 
Triandis & Suh, 2002) defined society in terms of "Verticality" or "Horizontality".  
Vertical societies believe in social distinctions, status and hierarchies while horizontal 
ones desire equality between all people.  Societies and people can have one of four 
possible dominant characteristics: vertical collectivism, horizontal collectivism, 
vertical individualism and horizontal individualism.  These constructs are important as 
they influence the propensity of individual co-operation, as well as individual 
preference for certain outcomes.  Individuals high in vertical 
individualism/idiocentrism, for instance, wish to maximise the difference between 
what they get out and what another gets out (Triandis, 1995).  In the herders on the 
commons example, such people would seek to get the most out of the pasturage at 
the expense of the other herders.  The notion of winning is thus very important to 
vertical individualists.  Conversely, horizontal individualists seek fairness and equal 
outcomes for all (Triandis, 1995; Gärling, 1999). 
 
There has also been an acknowledgement of the dynamic nature of societies and 
their culture.  Thus societies change as do their levels of individualism and 
collectivism.  Change has been evidenced to occur as a society becomes more 
affluent, mobile and diverse (Triandis, 1995).  Increasing levels of income, mobility, 
choice and mixed populations coincides with an increase in individualism (Triandis, 
1995).  Emerging markets, such as South Africa, feel these changes acutely and 
their citizens are changing their social value orientations.  This will, of course, impact 
on the levels of co-operation in general and in a resource dilemma in particular. 
 
Although individualists are less co-operative, they have greater levels of self-efficacy 
than collectivists (McCarty & Shrum, 1991; Triandis, 1995).  Thus their levels of PCE 
or perceived consumer effectiveness, should be higher than those of collectivists, 
and they will be more likely to act as they believe their actions will have an impact.  
Collectivists, then, believe in co-operation with in-groups, while individualists have 
greater belief in individual power.  Thus individualism and collectivism adds depth to 
the understanding of social dilemmas and their possible solution.  Individualists 
should be encouraged to cooperate with groups, while the PCE of collectivists should 
be increased so they do not see their efforts as futile. 
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 1.3. Motivation 
 
The study evaluated if the tenets of the social dilemma framework were present and 
could play a role in the effective marketing of water conservation in South Africa.  
Water conservation falls into the class of social dilemmas known as Resource 
Dilemmas (Van Vugt, 2001, 2002).  Wiener and Doescher (1991, 1994) explored the 
workings of resource dilemmas in the context of social marketing. As marketers, 
Wiener and Doescher (1991, 1994), Wiener (1993), Ellen, Wiener and Cobb-Walgren 
(1991), Berger and Corbin (1992) isolated two key variables affecting the marketing 
solution of social dilemmas: Faith in Others (FIO) and Perceived Consumer 
Effectiveness (PCE).  The fundamental orientations of consumer behaviour towards 
environmental problems are different to those towards goods and services.  Thus, 
the influence of two such orientations, individualism and collectivism, on the tenets of 
the social dilemma framework was also studied.   
 
Water conservation, therefore, readily falls into the context of other overseas studies 
on the applicability of social dilemma theory to marketing problems and thus the 
current study could provide further support for the wide applicability of Wiener and 
Doescher’s framework.  Thus the promise of their work to help resolve social 
dilemmas, or “dilemmas of the commons” has been in part fulfilled.  The as yet 
unexplored potential for the use of social dilemma theory and associated marketing 
strategies on water conservation, an almost typical commons dilemma, was 
empirically tested in the present research.  In doing so, the current research takes 
the marketing use of social dilemma out of the developed world and into the 
developing world.  This will then in part address Wiener and Doescher’s (1991) 
directive to establish whether their promotional framework to resolve social dilemmas 
is generalisable to non-Western cultures.  In particular it will help determine if their 
belief that individualistic and collectivist cultures will interact with the treatments used 
in social dilemma experiments, as suggested by the work of Triandis (1995).   
1.4. The Research Problem 
 
Thus the key areas for the current research are: firstly, the belief in individual 
effectiveness, measured by perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE), and, secondly, 
the belief that others will co-operate, or faith in others (FIO), and thirdly, the extent to 
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which these variables are moderated by the degree of individualism and collectivism 
present in the target community.  Figure 1 illustrates the relation of these constructs 
in the current research. 
 
A diagram of the proposed model is outlined below: 
 
 
 
Belief in the co-
operation of others 
Perceived consumer 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
Value orientation: 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
Water 
conserving 
behaviours 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Model 
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
The research followed a descriptive research design whereby 444 self completion 
interviews were held with teenagers (14-17 years old).  A self completion 
questionnaire is one that is filled in by the respondent and not the interviewer and is 
common in educational research (Zikmund, 2003).  The population of teenagers was 
selected as they are the primary focus of the South African government's 
informational campaign to conserve water.  Moreover, according to the Social-
Ecological Approach, a model followed by many social marketers (Alcalay & Bell, 
2000), the environment in which an individual is raised is vital to their attitude 
formation later in life.  Thus the current study measured the water conservation 
behaviour of teenagers, their observed behaviour of communities and schools and 
their individualist/collectivist orientation. 
1.6. Limitations of the Study 
 
The study is a descriptive one; hence no causality can be inferred.  Its results are 
limited to a young population in the industrial heartland of South Africa. 
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1.7. Chapter Summary and Outline of Dissertation 
 
The current chapter provides an introduction to and overview of the key concepts 
involved in the current study.  The place of social dilemma theory and individualism 
and collectivism within marketing was established.  Each concept and its implications 
for other constructs were discussed.  A model outlining the study was presented in 
Figure 1, p.7. 
 
Chapters 2 to 5 cover the three areas of literature pertinent to the research.  Chapter 
2 reviews social marketing, while Chapter 3 scrutinises social dilemma research, 
from its origins to its solutions.  The various typologies of social dilemmas are 
discussed as well as the two key variables of faith in others and perceived consumer 
effectiveness.  Chapter 4 turns to individualism and collectivism.  The terms are 
defined and the progress in both theory development and empirical work are 
outlined.  Hence the development towards horizontal and vertical individualism and 
collectivism is explained and the characteristics of each are provided.  The ecology 
involved in the formation of individualism and collectivism is detailed, as is the use of 
the concepts in social dilemma theory and marketing.  The next area of interest is 
water research, covered in Chapter 5.  The global water situation, its challenges and 
the approaches of authorities to deal with these are outlined.  The chapter includes a 
review of environmental approaches across disciplines and then in marketing.  It 
closes with a look at water marketing research in South Africa. 
 
The methodology is provided in Chapter 6, where a detailed list of research 
questions and hypotheses can be found.  The reasoning behind the sample and 
measurement instrument selection is located here.  Chapter 7 presents the results 
and Chapter 8 provides the discussion of the findings, conclusions and suggestions 
for future research. 
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2. Chapter 2: Social Marketing  
 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter reviews the field of social marketing.  In order to illustrate the 
place of social dilemmas in the broader discipline of social marketing, a review of 
social marketing is presented.  Firstly, social marketing’s domain is reviewed along 
with its definition, secondly the various modes of thought that have guided its theory 
and practice are provided and thirdly, the position of social dilemma theory within the 
schools of thought is presented. 
 
2.2. The Domain of Social Marketing 
 
Social marketing arose out of a belief that marketing theory and practice could as 
equally be applied to non-commercial activities as it could be used for for-profit 
commercial gain.  Although this proposition met some resistance when it was first 
introduced by Kotler and Zaltman (1971) (Peatie & Peatie, 2003), in the three 
decades since the growth of marketing’s ‘third consciousness’ (Kotler, 1972, p.64), 
the use of marketing processes and function for a wide variety of exchanges (Kotler, 
1972) has been generally accepted.  Thus marketing has been defined in terms of 
functional rather than structural considerations.  To define a field by means of 
function is to see it as a process or a set of activities.  To define a field in terms of 
structure is to identify it with some phenomena such as a set of institutions (Kotler, 
1972).  In this view marketing can be viewed in terms of the processes it uses or its 
domain.  Thus Kotler and Zaltman (1971) rooted marketing practice in its process 
rather than its structures, which enabled its processes to be used outside of the profit 
orientated commercial domain.  Hence Kotler and Zaltman’s (1971) definition of 
social marketing was: 
.…the design, implementation and control of programs calculated 
to influence the acceptability of social ideas and involving 
considerations of product planning, pricing, communication, 
distribution and marketing research. (p.5) 
 
Thus social marketing was conceived in 1971 to entail the marketing of social ideas 
by means of techniques and practices developed within the marketing spectrum.  
The emphasis on the marketing of ideas led to some confusion of social marketing 
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with social communication and educational efforts (Rothschild, 1997).  Many social 
programmes are primarily associated with one of the four Ps, that is promotion, and 
hence such a narrow perspective does not constitute social marketing (Andreason, 
1994).  Furthermore, many academics and practitioners felt that the definition of 
social marketing did not sufficiently distinguish the discipline from other related 
activities such as societal marketing, nor did it provide guidelines as to whether profit 
orientated organisations could engage in social marketing, such as a car insurer 
encouraging safe driving (Andreason 1994). Moreover, many felt that social 
marketing was more than the marketing of ideas, but the marketing of attitudes and 
behaviours.  Andreason (1994), for example, revised the definition to:  
the adaptation of commercial marketing technologies to programs 
designed to influence the voluntary behavior of target audiences 
to improve their personal welfare and that of the society of which 
they are a part. (p.11, emphasis added) 
 
The Andreason definition has been widely accepted in the last ten years.  Its core 
contribution was the change of behaviour brought about by conventional marketing 
tools.  Both Andreason and others (Hastings & Saren, 2003) have espoused the 
techniques of marketing as well as its consumer orientated focus as the core offering 
of marketing to resolving social problems.   
 
Nevertheless, the Andreason definition has, too, become a yet another landmark in 
the evolving field of social marketing.  Whilst this definition is widely held, it restricts 
social marketing to “commercial marketing technologies” that is theories and 
processes already developed and used within the marketing field.  As the field has 
progressed, social marketers find that social marketing, like services marketing 
before it, can be greatly served by theory and practice from other fields as well as 
that developed within the field itself (Peattie & Peattie, 2003).  Peattie and Peattie 
argue that the unique situation of social marketing makes direct translation of 
conventional marketing practice somewhat clouded.   
 
Evidence of this can be found in the difficulties documented by various researchers in 
the field (Rothschild, 1979; Fox & Kotler, 1980; Bloom & Novelli, 1981).  Commercial 
marketing places increasing emphasis “on products we want, but don’t particularly 
need, [c]onversely in social marketing, the emphasis is on behaviours we need, but 
don’t particularly want” (Peattie & Peattie, 2003, p.380).  Thus conventional 
marketing concepts must be reframed, then, to a social marketing vocabulary that 
includes “social propositions” rather than products; “costs of involvement” instead of 
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price; “accessibility” instead of place; “social communication” instead of promotion; 
“interaction” instead of exchange and competition framed in terms of competing ideas 
and the need to win the battle for attention to secure behavioural adoption (Peattie & 
Peattie, 2003). 
 
Social marketing’s domain, therefore, has grown from one of social communication of 
ideas, to behavioural change using a consumer orientation and marketing tools, to 
one of behavioural change using marketing and other relevant concepts.  Thus, 
social marketers use marketing as a base for the application of all relevant theory 
and practice to effect behavioural change in society.  Such an approach remains true 
to the heart of marketing; that is “marketing has always been concerned with the 
influence, if not manipulation of consumer demand” (Hastings & Saren, 2003, p.311), 
while using theories from sister disciplines, particularly from the domains of 
psychology and economics.  In this spirit, social dilemma theory, which has origins in 
both of psychology and economics, has been successfully employed in the marketing 
of societal change.   
2.3. An Overview of Social Marketing Practice: From 
Exchange Theory to Social Dilemmas 
 
Just as the definition of social marketing has altered from one of idea modification to 
behaviour change, the means by which this goal could be achieved has also altered 
in the years following Kotler’s (1969 in Kotler, 1972) expansion of marketing to the 
domain of social causes.  Kotler’s broadening of marketing was met with substantial 
derision by marketing scholars who felt that marketing was to be strictly applied to 
markets and profit enterprises (Andreason, 2003; Hastings & Saren, 2003).  Not 
surprisingly then, initially social marketers adhered to the application of established 
marketing concepts to social issues, notwithstanding the fact that marketing itself 
constantly borrowed theory from other disciplines.  Glenane-Antoniadis, Whitwell, 
Bell and Menguc (2003, p.326) classify these approaches, which still persist, as 
“traditionalist”.   
 
Such approaches are found in the application of exchange theory to social causes 
(Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; Glenane-Antonaidis, Whitwell, Bell & Menguc, 2003).  
Exchange theory is held to lie at the heart of marketing and entails a trade between 
two parties, each of whom has something of value to offer and the perceived benefits 
of the deal outweigh the perceived costs of the purchase (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971; 
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Kotler, 1972; Hastings & Saren, 2003).  Kotler (1972) outlined the application of 
exchange theory to social causes in his seminal paper by stressing the use of 
established marketing tools, that is, the four Ps, market segmentation, target 
marketing, market research and the like, to induce an exchange between benefits 
and costs of behaviour change: 
Marketing is a particular way of looking at the problem of 
achieving a valued response from a target market.  It essentially 
holds that exchange values must be identified, and the marketing 
program must be based on these exchange values.  Thus the 
anticigarette [sic] marketer analyses what the market is being 
asked to give up and what inducements might be offered.  The 
marketer recognizes that every action by a person has an 
opportunity cost.  The marketer attempts to find ways to increase 
the person’s perceived rate of exchange between what he would 
receive and what he would give up in freely adopting that 
behavior. (Kotler, 1972, p.72) 
 
The “traditionalists” adopted this approach and many social marketing tools 
employed in the years that followed were based on such a view.  Exchange theory 
was extensively used in health communications whereby individuals, groups and 
organisations had resources that they could be willing to exchange for perceived 
benefits (Alcalay & Bell, 2000).  The “seller” provides a tangible good (such as a 
smoking cessation kit) or an intangible product (such as an idea, as found in the 
health risks of a high fat diet) (Alcalay & Bell, 2000).  The “sale” or transaction is 
brought about by established marketing tools and theories.   
 
Alcalay and Bell (2000), in their extensive review of social marketing tools, outlined 
the most widely used social marketing practices: The Health Belief Model (HBM), the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the Information 
Processing Paradigm and the Transtheoretical Model (TM). Other models include the 
Motivation Opportunity and Ability (MOA) Framework (Binney, Hall & Shaw, 2003) 
and other more stepped methods, such as the “Seven Step Social Marketing 
Approach” (Social Change Media, 2003).  All of these models were based on widely 
used theories in marketing (although many had their genesis in other disciplines) and 
followed an individualistic and context free approach.  Therefore, the individual was 
the object of focus in the exchange, and their environment, whether political, cultural, 
social or economic, was largely excluded. 
 
The lack of social context in the interventions was not the only critique of the 
traditionalist viewpoint.  Many scholars argued that exchange theory is limited in its 
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application to social causes: that is, it is hard to sell benefits that consumers could 
possibly never see; the benefits themselves are often ambiguous; and Kotler’s 
prerequisite of balance of power in such exchanges did not exist for disadvantaged 
groups (Hastings & Saren, 2003); moreover, many environmental or societal causes 
have no clearly defined immediate benefit for the individual.  Other scholars (Peattie 
& Peattie, 2003) have questioned whether or not a genuine exchange is possible in 
social marketing.  After all, no behaviour or product is owned or transferred between 
parties and the quid pro quo of a commercial exchange is lacking (Peatie & Peatie, 
2003).  Even advertising models, such as the Information Processing Paradigm, were 
critiqued for possessing too narrow a focus on messages that must be received and 
decoded by an audience, whilst communication theory had advanced beyond this 
towards an idea of communication as a social process that stressed interaction, 
involvement and shared understanding (Peattie & Peattie, 2003). 
 
These critiques substantiated the second movement in social marketing; one that 
looked outside the domain of traditional marketing practice for the tools for social 
change and often ran in parallel with the traditionalist approaches.  The second 
movement was termed "the convergents" and adherents followed either an 
individualist or a societal and relational approach (Glenane-Antonaidis, Whitwell, Bell 
& Menguc, 2003).  Individualist methods include Social Learning Theory (Alcalay & 
Bell, 2000), Stakeholder Theory, Diffusion Theory and Quality Of Life Theory 
(Glenane-Antonaidis, et al., 2003). 
 
The societal and relational approach was bred from a plethora of critiques that held 
that no social change was possible without an acknowledgement and an inclusion of 
the broader environment.  An individualistic approach blind-sided social marketers to 
the negative or constraining social structural influences on individual behaviour, 
particularly those that originated in the marketing activities of their commercial 
brethren (Goldberg, 1995).  Indeed, a focus on the individual ensured that the social 
status quo was endorsed and not questioned (Goldberg, 1995).   Moreover, such an 
approach assumed that the power to correct the situation lay entirely in the hands of 
the individual as the role of outside structures was not acknowledged (Andreason, 
1997).  Such a view becomes more problematic when the behavioural change profits 
third parties or a collective, such as driving slower or recycling.  The role of personal 
benefit and cost then changes and must of necessity widen the scope of focus to 
being more societal than individual.  Furthermore a collective change, as required for 
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water conservation, demands collective action and the cost/benefit ratio difference 
between individuals and the larger society.  
 
The application of social dilemma theory to social marketing, therefore, stemmed 
from the societal and relational approach that was borne within the convergents.  
Social dilemma theory, along with theories such as the Community Organisation 
Model, the Social-Ecological Approach (Alcalay & Bell 2000), Community-Based 
Social Marketing (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000a; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000b) and the 
Community Readiness Model (Kelly, Edwards, Comello, Plested, Thurman, & Slater, 
2003) exemplify the social method within social marketing.  Although there have 
been fewer studies by the convergents, these have been more wide ranging and 
have dealt with a far greater variety of contexts.  Social dilemma theory is one of the 
few, however, that deals with the problem of engendering collective benefit from 
individual cost. 
 
 
2.4. Chapter Summary 
 
Through the long-standing evolution of marketing’s approach to social issues, there 
have been various ways of addressing the social aspects of a community from a 
marketing perspective.  Many scholars have, and indeed persist, in using the many 
theories routinely used by marketers to explain consumer behaviour.  Such 
‘mainstream’ marketing theories have had varying degrees of effectiveness and are 
often critiqued as not addressing the social and environmental context in which 
consumers find themselves, as they are viewed as placing too much emphasis on 
the individual.  Hence the current study has focussed on the broader context and 
hence followed the ‘convergent’ school of thought in social marketing.  Thus other 
mainstream marketing theories are not covered as they have limited application in 
this particular study. 
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3. Social Dilemma Theory 
 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter reviews the field of social dilemma research.  The core concepts 
that underpin all social dilemmas are described, followed by a review of the various 
typologies through which these concepts are expressed.  The two main components 
of social dilemmas, perceived co-operation of others and perceived consumer 
effectiveness are then presented.  The chapter then turns to solutions to social 
dilemmas and closes with the application of this theory to social marketing. 
 
3.2. Definition 
 
Social dilemma theory is rooted in the established ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ 
principle, as set out by Hardin in his 1968 seminal article.  Social dilemmas, 
particularly in the case of pollution, global warming and water conservation, have 
faced intense interest from all academic disciplines over the last thirty years (see 
Dawes, 1980; Ostrom, 1998; Kollock, 1998 and Dawes & Messick, 2000 for reviews).  
Much of the work in defining the conditions of social dilemmas was outlined in key 
articles in the 1980s, when social and economic researchers sought to build on the 
pioneering work of Hardin.  Hardin (1968) captured the heart of a social dilemma with 
his metaphor of overgrazing on the commons: that, as a rational being, an individual 
herdsman sharing the common pasturage, views adding an additional animal to his 
herd to be beneficial to himself; however, should all his fellow herdsmen do likewise, 
the commons would be destroyed.  The situation is a tragedy because a rational man 
is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. (Hardin, 
1968, p.1244) 
 
The true meaning of tragedy is apparent here: not unhappiness but the remorseless 
working of things (Kollock, 1998).  Hardin, too, eliminates Adam Smith’s ‘invisible 
hand’ in resolving population problems, as Smith does not examine the paradox 
where individual gain is not at the expense of others – a concept captured in the 
economic concept of an externality (Dawes, 1980).  Externalities can be both 
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negative and positive; these simply entail that the behaviour of one has an impact on 
others without the explicit agreement of those persons (Dawes 1980).  Furthermore, 
only when externalities are small can efficient results for the collective be produced 
by decentralised decision making, as found in Adam Smith’s markets (Kollock, 1998).  
Large externalities produce a social dilemma, as self-interested, myopic, individual 
decisions converge at an equilibrium of collective disaster (Schwartz-Shea & Orbell, 
1992). 
 
Thus a social dilemma is a situation where gain accumulates to the individual, but 
costs accrue to the collective.  The most widely cited definition is that of Dawes 
(1980): 
Social dilemmas are characterized by two properties: (a) the 
social payoff to each individual for defecting behavior is higher 
than the payoff for cooperative behavior, regardless of what other 
society members do, yet (b) all individuals in the society receive a 
lower payoff if all defect than if all cooperate. (p.170)
 
Komorita and Lapworth (1982) extended the definition of Dawes; they viewed the 
rational choice to defect as a dominating strategy, as it yields a higher outcome for 
an individual than any other choice, and the choice of this dominating strategy results 
in a deficient equilibrium.  Equilibria in individual/collective interactions are termed 
Nash Equilibria and are defined as ‘’any pair of strategies with the property that each 
player maximises his or her payoff given what the other player does’’ (Ostrom, 
Gardner & Walker, 1994, p.54).  An equilibrium is termed deficient if there are other 
outcomes that reward larger payoffs to every member of the group (Komorita & 
Lapworth, 1982). 
 
There are, however, a few more preconditions before a situation can be termed a 
‘social dilemma’.  Firstly, it must be impossible to exclude anyone from the commons; 
second, there must be a group benefit to be had from social co-operation; thirdly, 
there must be a production function linking the contributions by individuals to the final 
level of the good produced, meaning that contributing to the overall good must have 
a form of cost for the individual and, fourthly, the societal production costs are the 
same regardless of group size.  To elaborate, public television has a fixed cost of 
production, no matter how many people access it.  Fifthly, the benefits must be 
divisible, that is collective benefits can be individually consumed (Sell & Wilson, 
1991; Heckathorn, 1998).  These preconditions lead to important additional options 
for individuals in a social dilemma.  As the production costs are the same regardless 
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of group size and no individual can be excluded, there is always the potential for free-
riding once a critical number of people have contributed to solving the dilemma: 
some can always defect (Biccheri, 2002 and Szilagyi & Szilagyi, 2002).  
 
3.2.1. Conceptualisations of the Individual in Social Dilemmas 
 
Despite Hardin’s forecast of doom, much co-operation in solving social dilemmas has 
been found to be present (Ostrom, 1998).  Part of the debate stems from the notion 
of individual self interest.  Social dilemma definitions have, by and large, been 
provided by economists, such as Hardin.  Consequently, there has been a great deal 
of focus on utilities, payoff matrixes and the notion of rational man.  Not surprisingly, 
the idea of ‘rational’ man came under much fire since the 1990s. Schwartz-Shea and 
Orbell (1992, pp. 21-22) question the economists’ assumption of egotism as the main 
driver of human motivation; instead they propose that humans could rather be ‘social 
animals’ disposed to cooperative behaviour; ‘parochial animals’, submerging private 
welfare to small local groups, or, alternatively, people are ‘moral animals’, placing 
welfare of general populations over that of small membership groups.   
 
Economists countered this with the notion of social and non-social payoffs; while the 
individual may benefit from defecting privately (a non-social payoff), she would face a 
social cost in terms of the esteem to which her community viewed her actions 
(Hollander, 1990).  Later economists and psychologists focussed on the notion of 
bounded rationality: an individual acts to the best of her ability based on the time, 
abilities and information available to her (McCarthy & Hagan, 1998).  
 
Heckathorn (1998) explicitly linked bounded rationality to ideology, particularly that of 
individualism and collectivism.  He did so by deducing that the cost of acquiring 
information is large for individuals with bounded rationality in complex systems.   
Therefore, in order to reduce the costs of decision making, human actors condense 
their motivations to a few well known images of the ‘good society’ embodied in the 
core philosophies available.  Philosophies such as individualism and collectivism 
conceptualise the relationship between individual and collective interests and can 
thus serve as a basis to reconcile those interests (Heckathorn, 1998).   
 
The political scientist Elinor Ostrom took this notion further and turned it into common 
academic currency in her 1998 presidential address to the American Political Science 
Association.  She reviewed much multi-disciplinary literature and concluded that the 
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role of learning heuristics, social norms and rules were better tools to understand 
actors in social dilemmas than the current focus on ‘talented, analytically 
sophisticated, short-term hedonists’ that most economic theories and psychological 
research viewed participants to be (Ostrom, 1998, p.15).  Hence, individualism and 
collectivism and the behavioural norms associated with these constructs can be seen 
as powerful shapers of Ostrom’s ‘complex fallible learners’ (1998, p.9), rather than 
‘rational men’ who make decisions in social dilemmas. 
  
3.2.2. Core Choices in a Social Dilemma 
 
Most social dilemma research describes the choice facing individuals in a dilemma to 
be binary: to co-operate or defect (Yamagishi, 1992) and much research developed 
economic models based on these two options and, consequently their influence on 
payoff matrixes (Heckathorn, 1998).  Although this approach has been criticised by 
more recent researchers who believe that defect/co-operate choice can be 
continuous (Parks, 2000; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002) and too rational (Ostrom, 
1998), it still forms the basis for the payoff matrixes for different types of dilemmas as 
it demonstrates well the individual return for co-operation and defection.  Overall, the 
payoff matrixes are constructed as set out in Table 1 below. 
 C (Co-operate) D (Defect) 
C (Co-operate) 
CC 
R = V – Kc1
(R = the ‘reward’ payoff) 
CD 
S = V(1 – 0.5F)  – Kc1
(S = the ‘sucker' payoff) 
D (Defect) 
DC 
T = V(1 – 0.5F) 
(T = the ‘temptation’ or free-riding 
payoff) 
DD 
P = 0 
(P = the ‘punishment’ payoff) 
Table 1: Core Payoff Matrix 
Adapted from Heckathorn (1998, p.458) 
Where:  
 
C = Co-operative Choice 
D = Choice to Defect 
V = Value of the Good/Resource 
F = The Production/Preservation Function – the function reflecting the critical mass 
required before the accumulated co-operative acts produce the public good or 
preserve the resource 
0.5 = the Proportion of the Population Selecting a Co-operative Choice 
K = Individual’s Cost 
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Table 1 is a simplified payoff matrix where the options and outcomes of a two-person 
social dilemma are represented.  The first column represents the first player’s 
individual choice (co-operate or defect), while the first row represents the second 
player’s choice between the same two options.  Essentially, this matrix can be 
extrapolated to multi-player social dilemmas, such as found in water conservation, as 
an individual’s co-operation is met with either co-operation or defection from the 
group at large; or else the individual’s defection is met with co-operation or defection 
of one other.  In terms of the above table, the benefit to any individual depends on 
the level of resource preserved (L), which is a proportion of the total amount that 
could potentially be preserved, and the value (V) which is the full preservation of the 
resource, less the cost of the individual’s co-operation (K) (Heckathorn, 1998).  
Under these conditions, the utility functions have the form: 
 
Equation 1: Utility Functions 
 U = VL – K  
 
The standard production function in economics and collective action is an S-shaped 
curve, adapted for water conservation as a preservation function (see  
Figure 2).  If D is the number of actors in the group who defect, N is the number of 
actors in the group, F is an exponent controlling the shape of the preservation 
function and L is the level of resources preserved (Heckathorn, 1998), thus: 
 
Equation 2: Preservation Function 
 L = 1 – (D/NF) 
 
Therefore, as defined from the above notations, the level of collective resource 
preservation or collective good production can vary from L = 0 (no 
production/preservation) where D = N to L = 1 where D = 0 (full 
production/preservation).  When intermediate numbers of actors co-operate, that is 0 
< D < N, the link between the proportion of the population contributing to saving the 
resource and the level of preserving that resource depends on the value of the 
exponent F (see Heckathorn, 1998 for the application to public goods). 
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Figure 2: The Preservation Function 
Adapted from Heckathorn (1998, p.456) 
 
In order to demonstrate the relationship between the proportion of the group that 
contributes ((N – D)/N) and the level of resource preservation (L), the changing value 
of F must be taken into account.  When F = 1, the preservation function is linear – at 
any given proportion of the population who co-operate will correspondingly preserve 
that proportion of the collective resource.  If F > 1, the preservation function is 
decelerating, that is, the slope of the preservation function is a decreasing function of 
the number of contributors (N – D), thus there are diminishing marginal returns. Thus 
the impact of each additional person's co-operation is negatively related to the 
number of people who co-operate.  Volunteering help at the scene of a traffic 
accident is an example of such a situation: a certain number of people are needed to 
stop and give aid, but if more that a critical amount stops, they become a hindrance.  
If F < 1, the preservation function is accelerating, that is, the slope of the preservation 
function is an increasing function of the number of contributors (N – D), thus there 
are increasing marginal returns.  Here the impact of each additional person's co-
operation is positively related to the number of people who co-operate.  Not littering 
is a good example of increasing marginal returns (see Figure 3, below). 
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Figure 3: The Role of F in the Preservation Function 
Adapted from Heckathorn (1998, p.456) 
 
In situations where the preservation function is decelerating, very few individuals in 
the population need co-operate before a high level of the resource is conserved, thus 
the threat is small.  F in these instances is large.  Conversely, in situations of serious 
threat (such as global warming), high levels of co-operation are needed before 
collective benefit may be realised.  F in these cases would be small. 
3.3. Typologies of Social Dilemmas 
 
Social dilemmas are conceptualised in three broad types: (1) intrapersonal dilemmas, 
seen in social traps or social fences (Messick & Brewer, 1983; Read & Roelfsma, 
1999); (2) two-person social dilemmas, represented by the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), the less used Altruists’ Dilemma, the Assurance, Chicken or 
Privileged Games; and (3) multiple person or N-person dilemmas, constituted by the 
public goods provision or resource preservation dilemmas (Messick & Brewer, 1983; 
Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick & Wilke, 1992; Messick & Liebrand, 1995, 1997; 
Kollock, 1998 to name a few).  The three types are discussed briefly and their 
contribution to understanding social dilemmas is provided below, before the key 
dilemma for water conservation, Resource Dilemma and hence the current study, is 
presented. 
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3.3.1. Intrapersonal Dilemmas: Social Traps 
 
In 1973 Platt first conceptualised dilemmas in terms of intrapersonal situations or 
‘social traps’ (Dawes, 1980).  Essentially, in a social trap, immediate rewards leads to 
long term punishment; hence future selves pay the price for present self benefits 
(Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983).  Such conflicts occur in conditions of 
alcohol use, cigarette smoking, work procrastination and the like, as the future self 
must pay for the present self’s negative behaviour (Read & Roelfsma, 1999).  Thus 
there is an element of time delay that separates the behaviour from its 
consequences, since the current defection by the immediate self has negative 
implications for the future self. 
 
Social traps involve problem behaviour such as cigarette smoking, where the ill 
effects manifest long after the behaviour (Dawes, 1980).  Messick & Brewer (1983) 
differentiate between social traps and social fences, stating that social fences are 
different as the problem behaviour is one of avoidance rather than action: such as 
the delay of study resulting in lower marks.  Although psychologists have termed 
intrapersonal dilemmas as part of the broader social dilemma context, many later 
behavioural scientists have excluded these from their reviews (see Kollock, 1998).  
Nevertheless, study of social traps and fences highlighted a key variable that was 
excluded in many Prisoner Dilemma (PD) tests: that of time.  Separation between 
actions and their consequences is a hallmark of Resource Dilemmas, as the effects 
of water over-use or global pollution are often deferred into the future. 
 
3.3.2. Two Person Social Dilemmas 
 
Schwartz-Shea and Orbell (1992) term two person dilemmas as ‘simple dilemmas’.  
A large body of literature has focussed on two person social dilemmas, usually with 
emphasis on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).  Indeed the ease in which this dilemma 
can be tested in the laboratory, to which Liebrand, Messick and Wilke’s (1992) ‘state-
of-the-discipline’ edited collection of research is testimony, and the smoothness of 
computer simulation with one player interacting in an iterative one-on-one fashion 
with others (from Axelrod, 1984 onwards), has encouraged focus on the PD game.  
Other two-person dilemmas are the Assurance, the Chicken, the Privileged Games 
and the Altruists’ Dilemma (Heckathorn, 1998; Kollock, 1998).  Nevertheless, the PD 
game, and its associated research, remains important for all research in social 
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dilemmas as it was the means through which many key variables in social dilemmas 
were isolated. 
 
3.3.3. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The PD metaphor has long been a successful narrative of a social dilemma; it has 
appeared in innumerable studies and reflected in countless television dramas.  The 
PD game was created by Flood and Dresher, two scientists at the RAND Corporation 
in 1950, but the metaphor itself was the product of Albert Tucker, a mathematician 
friend of the pair (Kollock, 1998).  
 
The metaphor runs thus: two prisoners have been arrested for a crime committed 
jointly; the district attorney (DA) places the offenders in separate rooms and tells 
each privately that she is certain of their mutual guilt and has sufficient evidence to 
send both to prison for one year (McCarthy & Hagan, 1998).  The DA then offers 
each clemency if they provide evidence against their partner in crime, thereby 
decreasing their sentence while increasing that of their co-offender (McCarthy & 
Hagan, 1998).  Neither individual knows the decision of the other; thus the degree to 
which they trust their partner to co-operate with them and keep quiet, or defect and 
obtain clemency, must factor into their decision.  If both implicate the other (defect), 
neither realises the optimal return of clemency, nor the most costly outcome – a long 
prison term.  If they both co-operate with each other and remain silent, their individual 
sentences are reduced and they maximise their collective rewards, although the 
maximum individual payoff occurs when only one defects (McCarthy & Hagan, 1998).  
The betrayed partner receives the ‘sucker’s payoff’, while the informer is given 
immunity, hence allowing an offender to escape by turning ‘state’s evidence’ 
(McCarthy & Hagan, 1998). 
 
The dilemma described by the PD metaphor is that of unsecured transactions, where 
one party has to trust another to co-operate for both to maximise joint gains (Kollock, 
1998).  In the case of building a fence between neighbours, for example, both are 
better off with the fence and both will benefit if they jointly contribute towards the 
construction costs (CC from Table 1, p.18). Nevertheless, individual benefit is 
maximised if one defects, leaving the other neighbour to incur all costs – free ride or 
‘temptation’ (DC in Table 1, p.18).  Both are badly off when neither contributes (DD) 
as the good is not produced, while the sucker’s payoff (CD in the same table) is the 
worst possible individual outcome for the individual who co-operates while her 
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partner defects.   Thus they end up bearing the costs while their neighbour gains a 
fence at no personal cost.  In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, therefore, the outcomes are 
arranged thus: DC>CC>DD>CD (Kollock, 1998; Heckathorn, 1998). 
 
3.3.4. Assurance Game 
 
When the outcomes (DC>CC>DD>CD) are switched, two important games emerge: 
the first stems from unilateral co-operation that leads to better outcomes than mutual 
defection (CC>DC>DD>CD) (Kollock, 1998).  Here the preservation/production 
function is sharply accelerating and temptation and sucker payoffs decline in value 
(see Figure 3, p.21) (Heckathorn, 1998).  As both are better off if co-operation is 
mutual, the dilemma involves one of trust – would each trust the other to co-operate?  
Without trust, mutual defection is the next best option; hence the assurance game 
has two equilibria: mutual co-operation and mutual defection (Kollock, 1998). This 
usually occurs if the threat to both is large or the target is difficult (Heckathorn, 1998). 
 
3.3.5. Chicken Game 
 
Switching the outcomes again allows the other two person game to emerge: the 
Chicken or Snowdrift game (Heckathorn, 1998; Kollock, 1998 and Doebelli & Hauert, 
2005).  The chicken metaphor is a striking one: two cars, racing towards each other 
in a game of ‘chicken’, embody this dilemma:  the first to avert a collision is a 
‘chicken’ and loses face, while the other gets the glory; nevertheless, if both were to 
‘defect’ – that is not give in, the consequences are dire (Kollock, 1998).  
Correspondingly, the Snowdrift game is one where two drivers are trapped on either 
side of a snowdrift and have the options of staying in the car (defecting) or removing 
the snowdrift (co-operating); both are worse off if neither co-operates, but one has 
the potential to gain large rewards if they are the only one to defect (Doebelli & 
Hauert, 2005).  In this situation, co-operation provides a common good that can be 
exploited by others, but also a good that is needed by the self (Doebelli & Hauert, 
2005).  Thus the payoff functions in this kind of dilemma are DC>CC>CD>DD – note 
mutual defection is now the least favourable outcome.   
 
The reversal of preferences comes from a more sharply decelerating 
production/preservation function, as an additional cooperator produces an even 
larger proportion of the common good (Heckathorn, 1998).  In other words, it takes 
just one person to bring about a large proportion of shared good, just as it takes one 
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driver to flinch in the situation of two cars playing ‘chicken’.  Just as in the assurance 
game, there are two equilibria; although, unlike the assurance game, both rest on 
unilateral rather than mutual action: unilateral defection or unilateral co-operation 
(Kollock, 1998).  An Assurance Game requires mutual action, while a Chicken Game 
requires just one party to co-operate. 
 
3.3.6. Privileged Game 
 
It has been argued that the Privileged Game is not a dilemma (Heckathorn, 1998), as 
CC>DC>CD>DD.  Thus mutual co-operation has the highest payoff and mutual 
defection the lowest.  Strictly speaking, there is no conflict between individual and 
collective interest.  It occurs when the collective good grows in value or the cost of 
contributing declines, and the outcome of mutual co-operation is best for all involved 
(Heckathorn, 1998).  A negative outcome or defection in such a game is sometimes 
termed ‘Spite’ (Heckathorn, 1998). 
 
3.3.7. Altruists’ Dilemma 
 
Unlike the games outlined above, the Altruists’ Dilemma is one where 
DC>DD>CC>CD.  Defection therefore is the typical preference.  It can be found 
when the value of the collective good is reduced or if the cost of contribution is 
increased, thus universal defection becomes preferable to universal co-operation 
(Heckathorn, 1998).  It serves to prove that mutual co-operation is not always the 
best outcome and has been used in studies of coercion (Heckathorn, 1998).  It could 
occur in situations where there is group think, thus the individual needs to defect, but 
there is pressure from the group to conform.  The best outcome for the individual and 
perhaps society as well, is when the individual defects. 
 
3.3.8. Contribution and Critique of Two-Person Social Dilemmas 
 
Two person social dilemmas have emphasised the jointness and “nonexcludability” of 
social dilemmas.  The uncertainty inherent in the conflict is highlighted both in terms 
of the production/preservation function (whether it is accelerating or decelerating), 
the behaviour of others (trust) and the minimal co-operation required before the 
public good is attained.  The production/preservation function is a measure of how 
many co-operators it takes for the public good to be produced or the resource to be 
saved.  Furthermore, each metaphor provides insight into the behavioural choices 
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(co-operation and defection) and their associated outcomes and costs (free-riding, 
cost, mutual loss, mutual benefit).  These are present in all social dilemmas. 
 
The critique two-person social dilemmas have faced is primarily that the functions of 
two-person games engender different variables to that of the larger, more common 
and more problematic multi-person dilemmas.  Generally, parties in a two-person 
dilemma are known to each other; the harm of non-co-operation is focussed on one 
other person, rather than diffused amongst many; and, if a dilemma is iterated, the 
known historical behaviour of one other will shape the partner’s strategy (Van Lange 
et al., 1992).  
 
The research paradigms used to test two-person (mainly PD games) have come 
under severe criticism.  Most of this has centred on the external validity of the studies 
(Van Lange et al., 1992; Wiener, 1993; McCarthy & Hagan, 1998).  The majority has 
been conducted in a research laboratory; usually among student populations and for 
nominal monetary payoffs (Van Lange et al., 1992; Henry, 2000).  Ostrom (1998) 
was particularly scathing of such studies, especially their limitation to one-shot or 
finitely repeated social dilemmas – hence the impact of continued interaction 
amongst a group of social actors in the real word escapes the laboratory: 
[s]ubstantial evidence from experiments demonstrates that co-
operation levels for most one-shot or finitely repeated social 
dilemmas far exceed the predicted levels and are systematically 
affected by variables that play no theoretical role in affecting 
outcomes. (Ostrom, 1998: p.2) 
 
Ostrom (1998) goes on to assert that many key variables present in real-life social 
dilemmas, such as group size, heterogeneity of participants, their dependence on 
benefits received, their discount rates, the type of predictability of transformational 
processes involved, the nesting of organisational levels, monitoring techniques and 
the information available to participants, cannot be adequately translated into a 
laboratory or a computer simulation setting.  She thus joins the mounting chorus 
amongst social dilemma researchers: the need for mundane realism (McCarthy & 
Hagan, 1998; Henry, 2000; Eaton, 2004).  Interestingly, most forays into improving 
the mundane realism of social dilemma research has been in the field of N-person 
social dilemmas, such as the work of Eek, Loukopolos, Fujii and Gärling 2002; Fujii, 
Gärling and Kitamura (2001); Sen, Gürhan-Canli and Morwitz (2001); Van Vugt 
(1997; 2001 and 2002); Van Vugt, Van Lange, Meertens and Joireman (1996) and 
- 26 - 
Wiener (1993), which began in earnest since 1990 and has slowly been gaining 
momentum.   
 
3.4. Multiple Person Dilemmas or N-Person Dilemmas 
 
Multiple person dilemmas, or N-Person dilemmas, share common features with PD 
games, in that the collective good is "nonexcludable", the payoff matrix is the same 
as in Table 1, p.18 and the outcomes are in the order of DC>CC>DD>CD.  These 
games, however, fall into Schwartz-Shea and Orbell’s (1992) categorisation of 
‘complex dilemmas’ and have the common feature of ensuring a desired outcome is 
produced amongst groups (not just the two people of PD games).  Consequently, 
such games have the challenge of obtaining co-operation amongst large populations, 
most of whom remain anonymous to each other and responsibility becomes diffused 
(Fleishman, 1988; Sell & Wilson, 1991) and, moreover, they often contain different 
subgroups who value the outcome differently (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Bryan, 
2004).  Most importantly, the size of the group engenders anonymity and thus 
increases the temptation to free-ride (Kollock, 1998). 
 
The size of the group places the dilemma set with another problem: that of scale 
(Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  This problem arises when large groups are involved, 
sizeable numbers of whom are required to sacrifice before the community good or 
resource is preserved.  Rothschild (1979) used the example of littering to illustrate 
the problem of scale: unless all community members refrain from littering, none of the 
community would live in a pristine environment.  As a large number of people are 
required to sacrifice, the benefit to the community of one person’s sacrifice is almost 
zero and thus that person’s social payoff is negative (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  
Although each person’s individual social payoff from defecting (in this case, littering) 
is negative, he or she would always be better off if most individuals did not defect 
(Wiener & Doescher, 1991). 
 
Thus all the hallmarks of a dilemma, as outlined in the definition and core payoff 
matrix, are present.  The additional factor of scale needs to be included.  Wiener and 
Doescher (1991, pp.40-41) have provided the expression: 
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Equation 3: Factor of Scale 
 
 U(C,T) > T for some C > n* 
Where: U = Amount of utility from resource preservation 
 C  = Number of community members who sacrifice 
 n = number of people in the population 
 n* = Threshold number of people required before 
   the resource is preserved 
 T = Temptation to defect 
 
Where U(C,T) is the amount of utility a person gets from the preservation of the 
community good, when C community members each sacrifice amount T and n is a 
specific number of people.  Figure 4 is an illustration of the problem of scale.  A 
person who sacrifices when fewer than n* people do is a sucker as the utility she 
gains from her sacrifice is less than its value.  A person who sacrifices when at least 
n* people sacrifice is forgoing the opportunity to free ride, as she could enjoy the 
community good without sacrificing. 
 
Free Rider 
Sucker 
Utility 
U (C,T) 
U (T) 
C=n*  
Figure 4 The Problem of Scale 
Wiener & Doescher (1991, p.40) 
 
Water conservation falls squarely in this class of social dilemmas.  Nevertheless, N-
Person dilemmas occur in two dominant types and these cannot be used 
interchangeably, as has occurred in some studies (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).  One of 
the chief reasons for this is the notion of framing. 
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3.4.1. Framing 
 
Multi-person or N-person social dilemmas have been categorised into two main 
types: firstly, ‘give some’ games or Public Goods Dilemmas and ‘take some’ games 
or Resource Dilemmas (Dawes, 1980).  The ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ is viewed as 
a ‘take some’ or a Resource Dilemma.  The distinction between the two is important: 
there is a long-standing set of empirical evidence stating that individuals respond 
differently to gains and losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 in Van Dijk & Wilke, 
1995).  Such line of reasoning forms Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), 
which is an enhancement of the theory of Expected Utility (EU) when it comes to 
explaining choice in N-person social dilemmas (Sell, Chen, Hunter-Holmes & 
Johansson, 2002).   
 
The discussion earlier highlighted expected utilities in terms of individual outcomes 
from a social dilemma, such as the prevalent outcome structure DC>CC>DD>CD 
and the operation of the payoff matrix (see Table 1, p.18). While still valid and, 
indeed, the foundation of much thought in economics, there are violations of the 
expected outcomes that occur when people evaluate two outcomes differently, even 
though the outcomes have the same consequences (Sell et al., 2002).  Thus 
Expected Utility Theory’s failure to adequately differentiate between decisions to give 
to public goods and take from community resources is challenged by prospect theory 
(Sell et al., 2002).  Expected Utility Theory asserts that there is one utility curve; 
prospect theory argues for two: one for gains and another for losses (De Vries & 
Wilke, 1992).  Figure 5 below demonstrates the accepted prospect theory ‘value 
function’.  In EU, Quadrant 1 would be sufficient, as no difference is expected 
between the utility for gains and losses; in prospect theory, Quadrant 2 is required as 
a different curve is believed to characterise the same individual within the loss 
domain. 
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Figure 5: Prospect Theory, ‘Value’ Function 
Sell et. Al. (2002, p.287) 
 
The reason for two quadrants lies in what is termed the ‘endowment effect’ 
(Fleishman, 1988; Komorita & Carnevale, 1992; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).  The 
endowment effect is attributed to the fact that possession of a good or resource 
instantly increases the perceived value of that good because of the acquisition 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Sell et al., 2002). When applied to Public Goods and 
Resource Dilemmas, individuals would then have to give something up and hence 
suffer a loss in order to contribute to a good that is shared with others (Sell et al., 
2002); hence this lies in quadrant 1 of Figure 5 and individuals will be risk averse 
towards giving.  Conversely, in resource dilemmas, individuals would be more risk 
seeking (quadrant 2) and more willing to reign in their behaviour if that means they 
will keep a group good (Sell et. al., 2002).  In other words, individuals are risk 
adverse when it comes to giving something up in return for uncertain collective gain; 
but rather than sustain a loss of a collective resource, individuals would forgo taking. 
 
3.4.2. Public Goods Dilemmas 
 
A public good is a resource from which all may benefit, regardless if they have 
contributed towards its production.  Public television is the most commonly used 
example (Kollock, 1998).  Public goods are both "nonexcludable" and "nonrival", that 
is, no one may be prevented from enjoying the good and the consumption of that 
good by one does not affect the consumption of another (Kollock, 1998, p.189).  In 
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public goods, the preservation function detailed earlier becomes a production 
function.  In order to produce the goods, individuals must give; hence quadrant 1 of 
Figure 5, p.30, governs Public Goods dilemmas. 
 
The extent to which public money is required to provide water to a community, water 
conservation efforts may constitute Public Goods Dilemmas; nevertheless this is not 
the case in South Africa.  The country’s new constitution guarantees everyone “the 
right to have access to…(b). sufficient food and water” (South African Constitution, 
Section 27.1, 1996), so the basic water needs of poor people must be met and it is 
impossible (ethically, practically and legally) to deny anyone water, even if they 
refuse to pay for it (Naidoo, 1999). Due to these complexities, many consumers are 
in arrears with their water service accounts, and local authorities cannot collect this 
money or cut off water supplies - attempts to do so have met with violent 
confrontations between consumers and police. Accordingly, in order to reconcile the 
need to ensure everyone has access to water and at the same time prevent 
municipal bankruptcies, a compromise was developed (McKay, 2000).  
 
For practical, legal and ethical purposes, the constitutional right of access to water 
was interpreted as the “right of access to a basic minimum of 25 l of clean potable 
water per person per day” (McKay, 2000). This has translated into a provision of 
6000 l of clean potable water per household per month, which will ensure that all 
households with 8 members or less have access to 25 l of water per person per day 
(half of the internationally recommended 50 l of water per person) (Kuylenstierna, 
Bjorjlund, & Najlis 1997).  This policy is known as “Free Basic Water” (FBW) (McKay, 
2000, p.4).  Thus water conservation, while still being "nonexcludable", and to some 
extent "nonrival", does not operate under a production function; hence we now turn to 
Resource Dilemmas.  
 
3.4.3. Resource Dilemmas 
 
3.4.3.1. Defined 
 
Resource management dilemmas occur when, like the example of herders sharing a 
common pasture, group members have access to a common resource (De Vries & 
Wilke, 1992).  Like the Public Goods Dilemma (PGD) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD), Resource Dilemmas (RD) are "nonexcludable"; they are not, however, 
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"nonrival"; indeed it is the very rivalry, termed subtractability (Kollock, 1998, p. 191) 
that is part of the problem.  For every fish caught by one fisherman in a river, one 
less fish is available to other fishermen.  In the case of Resource Dilemmas (RD), it is 
not the production function that matters, but the preservation function, often termed 
the ‘replenishment rate’ (Kollock, 1998, p.191).  The replenishment rate depends on 
a number of factors: size of the group sharing the resource; harvesting levels; natural 
replacement and any other factor that determines the degree to which the 
subtractable joint resource may be appropriated without exhausting the commons 
(Kollock, 1998).   
 
Hardin operated under the assumption that the carrying capacity of the commons 
was known, a position which has come under much fire as common resources are 
often subject to the greatest degree of uncertainly as their constraints are unknown, 
and are, consequently, over-harvested (Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman & Weg, 1992).  
Indeed, some researchers believe that the environmental uncertainty that Resource 
Dilemmas present enables this variable to be best studied in the resource paradigm 
(Rapoport et al., 1992).  Environmental uncertainty, does not, however, automatically 
lead to defection; Van Dijk and Wilke (1998) were the first to dispute the 
uncertainty/defection assumption of most researchers.  Van Dijk and Wilke (1998) 
found that uncertainty had an effect on behaviour, most notably on coordination 
rules, but its effect depended on a number of other factors.  
 
 
3.4.3.2. Behaviour in Resource Dilemmas 
 
It is also possible to underuse a common resource, as outcomes of Resource 
Dilemmas depend on the harvesting behaviour of others and the size of the resource; 
yet exceeding the limit of the resource results in negative consequences for all, as 
the resource is subtractable (Rapoport et al., 1992).  Thus it is not the harvesting 
behaviour, but the coordination of that behaviour that becomes important: certainly 
some researchers have asserted that a Resource Dilemma is a dilemma of 
coordination, where harvesting behaviour needs to be managed (Van Lange et al., 
1992).  Rapoport et al. (1992) suggested that the best explanation for harvesting 
behaviour is their constrained egoism hypothesis, where individual action is governed 
by perceptions of fairness.  Their explanation for this is as follows: in symmetric 
situations where all parties have equal positions, each party expects the others to 
adhere to an equal sharing rule; however, if others over-harvest, matching their 
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behaviour is seen as fair as well, and over-harvesting by all ensues.  In Rapoport et 
al.’s (1992) constrained egoism hypothesis, non-egoistic behaviour is best explained 
through respect for the entitlements of others.   
 
Subsequent researchers have disputed this conclusion, most notably Budescu and 
Au (2002) who found that protocols of play were important in harvesting decisions.  
They investigated sequential and positional protocols, where in a sequential protocol 
every player knew their position and the sequence of total requests, whereas in a 
positional protocol, the player only knew her position.  Budescu and Au’s (2002) 
findings provided support for their own prior research in asserting that first movers 
harvest the greatest share of the resource, while last movers harvest least.  In their 
study, they found little evidence for the constrained egoism hypothesis.  Eaton (2004) 
drew similar conclusions to Budescu and Au.  Nevertheless, it is questionable the 
extent to which these findings can be generalised, as both of these later studies 
concerned limited populations, small group sizes and instances where position to 
harvest could be known.  Thus Rapoport et al.’s (1992) environmental uncertainty still 
holds true, unless one argues that positional and sequential effects could come into 
play through broadcasting that the amount left in the resource is minimal and the 
current users are nearing the end of that resource, such as warnings regarding over-
fishing, global warming and the threat of electrical brownouts, as Wiener and 
Doescher (1991) suggest marketing could do. 
 
Prospect theory, and its associated research, also offers an alternative perspective 
on the seeming contradictions between Rapoport et al.’s and Budescu and Au’s 
explanation of behaviour in resource dilemmas.  Prospect theory, evidenced earlier 
(see Figure 5, p.30), conceptualises behaviour in Resource Dilemmas as inherently 
more risk seeking, as individuals do not have to incur a loss to create a public good; 
they merely have to refrain from taking to ensure that they do not sustain a loss of 
the (albeit) group possession (Sell et al., 2002).  Empirical evidence for this has been 
mixed and largely context dependent; generally prospect theory has been found to 
have an effect when resources are near depletion and when others are more 
cooperative (Sell et al., 2002).  The greater impact of prospect theory when 
resources are close to exhaustion parallels Budescu and Au’s (2002) sequential 
effects.  That is, last movers draw less from a shared resource.  Moreover, prospect 
theory also provides an explanation for this: people are risk averse when it comes to 
potential losses, thus, when the potential loss of a shared resource is imminent, 
individuals move to keep that resource.  It is even easier, in terms of the theory to 
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keep a resource when individual behaviour required does not entail giving to a 
production function, as in a Public Goods dilemma. 
 
3.4.3.3. Origins of Co-operation in Resource Dilemmas 
 
There are essentially two different perspectives on the foundation of co-operation in 
Resource Dilemmas: the ‘’self interest’’ and the ‘’community’’ perspective (Van Vugt, 
2002).  Rational theories, such as game theory, have been responsible for much of 
the self-interest explanation (Van Vugt, 2002).  Resource users are driven by short-
term self-interest and will consume regardless of the carrying capacity of the land – 
as evidenced by Hardin’s herders on the commons.  Nevertheless, as illustrated 
earlier, there has been considerable dissent regarding this perspective (see Ostrom, 
1998), as it has failed to explain much cooperative behaviour in evidence.  Other 
lines of research demonstrate that users are sensitive to other aspects of the 
Resource Dilemma beyond self-interest, which Van Vugt (2002) summarises as 
belongingness and identity needs.  Such needs are seen to be generated from most 
people’s desire to have meaningful social relationships and are essential for a 
species evolved in groups rather than as solitary individuals (Van Vugt, 2002). 
 
3.4.3.4. Symmetric/Asymmetric Resource Dilemmas 
 
Schwartz-Shea and Orbell (1992) were some of the first researchers to question the 
assumption in social dilemma research that the externalities that generated the 
dilemma are equally shared by the entire population.  That is, the tragedy of the 
commons was assumed to have a symmetric nature.  Externalities could be carried 
by one subset of the population but avoided by others, termed a difference in ‘reach’ 
(Schwartz-Shea & Orbell, 1992, p.5).  Thus the entire population of herders may not 
have equal access to the commons nor may they have equal size herds. Thus the 
concept of asymmetric dilemmas has subsequently been explored.  Van Dijk & Wilke 
(1995) were the first to study asymmetric Resource Dilemmas, although there had 
been some interest in asymmetric situations in Public Goods Dilemmas.  The Public 
Goods Dilemma literature suggested that the ‘number of endowments’ that 
participants possessed would determine their level of contribution to the public good 
(Wit, Wilke & Oppewal, 1992; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995; Van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke & 
Metman 1998).  Public Goods Dilemma research found that the norms of fairness 
came into play and a ‘proportionality rule’ prescribed that it would be fair for group 
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members to contribute in proportion to their endowments (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).  
Zeng and Chen (2003) established that this held true amongst corporate alliances. 
 
Norms of fairness were hypothesised to also mediate between asymmetries of 
access in a Resource Dilemma (Van Dijk & Willke, 1995).  Van Dijk and Wilke found, 
however, that instead of the proportionality rule, participants used an ‘equal final 
outcomes rule’ in Resource Dilemmas.  The proportions rule in Public Goods 
Dilemmas meant that each person would contribute in proportion to his ability or 
endowment.  Giving something to a social cause would depend on the amount with 
which the actor started.  In the equal final outcomes rule, individuals were more 
concerned with equitable outcomes for all group members.  Thus subjects in an 
advantageous position (with greater herds of cattle or high access to the resource) 
were more likely to co-operate in the Resource than in the Public Goods Dilemma 
because they had a greater stake and had more to lose (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), a 
finding which was corroborated by their 1998 research. The rule itself was assessed 
by Van Dijk, Wilke, Wilke and Metman (1998) as conforming to an individual’s desire 
for distributive justice.  These authors note the ‘phrasing' of a N-Person’s dilemma in 
terms of a public good to be contributed towards or a resource to be divided would 
have important effects on the response of the group.  The ‘phrasing effect’ manifests 
itself as subjects are more ready to divide outcomes equally when they are dividing 
resources than when they have to divide expenses (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).   
 
Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) explicitly elaborate on the implications of this for water 
conservation: participants would prefer the costs of a water distribution system to be 
distributed proportionally, that is, payment in proportion to the income or usage of the 
water system; but in times of drought or shortage subjects would elect the equal final 
outcomes rule should the dilemma be phrased as one of preserving a shared 
resource (rather than setting up a distribution system).  These findings directly tie in 
with prospect theory (Figure 5, p.30) and associated research discussed above.  
People are more sensitive to losses rather than gains; hence they are more hesitant 
to pay for the cost of the public good of a water distribution system.  Consequently, 
the proportionality rule is preferred.  In addition, people are more willing to take less 
when the resource is near depletion, a finding which is in line with Budescu and Au 
(2002) and Sell et al. (2002). 
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3.5. Key Variables 
 
In the discussion of the core concepts involved in social dilemmas as well as the 
typologies, two variables emerge as key: co-operation of others and perceived 
individual effectiveness.  The F function highlights both of these conditions:  the 
number of others who co-operate (N) and the proportion of these who are required to 
produce a given level (L) of resource preservation, that is, their collective impact, is 
summarised in the F function.  Where F is large, so is the impact of one individual; 
thus only a few individuals need co-operate for the resource to be preserved.  In 
cases where F is small, large numbers of individuals need to co-operate before the 
resource is preserved (see Table 1, p.18). 
 
The decision, therefore, to co-operate or defect depends on the number of fellow 
cooperators or defectors in a community and the impact that an individual’s sacrifice 
will have on the community goal (Kerr, 1992; Wiener & Doescher, 1994 and De 
Cremer & Bakker, 2003).  Should individuals co-operate and the dilemma is not 
solved, they are then ‘suckers’ (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983 and Wiener & 
Doescher, 1991).  A higher risk of being a sucker could occur if the community is 
large and the contribution of an individual is minimal (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  
There is the twin temptation to ‘free-ride’: if sufficient community members sacrifice to 
save the resource, not all members need to; hence some can benefit both personally 
and collectively through defecting (Wiener & Doescher, 1991; Szilagyi & Szilagyi 
2002).   
 
Consequently, individuals need to believe that sufficient others will sacrifice along 
with them so that the dilemma is solved; however, if it is believed that most others will 
co-operate or that their contribution is too small to be effective, individuals will defect.  
As Liebrand, Messick and Wilke (1992) summarised in their review of twenty years of 
dilemma research: part of the problem is in individual judgements about frequencies, 
relative frequencies and probabilities as both the outcomes of the behaviour 
(perceived consumer effectiveness) and the number of cooperators (perceived faith 
in others) are unknown (Ellen, Wiener & Cobb-Walgren, 1991). Thus L, D (number of 
defectors) and F (potential influence of individual action) are unknown.  Wiener and 
Doescher (1991, 1994) were among the first to note the potential contribution of 
marketing to reduce uncertainty and foster co-operation and it is these two variables 
that were the focus of their and Ellen, Wiener and Cobb-Walgren’s (1991) attention.  
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We thus turn to a more in-depth review of these two variables: perceived co-
operation of others and perceived consumer effectiveness. 
 
3.5.1. Co-operation of Others/ Faith in Others (FIO) 
 
[People] want to ‘do the right thing’; that is abstain from 
opportunistic behaviour, but they do not want to be the ‘only ones’ 
who are virtuous, because there is usually no point in being the 
only one who is virtuous. (Rothstein, 2000, p.487, emphasis 
added). 
 
Much literature in the field of social dilemma research has been dedicated to solving 
the riddle of fostering co-operation.  One of the key variables is an individual’s 
expectations or belief in the co-operation of others (Ellen, Wiener & Cobb-Walgren, 
1991; Berger & Corbin, 1992).  Even Sell et al. (2002) in their review of prospect 
theory found the theory to be more effective in explaining behaviour under the 
premise of a co-operative other.  The importance of this variable has been 
highlighted earlier in the operations of the F preservation function and the 
sucker/free-rider problem.  To reiterate:  a critical mass of individuals are needed for 
a resource to be preserved, however, co-operation risks the ‘sucker’ payoff as 
individual behaviour could be punished by the defection of others and non-co-
operation could be rewarded by the preservation of the resource and maintenance of 
own benefits which is the free rider temptation.  Individuals in a social dilemma must 
deal with the fear that others will not co-operate and they will be ‘suckered’ and, also, 
they must deal with their own greed to overcome the temptation to free ride if they 
believe others will co-operate (McCarthy & Hagan, 1998; Simpson, 2003).   
 
3.5.1.1. Reciprocity 
 
Ellen et. al. (1991) neatly encapsulated this conundrum as a function of what they 
termed ‘Faith in Others’ or FIO. The overriding importance of this variable has been 
in the longstanding evidence that co-operation is met with co-operation by the norm 
of reciprocity (Wiener & Doescher, 1994).  Axelrod’s (1984) seminal book The 
Evolution of Co-operation reviewed co-operative behaviour from biological organisms 
to the ‘Live-and-Let-Live’ system found in trench warfare during World War I.  His 
corroborating computer tournaments have been widely celebrated in the literature, to 
the extent that the twentieth anniversary of these simulations was commemorated 
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with a new round of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games (Doebelli & Hauert, 
2005). 
 
Unlike many economists, Axelrod never held that players had to be rational (Axelrod, 
1984), but did assert that scattered individuals with no interaction with each other 
would find it difficult to establish co-operation: small clusters interacting over 
extended periods of time were needed before reciprocity could totally come into play.  
Such groups could fully enable the ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984, p.124) to 
take effect: people were more cooperative if they were to have future dealings with 
others.  His computer tournaments tested various behavioural heuristics regarding 
the simulated interaction of individuals with a larger population.  While he did find that 
smaller groups tended to be more cooperative, individual co-operation was also a 
function of the existence of co-operation in the broader population.  Individuals 
ascertained defection levels from their immediate neighbours (Axelrod, 1984).  Thus 
he found that co-operation is not unconditional: reciprocity works for non-co-operative 
acts as well as for accommodating ones.  The most successful strategy in Axelrod’s 
stochastic games was Tit-For-Tat (TFT).  TFT matches individual choices to those of 
her neighbours and thus successfully induced stable and predictable actions in a 
population.  TFT was the most successful decision rule of the thousands that 
researchers entered into Axelrod’s tournaments (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
TFT would induce co-operation in an interacting population if the initial action was 
one of co-operation, which would thus be met with co-operation (Axelrod, 1984).  Any 
defection in TFT would be immediately met with defection by the interacting party – 
which underscores the value of provocability, as attempts to free ride are immediately 
punished (Axelrod, 1984, p.184).  Nevertheless, once the other party repents and co-
operates, they are quickly forgiven as TFT would immediately return with a 
cooperative action.  Axelrod’s heuristic requires population units to interact and 
hence highlighted the importance of territoriality (Axelrod, 1984) or localisation in co-
operation.   
 
Komorita and Lapworth (1982) established the translatability of such computer 
results to the laboratory; they found that a deadlock of defection (DD choices) could 
be broken by a small concession by one side, which, if matched according to the TFT 
principle, would lead to a solution as each party reciprocated the actions of the other.  
Such conclusions parallel the well known ‘foot-in-the-door’ techniques of marketing, 
where a small concession is obtained from a consumer in order to induce co-
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operation in a larger purchase (Churchill, 2000).  Social marketers, such as 
McKenzie-Mohr (2000b), have used this to great effect in efforts to encourage 
environmentally responsible behaviour. 
 
Larger, societal level dilemmas, such as Resource Dilemmas have been found to 
employ a modified version of TFT in computer simulations.  Messick & Liebrand 
(1995) tested three adaptations of the reciprocity norm in a series of computer 
simulations in both large and small populations.  The three norms, TFT, ‘Win-Stay, 
Lose-Change’ (WSLC) and ‘Win-Cooperate, Lose-Defect’ (WCLD), generated 
varying levels of co-operation across generations of iterations.  Only TFT induced 
homogeneity in the population, however large (Messick & Liebrand, 1995).  WCLD 
was the most effective with over 55% cooperative units in the population; WSLC was 
the least effective as it was most susceptible to the temptation of free-riding (Messick 
& Liebrand, 1995).  Yet results vary depending on the presence of a fixed reference 
point or one which is the mean of the neighbours (Messick & Liebrand, 1995).  This 
finding reiterates Axelrod’s contention that territoriality, that is the influence of the 
behaviour of nearby others, has a large impact on co-operation.  Thus faith in the co-
operation of others (FIO) has been found to be important in computer simulations of 
both large and small groups. 
 
3.5.1.2. Reciprocity and Norms 
 
The robustness of FIO has been found in laboratory settings (Liebrand et al., 1992; 
Van Lange et. al., 1992) as well as in real life Resource Dilemmas (Wiener & 
Doescher, 1994; McCarthy & Hagan, 1998).  Liebrand et al. (1992) noted that the 
effectiveness of public persuasion campaigns hinged on their effectiveness in 
convincing people that enough others would co-operate.  Sen, Gürhan-Canli and 
Morwitz (2001) established that co-operation in consumer boycotts (of companies 
whose policies violated environmental or political values) was determined partly by 
the boycott’s likelihood of success and the number of people who would join the 
action. Wiener and Doescher (1994) found that individuals were more likely to install 
a load control device to monitor their electricity use if they believed that others had 
done so too.  Wiener and Doescher (1991, 1994) were prepared to recommend, 
despite the questionable morality, that the over-claiming effect in market research 
surveys into green behaviour could be exploited, as the reported co-operation could 
be broadcast to the population, who would then respond in kind.   
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 The role of norms was reviewed by Carpenter, Matthews and Ong’ong’a (2004).  
These authors investigated the motivations of group behaviour – whether norm 
based or otherwise – through the employment of punishment mechanisms in the 
enforcement of pro-social norms (Carpenter, Matthews & Ong’ong’a, 2004).  
Carpenter et al. (2004) tested motivation for people who punish defectors in terms of 
fitness differential, strong reciprocity and social reciprocity theory. Fitness differential 
theory views punishment to be motivated by punitive sentiment: punishers seek to 
tax away the benefits of free-riding for no other reason than free riders are better off 
materially, which follows a material, rational man perspective.  Strong reciprocators 
care about in-group norms and are triggered into action by the ill-intentions that free 
riders display towards those norms.  Consequently, these enforcers only punish in-
group rather than out-group members.  Social reciprocators punish all defectors, 
regardless of group membership, because a widely-held norm has been violated 
(Carpenter et al., 2004).   
 
In Ostrom’s (1998, p.11) review, she isolated three reciprocity norms, at least one of 
which individuals usually make use of when faced with a social dilemma: 
 
1. “Always co-operate first; stop cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish 
noncooperators if feasible 
2. Co-operate immediately only if one judges others to be trustworthy; stop 
cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish noncooperators if feasible 
3. Once co-operation is established by others, co-operate oneself; stop cooperating 
if others do not reciprocate; punish noncooperators if feasible” 
 
She went on to outline a further possible three norms: 
4. “Never co-operate 
5. Mimic (1) or (2), but stop cooperating if one can successfully free ride on others 
6. Always co-operate (an extremely rare norm in all cultures).” 
 
Norms are thus vitally important; indeed they may be one of the reasons why 
reciprocity works so well.  Behavioural norms are slow to change once agreed upon 
(Bicchieri, 2002).  Groups often set norms for resource management simply through 
their behaviour and thus members simply follow a group norm regarding resource 
usage (Bicchieri, 2002).  This underscores once more reciprocity: behaviour is 
anchored and learnt by interacting with and the mirroring of others (Bicchieri, 2002; 
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Engel, 2004).  Thus co-operation will be fostered if non-co-operation is not present or 
is negatively viewed (De Cremer & Bakker, 2003).  We should therefore turn to the 
society in which co-operation is nested. 
 
3.5.1.3. Trust in Others as an Individual Characteristic  
 
Trust has long been discussed as key in cooperative behaviour, as it affects 
expectations regarding the actions of others (Parks, 1997; Parks, Henager & 
Scamahorn, 1997).  It has been defined as the belief that others will not exploit one’s 
goodwill (Komorita & Carnevale, 1992; Parks, Henager & Scamahorn, 1997) as trust 
is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the truster, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis & 
Schoorman, 1995, p.712).  Trust is one of the two founding principles of Pruitt and 
Kimmel’s goal/expectation theory’s fundamentals of co-operation: first a common 
goal of mutual co-operation must be present and second, “one should expect others 
to cooperate” (in De Cremer & Stouten, 2003, p.42, emphasis added).  De Cremer 
and Stouten (2003) viewed the essence of the expectations of co-operation of others 
to lie in trust. 
 
Trust is an individual characteristic and research has shown that individuals high in 
trust tend to co-operate more in Resource Dilemmas, while individuals low in trust 
tend to defect or harvest more from the resource (Messick & Brewer, 1983; De 
Cremer & Stouten, 2003).  To corroborate further, De Cremer and De Witte (2002) 
found trust to be independent of accountability for those high in trust.  Thus high 
trusters remained high trusters regardless of whether or not they had to account for 
their actions.  High trusters are also slower to react to erratic defection and co-
operation on the part of others.  They were, therefore, more tolerant of inconsistent 
behaviour (Parks, Henager & Scamahorn, 1997).  Parks, Henager and Scamahorn, 
(1997) attribute this tolerant behaviour as part of a greater need by high trusters for 
substantial evidence before they believe that others are exploiting them.   
 
Conversely, low trusters, when faced with messages regarding the tactics of others in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma, decreased their co-operation when the message was 
‘competitive’ or issued a warning that defection would be met with defection, while 
high trusters increased their co-operation levels when faced with the same message 
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(Parks, Henager & Scamahorn, 1997).  Lower trusters, nonetheless, are more 
supportive of policing and punishment in order to preserve the resource and they are 
more cooperative when a sanctioning system is in place (Yamagishi, 1992; Ostrom, 
1998).  In fact, Yamagishi (1992) found that low trusters were more willing to 
contribute towards a sanctioning system than to co-operate in the absence of such a 
system.  Contributions towards a sanctioning system would, in fact, constitute a 
second order social dilemma as a monitoring system would be a public good to which 
members of the community would have to contribute (hence co-operate) in order to 
produce (Ostrom, 1998).  Trust, therefore, represents a major variable in social 
dilemma, especially when dealing with individuals who have low faith in others (FIO). 
 
3.5.1.4. Trust in Others as Social Capital 
 
Trust in others does much to alleviate the fear of being a ‘sucker’ (Messick & Brewer, 
1983).  Messick and Brewer (1983) underline Axelrod’s findings through their 
assertion that ‘’trust develops from a sequence of interactions that reveal or disclose 
the motives and intentions of other[s]’’ (1983, p.25).  Choosing to trust in situations 
where no past interaction or, indeed, any interaction at all, is present requires 
‘depersonalised trust’ (Messick & Brewer, 1983, p.25).  Such overarching trust in 
others is often seen to lie in ideas about morality.  Wuthnow (1998 in Rothstein, 
2000) challenges the rational man assumptions, on which Messick and Brewer’s and 
Hardin’s conclusions are based, as: 
 
For most people, trust is not simply a matter of making rational 
calculations about the possibility of benefiting by cooperating with 
someone else.  Social scientists who reduce the study of trust to 
questions about rational choice, and who argue that it has nothing to 
do with moral discourse, miss that point. (Wuthnow, 1998 in 
Rothstein, 2000, p.485) 
 
Rothstein (2000) asserts that Hardin and his followers' rational approach to trust does 
not explain why the willingness to trust other individuals and societal institutions 
varies so greatly in different societies.   Rothstein (2000) joins Ostrom (1998) in 
changing the level of analysis, and to some degree, the responsibility for trust and 
co-operation to the institutional level.  The higher order level of trust is social capital 
(Rothstein, 2000).  When individuals in a social dilemma are seeking information on 
how to behave and the behaviour of others, they will most readily turn to their social 
interaction with others, the media or government institutions (Rothstein, 2000).  Such 
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interaction enables them to perceive societal norms and rules of appropriate 
behaviour (Rothstein, 2000).  Institutions play a key role in enhancing or restricting 
the building of mutual trust, reciprocity and the maintenance of social reputations 
(Ostrom, 1998).  Ostrom (1998) observes that political discourse that centres too 
much on leaders fosters citizen disempowerment, as citizen participation is restricted 
to merely one of electing leaders and not solving real world problems, such as the 
social dilemmas facing the communities in which they reside.  
 
Social dilemmas, in Rothstein’s view, serve to remind us that groups do not always 
have the norms that would be most functional for their needs and interests.  Often 
this is the result of a lack of social capital: individuals do not trust their institutions or 
each other and so fail to co-operate with either.  Rothstein found a high correlation 
between horizontal trust (between people) and vertical trust (trust in political and 
societal institutions) in his (2000) comparative study between Sweden and Russia – 
two countries with vastly different levels of social capital and co-operative behaviour.  
Not all can be blamed on social systems, however, as individuals are not merely 
cultural ‘dupes’, subject to the relentless working of their culture and society 
(Rothstein, 2000, p.489).   
 
3.5.1.5. Group Identity 
 
Group identity has long been posited to foster faith in others (FIO).  Messick and 
Brewer (1983) and Van Lange et al. (1992) collected evidence from a series of 
studies that provided evidence for increased co-operation among in-group members.  
Most of these studies were done before the drive for mundane realism (as discussed 
earlier) and were thus laboratory and small group in nature.  Nevertheless, group 
identity was suggested to foster social ties, provide a sense of membership, generate 
conformity and sanction non-co-operators (Messick & Brewer, 1983).  These findings 
have been corroborated through later work, such as that of Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994); Dawes and Messick (2000); Biccheri (2002) and Baron (2001). 
 
Categorisation into a group does not have to be based on any deep seated 
difference; psychological group membership can be generated from what is termed 
the ‘minimal group paradigm’ (Biccheri, 2002).  This paradigm stemmed from Tajfel 
and later Turner and Brewer’s experiments where they found that group identity 
would form on the basis of random and meaningless criteria (in Biccheri, 2002).  The 
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minimum criteria for group formation was merely the recognition and acceptance of 
some self-defining social categorisation.  Selart and Eek (2005) found support for 
place identity, such as a neighbourhood, as a sufficient criterion for in-group 
perception.  Social threats, interaction, common fate, proximity, similarity and 
common goals (Messick & Brewer, 1983; Wiener, 1993; Biccheri, 2002) may help 
group cohesiveness, but not necessarily be requirements for group identification 
(Biccheri, 2002).   
 
If group membership is so easily made through social categorisation, what would the 
effect be on co-operation?  Turner’s self-categorisation theory explains group 
behaviour to be dependent on the definition and perception of the self (potentially 
quite different in individualistic and collectivistic societies) where a social and a 
personal identity are present (Biccheri, 2002).  People alternate between social and 
personal identities, oftentimes perceiving themselves primarily in terms of their 
relevant group membership, depending on the situation (Biccheri, 2002).  The more 
salient group membership becomes, the greater the tendency for co-operation to 
group actions and adherence to group norms, hence if the in-group are high users of 
a resource, an individual is likely to be so too (Biccheri, 2002).  Nevertheless, the 
same high users, when a resource was threatened, were the most restrained 
thereafter (Biccheri, 2002), thus obtaining group compliance can be relatively easy 
when groups are cohesive thanks to a shared identity. 
 
Not surprisingly, then, co-operation in groups has been found to be enhanced 
through a feeling of inclusiveness (De Cremer, 2002) and individuals were more 
likely to choose cooperative or defecting behaviour in a similar manner to individuals 
who were described as similar to themselves (Parks, Sanna & Berel, 2001).  Van 
Vugt, in two studies of water conservation in England, found that users were more 
restrained in their water use during a drought if they identified with (Van Vugt, 2001) 
and felt attached to their community (Van Vugt, 2002).  Moreover, De Cremer (2002) 
and Van Vugt (2002) both believed that their results would to some extent be due to 
the actors' need for belongingness.  The need for belongingness gains additional 
credence as the individuals in De Cremer’s (2002) study co-operated the most when 
they were afforded respect by the group who were the ones who had initially felt the 
least included.  
 
Groups are not always beneficial for societal co-operation; in-groups have been 
found to co-operate when the insider’s gain is the outsider’s loss (Baron, 2001).  
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People favour groups that include themselves, even at the expense of their own self-
interest – a tendency that has been termed parochialism, closely related to ‘in-group 
bias’ (Baron, 2001; Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994).  Dilemmas between groups are 
thus often found to be the most extreme (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Dawes & 
Messick 2000).  Baron (2001) even found that in-group co-operation was increased 
further if the out-group was harmed through the process.  So, the more people think 
of inter-group boundaries as arbitrary, the more they can direct their non-selfish 
concern towards the good of the society (Baron, 2001).  Thus, Baron (2001) 
suggests a means of managing negative group biases through informing members 
about the parochialism effect that can work contrary to their own self interest.  
Interestingly enough Triandis, in working with individualism and collectivism, found 
that the parochialism effect of Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was largely 
restricted to ‘vertical individualists’ (Baron, 2001).  Such vertical individualists 
reported that they valued both the pursuit of self interest and competition against 
others – creating a remarkable paradox that individuals who claimed to be self-
interested were extremely willing to sacrifice their self interest on behalf of the group 
(Baron, 2001). 
 
3.5.2. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) 
 
In line with the F function provided earlier (Figure 3, p.21), the perceived criticality of 
individual actions has long been thought important (Klandermans, 1992; Messick & 
Rutte, 1992; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002).  Authors, such as Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994) dispute the extent to which actions by individuals in large groups could 
be viewed as ‘critical’.  Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) advocate that in inter-group 
conflict individuals are more cooperative because they are more efficacious.  At an 
individual level, therefore, it is not criticalness of an individual’s cooperative choice, 
but the extent to which they perceive their actions to have an effect.  The larger 
groups become, the smaller this effect is seen to be; individuals see themselves as 
ineffective and thus do not co-operate (Klandermans, 1992).   
 
Else, if the criticality hypothesis holds, individuals establish if a minimal contributing 
set is present, that is, if there are sufficient co-operators in the population already, 
and see their choice not critical to the preservation of the resource, hence they free 
ride (Bornstein, 1992).  Free-riding was not a luxury of critical players in smaller 
groups (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002).  Individuals, who perceive their contributions 
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to be critical, demonstrated greater social responsibility (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 
2002).  
 
Liebrand et al. (1992, p.31) noted that ‘’people avoid futile actions’’, whether these 
actions come from a lack of co-operation of others, or, more personally, a lack of 
effectiveness of their own actions.  Hence the enduring academic interest in 
perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE).   Perceived consumer effectiveness has 
evolved from persistent findings in social dilemma research regarding the role of self-
efficacy and individual impact on social dilemmas (see for instance Kerr, 1992; 
Messick & Rutte, 1992; Kollock, 1998; Dawes & Messick, 2000; Rothstein, 2000).  
Perceived efficacy in these studies was defined as “the extent to which one believes 
that his or her own contributions help to achieve collective goals” (Van Lange et al., 
1992, p.18). 
 
As highlighted earlier, efficacy of actions in social dilemmas is decreased as group 
size increases (Kerr, 1992; De Cremer & Bakker, 2003), making efficacy a key 
variable in Resource Dilemma (RD) research.  Most economists and psychologists 
refer to the pioneering work of Kerr (1992) who viewed efficacy from a personal and 
collective perspective.  Kerr (1992) was one of the first to establish a clear link 
between cooperative behaviour and efficacy.  He also found a link between collective 
and individual efficacy: individuals who were more efficacious tended to believe that 
their groups would be too.   
 
Marketers were the ones to coin the term ‘perceived consumer effectiveness’ (PCE) 
and have studied this in relation to socially and environmentally conscious 
consumption since the 1970s (Ellen, Wiener & Cobb-Walgren, 1991).  Marketers 
“conceptualized and measured [PCE] as the extent to which the consumer believes 
that the efforts of an individual acting alone can make a difference” (Ellen, Wiener & 
Cobb-Walgren, 1991, p. 102).  Ellen et al. (1991) go further to note that: 
 
Perceived consumer effectiveness is defined as a domain-
specific belief that the effectiveness of the efforts of an individual 
can make a difference in the solution to a problem. PCE is 
related to the concept of perceived behavioral control, which has 
been studied by theorists in the areas of leamed helplessness, 
locus of control, and perceived control (p. 103) 
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Kerr (1992) was the first to conceptualise efficacy as a moderator in social dilemmas, 
as prior to this it was thought to be a cause of co-operation, with equivocal results.  
Kerr (1992) hypothesized that as the self-efficacy of co-operation declines, so should 
the effectiveness of the public good remedy.  This has indeed been found to be the 
case in Kerr’s own work as well as in the social marketing studies of Ellen et al. 
(1991) and Berger and Corbin (1992), who independently found PCE to be related to 
positive action in a number of pro-environmental behaviours.  PCE is not just centred 
on an individual’s ability to effect social change; the ability of the target audience to 
actually perform the pro-environmental behaviour required can also be a problem.  
Van Vugt et al. (1996) found that self efficacy beliefs around individual ability to 
'carpool' were low and led to the failure of a solution to a real-world social dilemma.  
Consequently, Van Vugt et al. (1996) stress that it is important for social marketers to 
know more about the proportion of people who believe they are not capable of 
performing the collectively desired action so as to anticipate their feelings of 
frustration and relative deprivation.   
 
PCE’s importance as a moderator has been underscored through the findings of Lord 
and Putrevu (1998) who noted different reactions to green advertising messages 
based on level of individual PCE.  The work of Sen et al. (2001) also found PCE to 
moderate between individuals’ cooperative behaviour and the impact of normative 
social influences.  More recently, Kim and Choi (2005) found that PCE acts as a 
moderator between green environmental purchase behaviour and collectivistic 
orientations: collectivistic subjects would only exhibit pro-environmental behaviours if 
they had a high degree of PCE.  Kim and Choi’s (2005) results discount Henry’s 
(2000) dissenting voice against PCE: Henry asserted that group commitment made 
self-efficacy irrelevant; indeed Henry’s own empirical findings were not conclusive 
and were carried out on a sample of American college students. 
 
3.5.3. Solutions to Social Dilemmas 
 
Many solutions have been proposed to solve social dilemmas.  Types of solutions fall 
within one of two categories: behavioural solutions or structural ones.  Behavioural 
solutions aim at encouraging individuals to co-operate, while structural resolutions 
seek to change the properties of the situation so that it is no longer a dilemma 
(Messick & Brewer, 1983).  Kollock (1998) subdivides behavioural solutions further 
into ‘motivational solutions’ and ‘strategic solutions’.  The perspective taken on 
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human actors is what differentiates between Kollock’s two behavioural solutions: 
motivational solutions accept a view of Ostrom’s bounded rationality with a strong 
social heuristic (a norms approach), while ‘strategic solutions’ are designed for actors 
who are egoistic, hence the self-interested ‘rational men’ of most economists.  In 
separating the two, Kollock is implicitly accepting that either perspective could have 
relevance depending on the actors, the situation or the history involved. 
 
Motivational and strategic solutions are behavioural ones as they focus on changing 
the individual rather than the environment.    Kollock (1998) views the two as similar 
because they both assume that the rules of the game cannot be changed and 
consequently focus on behaviour.  Structural solutions, conversely, alter the rules of 
the game so that the dilemma is modified or eliminated completely (Kollock, 1998). 
As evidenced at the beginning of this chapter, behavioural change is a key part of the 
definition of social marketing and thus the domain of behavioural solutions is where 
marketing has most impact.  Nevertheless, marketing interventions need not be 
restricted to behavioural solutions alone; they can also play a role in enhancing the 
acceptability of structural solutions. 
3.5.3.1. Behavioural Solutions 
 
Most behavioural solutions take their cue from the core payoff matrix (See Table 1, 
p.18), the type of dilemma and the variables found to be influential.   
3.5.3.2. Motivational Solutions 
Motivational solutions act on people who place some value on the outcomes of 
others (Kollock, 1998) rather than just their own.  Thus these solutions seek to 
manipulate the payoff matrix in terms of the social payoffs rather than the non-social 
payoffs (Hollander, 1990) or to increase the importance weight to the outcomes of 
others (Liebrand, Messick & Wilke, 1992).  Liebrand et al. (1992) provide the 
following value function, where Q is the outcome and W is the weight afforded: 
 
Equation 4: Subjective Weight Value Function 
Adapted from Liebrand et al. (1992) 
 
 QT = Ws * QSELF + Wo* QOTHERS 
 
Thus motivational solutions seek to change the weights or else the perceived 
outcomes received by self and other. 
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a) Communication 
Communication, especially face to face communication, has been found to have 
great impact on small group co-operation in a laboratory (Liebrand et al., 1992; Van 
Lange et al., 1992; Murnighan & King, 1992).  In the laboratory, communication has 
enabled group members to coordinate their behaviour, as well as to work out what 
constitutes a "minimal contributing set" described earlier (Bornstein, 1992).  
Discussion also enhances group identity and norms, thus the ‘promise keeping’ norm 
is enforced – an individual makes a promise to co-operate, and then feels he or she 
has to comply (Bornstein, 1992; Biccheri, 2002). Thus what has been termed “cheap 
talk” has been lauded as a possible solution to dilemmas in small groups (Ostrom, 
1998, p.6).  ‘Cheap talk’ is when actors in a dilemma are allowed to communicate 
about strategies to solve that dilemma.  Communication alone enables individuals to 
make conditional promises to one another and potentially build trust that would be 
reciprocated by others (Ostrom, 1998). 
 
Larger dilemmas with more actors present more of a problem.  Klandermans (1992) 
questions the power of persuasion in a large scale Resource Dilemma.  He notes the 
additional concern of stressing a problem may even lead to less PCE and thus lower 
co-operation (Klandermans, 1992).  A positive appeal may also be counterproductive 
if the audience reaches the conclusion that the minimal contributing set has been 
established and they can now free ride.  As Klandermans (1992, p.313) concludes: 
“too much optimism reduces motivation, but so does too much pessimism”.  Wiener 
and Doescher (1991) have a similar disquiet and deal with it in terms of message 
framing (see point b) below). 
 
Rosen and Haaga (1998) argue that persuasive appeals could be effectively used 
amongst large groups. They empirically tested the influence of Petty and Cacioppo’s 
Elaboration Likelihood Model on inducement to co-operate.  In the model, individuals 
are viewed as differing in the ways messages are processed; some focus on 
message arguments and have a central route processing dominance, while others 
rely on more superficial cues (such as visual aids or emotional appeals) and have a 
peripheral route processing dominance (Arnould, Price & Zinkhan, 2002). High 
involvement decisions often follow the central route, while low involvement ones are 
processed peripherally (Arnould, Price & Zinkhan, 2002).  Rosen and Haaga’s (1998) 
results indeed were in line with the model's predictions and the peripheral route 
message seemed to increase cooperative attitudes the most, surprisingly amongst 
those high in the need for cognition.  The success of the peripheral route suggests 
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that conservation is indeed of low involvement and should be approached through 
appeals using the peripheral route.  
b) Message frames  
Framing was noted above as playing a crucial role in willingness to co-operate in a 
dilemma.  To reiterate, as individuals are more averse to potential losses rather than 
gains, they are more likely to co-operate when a dilemma is presented as a resource 
rather than a public goods dilemma (Liebrand et al., 1992; Sell et al., 2002). 
 
Framing is more than Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) losses and gains.  It also 
refers to the positively and negatively framed messages that Lord and Putrevu (1998) 
used in their study.  Sen et al. (2001) found positive or negative message frame to 
moderate the effect of FIO.  In marketing these are often termed ‘well-baby’ and 
‘starving baby’ appeals (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  Klandermans (1992) notes that 
framing can also be both diagnostic (identifying problems) and prognostic 
(suggesting solutions) as well, and both need to be done to motivate individuals.  He 
stressed that framing needs to be done with the target population in mind and the 
extent to which the proposed behaviour is in line with its values.  Wiener and 
Doescher (1991) considered each of the barriers to co-operation possible in a social 
dilemma (see column 1 of Table 2 overleaf) and suggested that an appropriate 
message appeals to be used in each instance. 
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Table 2: Message Frames – Overcoming the barriers to co-operation  
Source: Wiener & Doescher (1991, p.43) 
c) Group Identity 
Group identity, noted earlier, could play a role in fostering co-operation, as people 
are more likely to comply with like-others with whom they are grouped.  Indeed, very 
little is required for group identity to be fostered (Biccheri, 2002).  Van Vugt (2001) 
found this to hold in non-laboratory settings in the conservation of water. 
 
Nevertheless, large groups are hard pressed to establish common identity as 
membership is often diffuse and without personal contact. Many researchers have 
thus stressed the need for the market to be broken down into smaller groups 
(Klandermans, 1992; Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  Market segmentation is the 
common tool with which social marketers can affect this (Wiener & Doescher 1994).  
Alternatively, small community membership can be stressed and co-operation by 
neighbourhood combined action could be achieved, as Selart and Eek (2005) found. 
d) Social Capital 
Part of social capital is trust and group norms of co-operation (Rothstein, 2000; 
Ostrom, 1998).  Any effort to enhance the overall social capital in a society would 
make co-operation in response to any particular dilemma easier.  This would be 
particularly valuable for societies such as Russia, as Rothstein noted (see under 
Trust in Others as Social Capital, p.42). 
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e) Social Orientation 
Social value orientation, that is, whether people are altruists (maximise the outcomes 
of others), competitors (maximise the relative difference between self and partner) or 
individualists (maximise own outcome without any regard for the outcome of others) 
has been extensively studied in social dilemma theory (Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998) 
and it is the closest social dilemma theory has come to account for the underlying 
influences of individualism and collectivism (see Chapter 4).  Kollock’s (1998) 
assertion that no actual mechanisms have been developed by which social value 
orientations form part of interventions in a social dilemma underlines the need for a 
review of social value orientations in Chapter 4.    
 
3.5.3.3. Strategic Solutions 
 
a) Reciprocity 
Axelrod (1984, p.110) outlined the clear implications for small numbers of players to 
interact successfully: 
• Don’t be envious 
• Don’t be the first to defect 
• Reciprocate both co-operation and defection (successful interaction 
requires a degree of reprimand) 
• Don’t be too clever 
 
While Axelrod’s directives may help individuals, group reciprocity, as evidenced from 
the discussion above, is best served through norms and heuristics.  Kollock (1998) 
and Ostrom (1998) found norms around group behaviour to be a promising avenue 
for interventions.  Alternatively, co-operation could be generated in small 
communities, where the interaction of all the players with each other could be 
effected (Selart & Eek, 2005). 
b) Increasing choices  
Komorita and Lapworth (1982) was the only study in the literature that reviewed the 
possibility of introducing a third, intermediate choice between the absolutes of co-
operation and defection.  Providing individuals with a compromise option was found 
to be most effective in starting slow negotiations towards an acceptable compromise. 
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c) Ownership  
Bryan (2004) opens up a new avenue for prevailing over self-interest driven parties: 
foster a sense of ownership of the problem.  In a sense this echoes Ostrom’s (1998) 
call for greater citizen participation and, correspondingly, more social capital.  Shared 
ownership would then transform Equation 4, p.48 from the self/other dichotomy to a 
focus on overall outcomes.  Shared ownership solution differs from actual ownership 
(privatisation), which falls under the realm of structural solutions. 
 
Ownership of actions was found to be more prevalent if actions were visible (De 
Cremer & De Witte, 2002).  McKenzie-Mohr (2000a) used this to great effect in 
inducing co-operation for a neighbourhood recycling scheme when households had 
to place their recycling bins on the curb where all could see who was co-operating.  
The greater number of bins visible on the pavement, increased the likelihood that a 
non-cooperating house would recycle in order for their bin to be placed visibly on the 
sidewalk. 
d) Reward schemes  
Rewards for co-operation were criticised by Dawes (1980) as attempts to design 
away the dilemma rather than solving it.  Rewards change the pay-off structure and 
thus increase individual gain, eliminating the ‘social dilemma’.  In essence individuals 
receive extrinsic, non-social rewards for co-operation.  Nonetheless, Parks (2000) 
found reward schemas to induce high rates of co-operation that were maintained 
across a number of behavioural trials.  Reward schemes, however, were more 
effective if they were competitive and performance based and completely ineffective 
if participants were rewarded for simply taking part in a group (Parks, 2000). 
3.5.3.4. Structural Solutions 
 
Structural solutions were termed by Hardin to be “mutual coercion, mutually agreed 
upon” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247) and generally involve rules and regulations.  Dawes 
(1980) views these solutions to be essentially the same as Hobbes’ (1661 in Dawes, 
1980) authoritarian Leviathan state.  Ostrom (1998) prefers the workings of non-
authoritarian social capital.  Nevertheless, certain situations call for institutional 
coercion; indeed some individuals trapped in a dilemma may even request such 
intervention (Chipp and Morton-McKay, 2002).  Certainly, the imposition of structural 
solutions require additional costs to be met – the provision of a monitoring system 
was viewed as inefficient by Dawes (1980). 
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a) Temporary structural changes 
Not all structural changes need to be permanent to be used.  Van Vugt et al. (1996) 
and Fujii et al. (2001) both studied the imposition of a structural solution on a 
temporary basis: Van Vugt et al. (1996) investigated the obligation of a 'carpool' lane 
in Europe, while Fujii et al. (2001) looked at the reactions of drivers’ use of public 
transport during a freeway closure.  Both studies found the temporary structural 
intervention to vary in effectiveness, in fact, Van Vugt et al. (1996) reported that 
participants de-emphasised positive aspects of 'carpooling', while stressing the 
negative aspects of the structural solution.  Fujii et al. (2001) found that frequency of 
switching to public transport during the road closure was inversely related to the 
frequency of automobile driving before the closure.  On a positive note, Fujii et al.’s 
Japanese drivers who overestimated the additional time involved in public transport 
were more likely to change their perspective and continued to use this mode after the 
road closure was over (Fujii et al., 2001).  It is interesting to note that each of these 
studies was conducted in a different cultural system (Japan and the UK) and both 
had markedly different results. 
b) Sanctioning system  
The employment of a sanctioning system was shown in the discussion on trust to be 
favoured by those low in this attribute (Yamagishi, 1992; Ostrom, 1998).  In fact, low 
trusters were willing to contribute to the secondary level PG dilemma that such a 
system would create.  Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002, 2003) found that low income 
consumers expressed preference for a sanctioning system for non-payment of water 
service.  Not all consumers, however, favour a sanctioning system.  Ostrom (1998) 
noted that often sanctioning systems have the counter-intuitive result of making 
individuals become less trustworthy because they feel that they are not trusted.  The 
careful marketing of a sanctioning system presents a means to overcome this 
problem (Wiener & Doescher, 1991).  Nevertheless, payment for and the 
effectiveness of a sanctioning system stands as secondary dilemmas that need to be 
solved (Ostrom, 1998). 
c) Leaders 
Decisions regarding a shared response can be abdicated to a leader in order to solve 
the crisis (Ostrom, 1998).  When viewed from a social capital perspective, such 
leaders should foster vertical trust, as Rothstein (2000) noted.  Leaders though are 
generally not the preferred type of structural intervention (Kollock, 1998).  There is 
also the risk that any non-co-operative behaviour on the part of any leader would 
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lead to a decrease in social capital and correspondingly co-operation amongst the 
population at large.   
d) Privatisation  
One of the preconditions of social dilemmas is that of "nonexcludability".  
Privatisation seeks to change this through the imposition of boundaries (Kollock, 
1998).  Either authorities regulate who has access to the commons, how people 
withdraw from the commons, or ownership of the commons itself (Kollock, 1998; Van 
Vugt, 1997).  Thus the tragedy of the commons is curtailed because it is no longer a 
‘commons’.  Hardin (1968) himself advocated this as the best solution. 
 
Van Vugt (1997) studied the impact of social value orientation (pro-socials, pro-selfs 
and competitive individuals) on privatisation of a public good.  Overall, Van Vugt 
(1997) found that people were concerned more about the collective implications of 
universal access to the good than increased payments – a reference to the ‘equal 
final outcomes rule’ mentioned earlier (Sell et al., 2002).  Social value orientation was 
meaningfully related to the perception and response of the privatisation.  Surprisingly, 
pro-socials proved to be unexpectedly sensitive to the transition costs to the private 
system (Van Vugt, 1997).  Van Vugt (1997) concluded that success of privatisation 
systems would depend on minimising implementation costs and maximising 
individual and societal benefits.  Not all goods can be privatised and new questions 
regarding social justice arise: who gets the newly privatised commons and how are 
portions allocated (Kollock, 1998)?  Moreover, there has been some contention that 
‘tragedies of enclosure’ could occur, as individuals routinely neglect their own 
property (Kollock, 1998).  Ostrom (1998) opted for a third route: local regulation of 
access and use of the commons by those who use and have local knowledge of the 
resource.  But this option is often not available for all resources, especially municipal 
water in a large city. 
 
3.6. Marketing Applications and Relevance to Water 
Conservation 
 
Wiener and Doescher (1991) were the first marketers to identify and expand social 
dilemma theory as a vast potential source for successful social marketing strategies.  
Until their seminal paper, social dilemma theory rested largely within the domains of 
psychology and economics, and studies focussed on small group research.  They 
and the few others who followed their work, went on to establish in the decade that 
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followed the validity of this theory and the marketing strategies they derived from its 
premises.  Social marketers have successfully applied this theory to public goods, 
such as utilities (Wiener & Doescher 1994), consumer boycotts (Sen et al., 2001) and 
pro-environmental behaviour (Kim & Choi 2005).   
 
It has generally been the overwhelming experience of social marketers that, despite 
large informational campaigns, attitudinal change does occur but very little 
behavioural change is effected (see for example Rothschild, 1979; Ritchie & 
McDougall, 1985).  Social marketers have spent considerable time investigating why 
this is so and how marketing strategies should be amended to increase their impact 
on actual behaviour.  Wiener and Doescher (1991) highlight the main problems with 
social marketing efforts aimed at achieving community rather than individual good: 
firstly, the low involvement barrier as consumers are not highly involved with the 
product or resource (such as energy and water consumption) and, secondly, the low 
benefit-cost ratio of the actions needed to preserve or achieve the community good.   
 
Water conservation is faced with both of these problems.  Water is readily available 
and very little (if any) consumer decision making is involved in its consumption.  
Furthermore, attempts at water conservation will inconvenience consumers and often 
extract additional monetary costs (such as retrofitting shower heads, repair leaks or 
drips, washing the car less often and changing toilet flush mechanisms) (Trumbo & 
O’Keefe, 2001).  Wiener and Doescher (1991) encapsulate such problems in terms 
of social dilemma theory:  In a social dilemma, the person who contributes to the 
overall good receives fewer personal benefits than one who does not (Dawes, 1980).  
Thus the key concern in a social dilemma is gaining the widespread co-operation of a 
large number of consumers, who may or may not belong to the same membership 
group (Ellen et al., 1991; Wiener & Doescher, 1991; 1994; Wiener, 1993; McCarthy & 
Hagan, 1998; Sen et al., 2001; Dawes & Messick, 2000). 
 
3.7. Chapter Summary 
 
The current chapter dealt with defining social dilemmas and outlining their key 
components.  This was done initially through an initial review of the rational man 
versus the social man perspectives of different researchers and an investigation of 
the payoff matrix involved.  The payoff matrix indicated that there are four possible 
outcomes from individual choice in a social dilemma: both co-operate (CC); the 
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individual co-operates while the other defects (CD) – the sucker payoff; the other co-
operates while the individual defects (DC) – the free rider and both defect (DD).  
Various combinations of these outcomes determine the type of two-person dilemma, 
whether it be the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a Chicken Game, an Assurance Game, 
an Altruist’s Dilemma or a Privileged Game. 
 
While two person dilemmas have been important to understand the dynamics 
involved in social conflicts, N-Person dilemmas have more real-world application.  
Two N-Person dilemmas were outlined: the Public Goods and the Resource 
Dilemma.  The characteristics of each were discussed.  Water conservation falls 
squarely into the latter type.   
 
Influential variables were then reviewed.  The most important of which were belief in 
the co-operation of others, termed Faith in Others (FIO), and perceived consumer 
effectiveness (PCE).  The applications of these variables for real-world social 
dilemmas were discussed.  The chapter then concluded with a review of possible 
solutions to social dilemmas, including a reflection on marketing’s contribution. 
 
In Chapter 4, the underlying dimensions of individualism and collectivism are 
discussed and their implications for social dilemma theory are delineated. 
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4. Chapter 4: Individualism and Collectivism 
 
 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter deals with the role of individualism and collectivism in social co-
operation.  First the concepts individualism and collectivism are defined.  The 
definition includes the terms used for an individual rather than a societal level of 
analysis, idiocentrism and allocentrism.  Next Triandis’ sub-dimensions of horizontal 
and vertical individualism and collectivism are discussed.  The characteristics of the 
two concepts are then reviewed followed by a reflection of the origins of these in 
ecology.  Next, the contribution of the two dimensions to social dilemma research is 
presented.  This is then followed by a review of the use of the concepts in marketing 
in general and social marketing in particular. 
 
4.2. Individualism and Collectivism Defined 
 
The roots of individualism and collectivism are very deep and lie across many 
disciplines (Triandis, 1989).  Individualism has been defined as “a belief that the 
individual is an end in himself, and as such ought to realize his ‘self’ and cultivate his 
own judgement, notwithstanding the weight of pervasive social pressures in the 
direction of conformity" (Gould & Kolb, 1964 in Triandis, 1989, p.52).  In opposition, 
collectivism places greater emphasis on: 
• the views, needs and goals of the ingroup rather than 
oneself  
• social norms and duty defined by the ingroup rather than 
behavior to get pleasure 
• beliefs shared by the ingroup rather than beliefs that 
distinguish self from the ingroup; and 
• great readiness to cooperate with ingroup members 
(Triandis, 1989, p.52) 
 
Toennies (1957 in Triandis, 1989) contrasted Gemeinschaft (more collectivistic) with 
Gesellschaft (more individualistic).  Individualism and collectivism are accordingly 
terms used to describe the relationship between individuals and society.  Generally 
these terms are viewed as polarities on a single axis for a society and separate axes 
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for individuals (Triandis, 1995; Earley & Gibson, 1998; Triandis, 2001; Triandis & 
Suh, 2002).  At an individual level of analysis the terms used are altered to allocentric 
(personal collectivism) and idiocentric (personal individualism). It is possible for 
individuals to be high or low on both constructs (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Individualism 
and collectivism can then be summated as the way in which individuals relate to 
themselves, their groups and the interaction between the two.  The pattern of 
responses that individuals display when relating to their groups demonstrates their 
degree of each dimension (Earley & Gibson, 1998). 
 
Each dimension describes a self- versus collectivity-orientation on the part of the 
individual (Earley & Gibson, 1998).  These orientations govern what actions are 
permissible under various settings.  A self-orientation entails that individuals are free 
to pursue private interests, whereas a collective-orientation demands that the 
interests and values of the collectivity are taken into account (Earley & Gibson, 
1998).  
 
4.2.1. Self/Other Priorities 
 
Thus, these orientations have been viewed as the extent to which personal goals 
overlap with that of collectives (Triandis, 1989).  Under Individualism it is considered 
acceptable for individualists to place personal goals ahead of collective goals; when 
a conflict arises between the two sets of goals, the ‘natural’ or expected choice is for 
the self (Triandis, 1989).  Collectivists, conversely, place greater precedence to the 
goals of the collective and, should any conflict between personal and group goals 
arise, collective goals override those of the individual (Triandis, 1995).  When the 
discussion of individual choice (outlined in Chapter 3, p.18) is viewed in the light of 
these orientations, the economists' perspective is revealed as very idiocentric: it is 
assumed that individuals will prioritise self interest. Thus the core payoff matrix (see 
p.18) does not account for the value of self/other priorities and the subjective weight 
function must be modified to include idiocentrism/allocentrism thus: 
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Equation 5: Subjective Weight Value Function Under Allocentrism/Idiocentrism 
 
 QT = IC (Ws * QSELF) + AC (Wo* QOTHERS) 
 
Where:  Q = Outcome 
 W = Weight 
 IC = Idiocentric orientation  
 AC = Allocentric orientation 
 
Yamaguchi (1994 in Voronov & Singer, 2002), while agreeing that collectivist 
individuals are more other orientated, disputed the belief that this is not related to self 
interest, stating that: 
Individuals may temporarily sacrifice their self-interest for the 
group so long as they can expect rewards from the group in 
the long run.  The expectation of punishment by group 
members can also motivate an individual to abandon personal 
goals in favor of those of the group.’ (p.464) 
 
Yamaguchi’s contention that collectivists (or allocentrics) are still self-interested adds 
the dimension of relationships and future payoffs into the discussion.  Much of the 
debate regarding the conceptualisation of the individual in social dilemmas stemmed 
from the notion of ‘rational man’ (see Chapter 3, p.17).  Ostrom (1998) debated the 
extent to which man could be rational, given that he lived in a bounded world; he was 
subject to cultural norms and he had to deal with continued interaction with group 
members.  The inclusion, therefore, of idiocentrism/allocentrism in the debate allows 
for rationality, social relationships, and continued interactions with others, what 
Axelrod termed the ‘shadow of the future’ (1984, p.124). 
 
4.2.2. Two Dimensions 
 
At an individual level, tendencies towards both orientations are present.  Brewer 
(1991) described this best through her Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, where all 
individuals across all cultures wish to be both similar to, and different from, an in-
group.  Should individuals feel included, their need for assimilation would be minimal; 
if they feel excluded, this need is maximal (Brewer, 1991).  Hence the hugely positive 
cooperative response De Cremer (2002) uncovered when he investigated the 
influence of inclusion on the co-operation of community members who had been 
previously peripheral to the group.   
 
- 60 - 
These two dimensions to some extent mimic the processes of allocentrism and 
idiocentrism.  Triandis (1995) extrapolated the implications of Brewer’s Theory to the 
dimensions of individualism/collectivism.  He thus concluded that in collectivist 
cultures the optimal distinctiveness point is close to the high-inclusiveness pole; 
whereas in individualist cultures this point is near to the low-inclusiveness pole.  
Triandis’ elaboration of Brewer’s Theory to individualism/collectivism is demonstrated 
in Figure 6, below.  Figure 6 demonstrates that Triandis suggested that individualists 
have a sharp gradient for differentiation and a flat gradient for assimilation and the 
opposite holds for collectivists.  Individuals, therefore, vary on both the degree to 
which they desire assimilation into the group (allocentrism) and the degree to which 
they wish to be separate (idiocentrism).  Hence the inclusion of both IC and AC in 
Equation 5 as these constructs affect all actors.  Furthermore, Triandis’ conclusion 
here regarding the slopes of each function provides a strong indication of the relative 
values of IC and AC in Equation 5 (see p.60).  Just as individuals can hold different 
values on the individualist/collectivist dimensions, societies are an accumulation of 
such more idiocentric or allocentric individuals and can thus contain a mix of the two 
orientations (Triandis, 1995).  South Africa contains a wide variety of both (Eaton & 
Louw, 2000; Corder, 2001). 
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Individualist 
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Figure 6: Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and Individualism and Collectivism 
Source: Triandis (1995, p.11) 
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 4.2.3. Vertical and Horizontal 
 
When Hofstede revitalised interest in individualism/collectivism in management 
studies in 1980 (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Kim & Choi, 2005), he did so in an 
international study of 117, 000 protocols IBM had collected from their employees 
(Triandis, 1995).  A factor analysis revealed four key factors: power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity (Triandis, 1995).  Power 
distance refers to the shared view amongst people that those who are at the top of 
the social structure are very different from those at the bottom (Triandis, 1995).  In 
societies with large power distance, the social hierarchy is very pronounced.  The 
most dominant factors in Hofestede’s study were power distance and individualism.  
When Brewer’s Theory and individualism/collectivism are taken in conjunction with 
power distance, the rationale for Triandis’ (1995) distinction of a Vertical and 
Horizontal dimension becomes clear.  Collectivists or individualists can be either 
vertical or horizontal in their orientation, depending on their value of power distance 
(Chiou, 2001).  Horizontal orientation emphasises equality, while vertical orientation 
stresses hierarchy (Chiou, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002).  In horizontal patterns, one’s 
self is approximately equal to all other selves; in vertical patterns, one’s self is not 
equal to other selves (Chiou, 2001).  Four types result: vertical individualism, 
horizontal individualism, vertical collectivism and horizontal collectivism. 
 
Horizontal collectivists merge with in-groups (for example, family, tribe and nation); 
the well-being of these groups is important to them, but they do not feel subordinate 
to those groups (Chiou, 2001).  Horizontal collectivists emphasise empathy, 
sociability and co-operation (Triandis & Suh, 2002).  They would not approve of 
differential compensation and they have no need to be distinct from their in-group 
(Triandis, 1995).  An Israeli kibbutz is seen to exemplify horizontal collectivism 
(Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Horizontal individualists stress self reliance; they do not like 
to ‘stand out’, that is be unique and conspicuous (Triandis, 1995).  Sweden and 
Australia are often held as examples of horizontal individualism.  Australians refer to 
this as the ‘tall poppy’ syndrome: those who stand out in society need to be cut down 
to size.  Sweden has received higher rankings of this attribute than Australia; in 
Sweden the elderly do not live with their children (to do so would be to be 
dependent), they take their own sheets when staying overnight at a friend’s and they 
would like to live as they please (Triandis, 1995), all signifying an individualist 
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orientation.  Swedes, nevertheless, do not desire to be distinctive or have high 
status: traits of horizontalism (Triandis, 1995). 
 
Vertical cultures are traditionalist; they emphasise in-group cohesion and respect for 
norms and authorities.  They have further been found to have a correlation with right 
wing authoritarianism, the tendency to submit to authority and sanction 
conventionalism (Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Vertical collectivists submit to the norms of 
their in-groups and are willing to sacrifice their personal identity for those groups 
(Chiou, 2001).  Vertical collectivism, along with right wing authoritarianism, has been 
observed to be positively correlated with age and religiosity and negatively correlated 
with education and diversity (Triandis & Suh, 2002).  India is an example of vertical 
collectivism. 
 
The United States of America (USA) has been noted as high on vertical individualism 
(Triandis, 1995; Chiou, 2001).  Americans have been found to be offended when told 
they are ‘average’ and they desire status, both of which are indicative of verticality 
and individualism (Triandis, 1995).  There are large socio-economic inequalities in 
the USA which the bulk of the population is unwilling to address through taxation, 
unlike the Swedes who pay up to 70% tax to distribute wealth and foster equality 
(Triandis, 1995).  Americans have a great respect for authority, as 65% of the 
American sample obeyed the distasteful instructions in Milgram’s experiments to 
harm others as opposed to only 40% in Australia (Kilham & Mann, 1974 in Triandis, 
1995).  Power distance is conventionally associated with collectivism (Triandis, 1989; 
Midgley & Tang, 2002), however the vertical dimension accounts for the presence of 
this factor in individualistic nations, such as America.  Characteristics of each cultural 
type are discussed in the section of that title below (see p.64). 
 
4.2.4. Dynamic Nature of Individualism/Collectivism in Cultures 
 
Culture is not static.  Levels of individualism/collectivism and their corresponding 
allocentrism/idiocentrism both wax and wane in populations.  Many Chinese and 
Japanese researchers note greater mixing of the two types in their own populations 
and movements towards one axis over another according to social and economic 
change (Kurosawa, 1992; Chiou, 2001; Midgley & Tang, 2002).  Likewise, there may 
be periods in an individual’s life where he or she has greater desire for and places 
emphasis on allocentrism over idiocentrism and vice versa.  The section on Ecology 
below provides some discussion of how this may come about (see p.68). 
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 Moreover, the components within individualism or collectivism change over time.  
The individualism of Plato’s Republic was far more paternalistic and collectivistic than 
the Greek Sophists of the same time (Triandis, 1995).  The Sophists followed the 
Machiavellian ‘any means to success is good’ and charged high fees for training 
young men to be successful; Plato viewed this as immoral and thought one should 
adhere to truth at all costs, even if it meant failure. Plato also included place for his 
philosopher kings in his Republic; figures not unlike the in-group authorities found in 
collectivism (Triandis, 1995).   
 
De Tocqueville, the 19th century social theorist who coined the term ‘individualism’, 
voiced a concern that the democratic individualism he applauded in the USA and saw 
in embryonic form in France after the revolution, had within it the potential to turn into 
‘narcissistic individualism’ (Watson & Morris, 2001).  De Tocqueville warned of 
selfishness that was “a passionate and exaggerated love of the self, which leads man 
to connect everything with himself and to prefer himself to everything in the world” 
(Tocqueville 1840/1945b in Watson & Morris, 2001, p.264).  Thus De Tocqueville 
distinguished between different types of individualism and wondered where unbridled 
individualism may lead.  He stressed that the principle of self interest had to be rightly 
understood and believed that women were instrumental in maintaining morality as 
they traditionally have greater focus on relationships and others (Watson & Morris, 
2001).  Triandis (1995) concluded thus that neither undiluted individualism nor 
undiluted collectivism is good for society. 
 
4.3. Characteristics of Individualism/Collectivism 
 
The polarities of individualism/collectivism have a well established associated set of 
characteristics that have been associated with each over time.  Many of these 
(summated in Table 3, p.67) can be conceptualised in terms of:  
• Role and power of the individual 
• Role and power of the group 
• Status and role of the in-group 
• Cultural looseness/tightness 
• Cultural complexity/cultural simplicity 
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Collectivist cultures afford very little power to individuals, thus people in collectivist 
societies have been reported to have low self-esteem and personal efficacy, but high 
group efficacy (Triandis, 1995; 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Collectivist roles are 
clearly defined in terms of the situation or context, so there is a split between public 
and private selves; furthermore, the self is seen as malleable and adaptive to 
situation (Triandis, 1995, 2001).  Lying is not interpreted as negative in collectivist 
cultures, provided that the social context calls for it in order for the other party to save 
face or to preserve the harmony of the group (Triandis, 1995, 2001; Leung, Au, 
Fernándes-Dols & Iwawaki, 1992).  Head-on conflict is to be avoided (Leung et al., 
1992).  Collectivism has a strong correlation with outer-directedness, where the locus 
of control is external (Triandis, 2001).  People high in allocentrism tend to have low 
self esteem (associated with ‘getting along’ rather than ‘getting ahead’), high 
embarrassment; high in agreeableness; pay attention to context over language and 
emphasise morality (community and divinity) (Hart & Poole, 2001; Koole, Jager, Van 
Den Berg, Vlek & Hofstee, 2001; Triandis, 2001).  Collectivists or allocentrics are 
motivated by receptivity to others and restraint of own needs and prefer the division 
of resources to be done on an equitable rather than an equity basis (Triandis, 2001). 
 
Individualism, conversely, affords more power and importance on the individual; 
hence these cultures tend to be inner-directed with an internal locus of control 
(Triandis, 1989, 1995, 2001; Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Along with a strong focus on the 
individual, that individual is seen to have enduring personal traits that remain 
consistent whatever the situation.  Thus individualists seek consistency between 
public and private selves (Triandis, 1995, 2001).  Situations and groups can be 
changed, not the self; hence when things are going poorly in a work environment, 
individualists are more likely to change the environment than themselves (Triandis, 
1995; Earley & Gibson, 1998; Gómez, Kirkman & Shapiro, 2000).  Correspondingly, it 
is important for the consistent self to be truthful (Leung et al., 1992; Triandis, 1995).  
Individualists or idiocentrics have high self esteem and normlessness; they pay more 
attention to language rather than context; they are motivated by their own needs, 
rights and capacities and prefer equity based division of resources to that of equality 
(Triandis, 1995).  Some Chinese theorists have criticised individualists for paying too 
much attention to the rights of man rather than his obligations and duties (Voronov & 
Singer, 2002). 
 
Cultures that are collectivist in nature tend to be tight, a term defined as the extent 
members of a culture agree on firstly, what actions are correct; secondly, deviation 
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from such actions is allowed and thirdly the degree and magnitude to which 
divergence from accepted actions is sanctioned (Triandis, 1995; Chan, Gelfand, 
Triandis & Tzeng, 1996).  The tightness found in collectivistic cultures is reflected in 
the lower crime rates, lower delinquencies and lower substance abuse figures 
(Triandis, 1995).  While collectivist cultures are viewed as high on tightness, they are 
seen as generally low on complexity.  Complexity, often crudely ascertained through 
the gross national product per capita (GDP/cap) (Triandis, 1995), measures the 
heterogeneity of the economic and ethnic composition of a population.  Thus lower 
income countries, rural areas, homogeneous and older populations tend to be less 
complex and more collectivistic, an inference supported by data gathered by Triandis 
(1989, 1995, 2001) and Corder (2001). 
 
Individualistic cultures tend to be loose and complex (Triandis, 1995).  These cultures 
are heterogeneous with often multiple and conflicting norms about behaviour, and 
punishment does not necessarily follow deviation (Triandis, 1995).  Individuals are 
presented with a large number of choices that they must make on a personal level.  
Increasing affluence generally provides greater choice and societal heterogeneity 
(Earley & Gibson, 1998).  Poor people tend not to have a great deal of choice; hence 
the correlation between GDP and complexity.  Triandis provides evidence that warm 
climates tend to be loose and cold tend to be tight; deviation from norms in very cold 
climates could mean frostbite or death.  Theorists have conjectured that greater 
control of self may result from tightness, hence the lower homicide but higher suicide 
rates (Triandis, 1995).  While tightness is associated with law and order, looseness is 
associated with creativity; hence tighter and thus more collectivistic cultures have 
greater respect for authority and norms and thus have less crime, but they pay the 
price in creativeness. 
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  Individualism/Idiocentric Collectivism/Allocentric 
Unit of Analysis Individual Group 
Values  
Self-reliance 
Competitiveness 
Aggressive creativity 
Accomplishment  
Enjoyment of life/happiness 
Exciting and varied life 
Insecurity 
Large military expenditures  
Prejudice towards racial and religious 
groups  
Assertive  
Internal locus of control 
Personal achievement  
Emotions as strong predictors of 
satisfaction 
Reciprocity  
Pro-social  
Restricted conformity 
Self-discipline 
Obligation 
Harmony 
Low creativity 
Security 
Duty; Tradition 
Dependence  
Attentive  
Obedience to authority 
External locus of control 
Social norms as strong predictors of 
satisfaction 
Emotional 
Drives 
Guilt 
Libido (sexual activity) 
Shame 
Filial piety 
Performing one’s duty - Proper action  
Imperatives 
Conquer frontiers 
Make the world adopt one’s own 
religion and political system; 
Dominate others or things (such as 
pets or possessions) 
Cultivate own habitat 
Emphasis Self-interest Logic 
Proper Relationships 
Holistic thinking 
Societal 
Economic Basis 
Hunting, gathering, fishing, foraging, 
trading Agricultural; not much trade 
Child rearing Children encouraged to be adults as soon as possible 
Children allowed to be adults at their own 
pace 
Use of Property Self-glorification Good of the group 
In-Groups 
Many; easy to enter and exit; 
impermanent; weak attachment; 
extensive skills for entering new 
groups 
Few; difficult to enter and exit; 
longstanding/permanent; usually from birth, 
right or marriage; Hostile towards out-
groups; strong attachment; in-groups 
provide protection 
Self Construct 
Independent  self 
Seek consistent self in all occasions 
and situations 
Self is based on long term 
dispositional traits; self is fixed, 
environment is changeable  
Interdependent self 
Public self separate from private self 
Self is based on situation or context 
Environment is fixed; self is malleable  
Age  Focus on youth; reverence for individual birthdays 
Focus on old; particular reverence for 
ancestors 
Communication   
Direct, use of word ‘I’;  
Take pride in honesty, ‘speaking 
one’s mind’ 
Indirect, face-saving; use of word ‘we’;  
Lies accepted 
Societal 
development Economically successful; high GDP Economically unsuccessful; low GDP 
Societal 
pathologies 
High rates of homicide, suicide, crime, 
delinquency, divorce, drug abuse, 
abuse of women and children; poor 
mental health 
Low homicide, high suicide, Excessive 
demands of families; can classify all others 
as out-groups 
Time perspective Short term Long term 
Table 3: Comparison of Core Attributes of Individualism and Collectivism 
Source: Constructed from Triandis (1989) and Triandis & Suh (2002) 
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4.3.1. Role of the In-group 
 
The role of the in-group plays a distinct difference in collectivist and individualist 
societies.  In-groups are defined as membership groups about whose welfare an 
individual is concerned (Triandis, 1995).  These groups are usually characterised by 
similarities among the members and individuals have a sense of common fate 
(Earley & Gibson, 1998).  Clear out-groups are viewed as competition for resources; 
a threat in some way, or as possessing different values (Triandis, 1995).  Collectivists 
react more negatively towards out-groups; thus they are often more ethnocentric 
(Triandis, 2001).  A common threat or shared fate increases levels of allocentrism.  
As noted in Table 3, p.67, allocentrics belong to fewer in-groups but are more tightly 
bound to them; idiocentrics belong to many groups yet these tend to be impermanent 
and loosely bound (Triandis & Suh, 2002).  Allocentrics prioritise in-groups and will 
often inflict harm on out-groups when faced with conflict (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 
1994; Dawes & Messick, 2000) 
4.4. Ecology 
 
“[C]ulture is to society what memory is to individuals” (Kluckhohn, 1954 in Triandis & 
Suh, 2002, p. 135) thus culture is the result of a group's collective historical 
experience of their environment.  Cultures develop conventions for sampling 
information from the environment and determine how much to weight the sampled 
elements to the population (Triandis, 1989).  Hence the amalgamation of these 
conventions are a reflection of a group’s: firstly, ecology (terrain, climate, flora and 
fauna and natural resources) and secondly, the maintenance system (subsistence 
and settlement patterns, social structures and means of production) that they have 
had over time (Triandis & Suh, 2002). 
 
As societies move from nomadic to agricultural to industrial and then information, a 
corresponding movement in their levels of collectivism/ individualism is evidenced 
(see Figure 7, p.69). Triandis (1989) performed a factor analysis on Mead’s 
anthropological data, where he discovered that the primitive societies that were 
hunter-gatherers were some of the poorest.  Nevertheless, they possessed many of 
the characteristics that would make for good individualists, as hunters are largely 
independent; operate in open environments where they must make their own choices 
amongst many options (Triandis, 1989; Triandis & Suh, 2002).  The benefits of 
settled living in agricultural communities reinforced a different set of norms.  People 
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had to co-operate to produce food, build communities and ensure that sufficient food 
was stockpiled.  Common fate was clearer to a group of people who depended on 
the weather (Triandis, 1989).  Hence, agricultural societies tend to be tight (Chan et 
al., 1996).  Affluence increased in a more settled society and accumulation of 
stockpiles led to social class and inequality (Triandis & Suh, 2002).   
 
 
 
Mobility 
Individual 
Orientation
Hunter/Gatherer 
Agricultural 
Industrial/Post 
Industrial 
Beyond? 
Group 
Orientation 
Affluence 
 
Figure 7: The Evolution of Societal Social Value Orientation 
 
The industrial revolution, the political upheaval heralded by the French Revolution 
and Protestantism presaged a move back to individualism.  The industrial revolution 
led to the division of labour, increased wealth disparities and the creation of 
increased choice.  The French Revolution destroyed the last vestiges of Feudalism 
whose structures had served as intermediaries between individual and government; 
just as Protestantism removed the strictures of the Catholic Church as intercessors 
between the individual and God (Watson & Morris, 2001).  Greater mobility also 
coincided with this period; though collectivists wished to stay at home, trader-
individualists wanted to go to market and many were happy to take part in the 
colonising enterprise that followed in the 19th and 20th centuries.  Mobility has been 
associated across time with individualism (Triandis, 1989).  Urbanisation further 
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enhanced the trend towards complex, loose societies that were heterogeneous 
(Triandis, 1989). 
 
In modern societies, individuals are faced with lax and multifarious cultures; there are 
many ways of doing things and many choices.  Thus it remains the individual’s 
prerogative when deciding on action, much like the early hunters, as the rules in their 
environment are less fixed and the sanctioning systems of others are less intrusive.  
Yang (1988 in Triandis, 1995) speculated that modernisation could eliminate cross 
cultural differences as the 20 characteristics he found across modern societies had 
12 that overlapped with individualism.  In Yang’s study, there was specific emphasis 
on personal efficacy, low integration with relatives, equalitarian attitudes, openness to 
innovation, sexual equality, achievement motivation, independence, self-reliance, 
active participation, risk taking and a non-local legal orientation.  Exposure to the 
mass media further propels society towards individualism, as it focuses on individual 
pleasure, is mostly Western in content, and is delivered and often consumed on a 
personal basis (Triandis, 1989). 
 
There is some concern that the dutiful individualist who understood the “principle of 
self-interest rightly served” (Tocqueville in Watson & Morris, 2001, p.265), where the 
demands of individual self interest were weighed against community interests, as “it 
is held that man serves himself in serving his fellow creatures and his private interest 
is to do good” (Tocqueville in Watson & Morris, 2001, p.264), is becoming a 
narcissistic individualist.  Tocqueville envisioned a thoughtful individualist who was 
cognisant of duty to others, which prevented him from becoming a pure hedonist 
über alles. The current trends towards a ‘what’s in it for me’ culture (Triandis, 1989, 
p.51) and a move from ‘what is good?’ to ‘does it feel good?’ (Triandis, 1995, p.29) 
raises the alarm that Hardin (1968) may be right.  A society focussed entirely on the 
narcissistic individual may indeed face “[r]uin [as] the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest” (Hardin, 1968, p.1244).  Individualism 
over history has had the shortest periods of dominance, and, with the growing threat 
of global warming, overpopulation and resource limitations, society may move back 
towards collectivism again (Lesse, 1984).  
 
Support for the ecological perspective and the continued evolution of individualism 
(at the expense of collectivism) with affluence, complexity, mobility and 
heterogeneity, has come from many quarters.  The Japanese and Chinese have 
done much to map the changing levels of these dimensions in their culture 
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(Kurosawa, 1992; Chiou, 2001; Voronov & Singer, 2002).  Chiou (2001) correctly 
predicted levels of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism in 
Taiwanese, Argentinean and US samples based on the variables of economic 
growth, rapid social change and the degree of pluralism in the society. 
 
4.5. Social Dilemma Theory: Social Value Orientations 
 
4.5.1. Individualistic/ Collectivistic Ideology and Social Dilemmas 
 
Given the focus on co-operation and the self versus other directives of individualism 
and collectivism, these constructs appear to be appropriate lenses through which to 
view social dilemmas.  Heckathorn (1998) viewed individualism and collectivism to be 
inextricably linked to social dilemmas, as the dimensions provided a guide for 
participants as to how to value individual and collective interests, especially when 
these goals are in conflict.  His matching of ideology to solutions to social dilemmas 
are presented in Table 4, p.72.  While Heckathorn (1998) only dealt with Two 
Person’s or Small Group Dilemmas (as evidenced in Table 4), some extrapolation to 
N-Persons Dilemmas can be made.   
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is one where joint co-operation is preferred and free-riding is 
a problem, thus everyone would prefer it if there is universal co-operation 
(Heckathorn, 1998).  Similarly, all would favour co-operation in a Resource Dilemma, 
but free-riding is a problem.  Hence Resource Dilemmas could be easier to solve 
under collectivism, particularly as social dilemma studies have shown that when 
members of an in-group are over-harvesting the commons, participants attempted to 
compensate by harvesting less (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Utz, 2004).  Thus fostering 
the allocentric tendencies within groups (as Table 4 suggests) may be a means to 
solve a Resource Dilemma within one group (as De Cremer, 2002 found).  Van Vugt 
(2002) also noted increased co-operation amongst water users in England when they 
felt attached to their community.  In situations where there is more than one in-group, 
this may be more difficult. 
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Table 4: Type of Ideology by Type of Social Dilemma 
Source: Heckathorn  (1998, p.466) 
Type of Dilemma Type of Ideology Path to Optimality (i.e. Virtue) Path to Suboptimality (i.e. Vice) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Collectivism 
Serve not your own interests, but the interests 
of others (i.e. altruism) 
Follow your own preferences, 
rather than others (i.e. egotism) 
Chicken (bargaining game) Pluralism 
Demand concessions from others, but also 
remain willing to make concessions 
(pragmatic egoism) 
Give in too easily, or make 
unrealistic demands, i.e. 
excessive compliance of rigidity 
Assurance Game Authoritarianism 
If leadership exists, follow it; if no leadership 
exists, create it so others can follow 
Failure to respect leaders; 
defiance 
Privileged Game Laisser-faire 
Allow everyone to do as they wish so the 
invisible hand can work its magic, i.e. 
individual freedom 
Regulations that impair people’s 
ability to act consistent with their 
preferences, i.e. constraint 
Nevertheless, when dealing with two groups competing over the same resource, a 
Chicken Game may be in place.  A Chicken Game could be appropriate as 
collectivists favour the in-group at the expense of the out-group (Triandis, 1995).  
When an out-group is present, even individualists become very cooperative with 
each other and the out-group effect is further enhanced amongst those high in 
allocentrism (Bornstein & Ben-Yosself, 1994; Sell et al., 2002).  Not surprisingly, 
then, dilemmas between groups are found to be the most extreme (Dawes & 
Messick, 2000), calling for the use of pluralism just as in Heckathorn’s (1998) solution 
to the Chicken Game (see Table 4, p.72).  Alternatively, in-group bonds should be 
lessened so that individuals see themselves as part of a larger in-group, which was 
what Baron (2001) was seeking when he attempted to reduce the parochialism 
effects of in-groups.  As highlighted earlier (see the discussion on group identity, 
p.43) parochialism, closely related to ‘in-group bias’, occurs as people favour groups 
that include themselves, even at the expense of their own self-interest and co-
operate when the insider’s gain is the outsider’s loss (Baron, 2001).  Parochialism is 
a particular problem amongst vertical individualists (Baron, 2001). 
 
An Assurance Game is one where participants are fearful of being suckers and will 
only co-operate if they believe others will too (see Chapter 3, p.24).  Sell et al. (2002) 
and Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998) found trust in non-ingroup members to be 
an issue for allocentrics.  Sell et al. (2002) conducted a study in America and China 
where respondents were placed into groups to play a Resource Dilemma game and 
a Public Goods game over a number of iterations.  The most remarkable aspect of 
this study was that the Chinese, unlike the Americans, contributed progressively less 
to both Resource and Public Goods Dilemmas over the number of trials.  Sell et al. 
(2002) attributed this result to the strength of social ties in collectivist societies to be 
restricted within a kinship structure rather than extending to the experimental groups.  
Work by Triandis (1989; 1995) supports this conclusion; hence collectivists find it 
difficult to trust out-group members.  When Yamagishi, Cook & Watabe (1998) had 
similar less cooperative results by Japanese in comparison to Americans, they 
statistically controlled for the influence of general trust and found that the effects of 
nationality disappeared, lending credence to Sell et al.’s (2002) conclusions.  Hence 
FIO (Faith In Others) may be a more salient variable for mixed societies where 
allocentrics do not trust others in the population.  Heckathorn (1998) suggests the 
use of a leader in such situations, a remedy that would be accepted by collectivists 
as they have a higher regard than individualists towards leaders (see Table 4, p.72).  
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A Privileged Game is one where the collective interest is served by the individual 
interest (see Chapter 3, p.25), hence it is not seen as a dilemma at all; it can be 
solved by the ‘invisible hand’ of the market (Heckathorn, 1998).  It becomes a 
dilemma when ‘Spite’ occurs (Heckathorn, 1998), as one group or member acts to 
disadvantage another. 
 
4.5.2. Co-operation Levels Amongst Individualists/Collectivists 
 
The discussion on individualism/collectivism above has highlighted the overriding 
importance of group over individual goals for collectivists, hence they would be 
expected to be more cooperative when tasked with producing a group good.  This 
indeed proved to be the case for Wagner (1995), who found collectivism to be the 
best predictor of co-operation for collectivists and not the mediating variables of 
group size, identifiability and shared responsibility that the social dilemma literature 
calls attention towards.  Individualists were more likely to free ride (Wagner, 1995).  It 
should be noted, however, that Wagner’s (1995) groups ranged in size from two to 
eight, limiting the applicability of his results to large scale social dilemmas such as 
Resource Dilemmas. 
 
Larger groups of cross-cultural natures were studied by Sell et al. (2002) who 
established that the effects of Prospect Theory, that is framing dilemmas in terms of 
gains and losses, held across individualistic (USA) and collectivistic (China) cultures.  
Thus, requests for restraint when harvesting a commons was more effective than 
requests for contributions to a Public Goods Dilemma (Sell et al., 2002).   
 
Triandis (1989) subdivided individualism and collectivism into different modes of how 
the self is construed.  Collectivists have an interdependent self, whilst individualists 
have an independent self (Triandis, 1989; Utz, 2004).  Utz (2004) explicitly tested the 
impact of manipulating the self-construal of subjects by priming them with either 
interdependence or independence.  Her results showed that priming positively 
promotes co-operation, even amongst individuals with vertical individualistic, or a 
competitive, outlook. 
 
4.5.3. Social Value Orientation 
 
While individualism/collectivism or its associated constructs (such as horizontal and 
vertical individualism/collectivism) have not had much direct focus in the social 
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dilemma literature, the dispositional variable of what has been termed ‘social value 
orientations’ has received much attention.  Values in this context are viewed “as 
beliefs pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct” (Gärling, 1999, 
p.398).  Social value orientations are viewed as relatively stable preferences for 
certain distribution of outcomes between self and other (Gärling, 1999; Utz, 2004).  
The origins of social value systems were in individual versus collective rationality, as 
some individuals favoured personal outcomes while others favoured collective; hence 
there was no predictable results as people value, and express preference for, 
different end states (Van Lange, 1992).  In addition, a moral issue was also felt to be 
present: individual gain, when purchased at cost to others, or collective gain, 
purchased at cost to self, was a question of fairness, or morality (Van Lange, 1992).  
Hence the persistent interest in social value orientations amongst social dilemma 
researchers. 
 
Researchers divided social value orientations into three types: pro-
social/cooperative, where the preference is to maximise joint outcomes; pro-
self/individualism, where the preference is to maximise own outcomes without any 
regard for others; competitive, where the difference between own and others 
outcomes needs to be maximised (Kuhlman, Brown & Teta, 1992).  Competitive has 
strong correlations with vertical individualism.  Social value orientations have been 
used to re-assess the core payoff matrix (see Chapter 3, p.18), as these would 
change preference for outcomes to self and others (see Equation 5, p.60).  
Cooperators/pro-socials transform the matrix by assigning positive values to both 
own and other’s outcomes; individualists do so by placing the heaviest weight to the 
self and competitors do so by computing the difference between own and others’ 
outcomes, favouring outcomes that provide the self with the greatest relative 
advantage (Van Lange, 1992). 
 
All value orientations perceive others to be like themselves; thus pro-socials expect 
cooperative behaviour, pro-selfs expect self-interested behaviour and competitors 
expect others to also seek to maximise own relative gain; defectors expect defection 
from others and co-operators tend to expect co-operation (Camac, 1992; Van Lange, 
1992; Parks & Rumble, 2001).  Evidence from various studies has lent support to 
this.  Camac (1992) established that individuals seek information that bolsters their 
existing intentions.  Pro-socials were the least focussed on greed information, that is, 
the possibility that they could free ride, and more focussed on information relevant to 
mutual co-operation or mutual defection (Camac, 1992).  Thus pro-socials focussed 
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on the CC and DD aspects of the payoff matrix (see Chapter 3, Table 1, p.18), while 
pro-selves focussed on the possibility to free ride (greed information) or be a sucker 
(fear information), represented by CD and DC on Table 1, p.18.  Camac (1992) did, 
however, find evidence of pro-social interest in fear information in some conditions, 
which supports Yamagishi’s (1998) and Sell et al.’s (2002) findings that collectivists 
do not trust out-group members. 
 
In three studies carried out by Kuhlman et al. (1992), Van Lange (1992) and Gärling 
(1999), the following characteristics were found to be prominent amongst pro-socials.  
Firstly, pro-socials were cooperative and tend to view others as such.  Secondly, pro-
socials also viewed co-operation to be a moral choice and were correspondingly 
influenced greatly by morality information (Van Lange, 1992; Kuhlman et al. 1992).  
Thirdly, they perceived people who co-operated as intelligent, unlike pro-selfs and 
competitives who perceived defectors to be intelligent (Van Lange, 1992).  Fourthly 
their reasons for cooperating were found to differ to those of competitives and pro-
selfs, as they had a stronger moral basis.  Gärling (1999) differentiated between 
collectivist values stemming from benevolence (true friendship, good relations with 
others, being liked) and universalism (institutional collectivism, linked to equality, 
social justice and solidarity).  In the benevolence condition, in-group members are 
known; in the universalism, group members are unknown strangers who are part of 
the same system (Gärling, 1999).  Co-operation was found to be based on 
universalism (and not benevolence), which was uncorrelated with individualism 
(Gärling, 1999).  Thus respondents co-operated because it was fair or the morally 
‘right thing to do’.  Nevertheless, all three studies were conducted amongst Western 
Europeans and, in Gärling’s case, the Swedes who are horizontal individualists 
concerned with equality and fairness. 
 
Other studies on the motivation of pro-socials returned different results.  Camac’s 
(1992) pro-socials viewed cooperative behaviour to be in line with self benefit, as did 
those in Yamagushi (1994 in Voronov & Singer, 2001).  Pro-socials in these studies 
were not concerned with moral 'rightness' but long-term self interest, as in the long 
run, the interests of the group and the individual coincide.  Thus group interest is an 
expression of self interest and is not so much a moral choice but a rational 
imperative.  Pro-socials were found to be more sensitive to costs of a sanctioning 
system (Van Vugt et al., 1996).  Price sensitivity may also come from the fact that 
collectivists have access to fewer resources (Triandis, 1989; 1995) and have lower 
financial satisfaction (Dutta-Bergman & Wells, 2002).  They may thus be more 
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sensitive to personal loss and thereby be more reluctant to provide public goods and 
more prepared to demonstrate restraint in Resource Dilemmas, as it involves no cost 
to the self. 
 
Not surprisingly, when an intermittent sanctioning system is in place, one which 
punishes only the offenders caught (such as a ticketing system), it has a greater 
impact amongst pro-socials than pro-selfs or competitors (Eek, Loukopoulos, Fujii & 
Gärling, 2002).  Under an intermittent sanctioning system, punishment is meted out 
to some, not all, and the system works through the risk perception it creates amongst 
defectors.  This is known as the ‘spill-over’ effect (Eek et al., 2002).  It serves also to 
reduce the fear concerns of being a ‘sucker’ (Eek et al., 2002).  Thus it is not 
surprising that this was very effective amongst the pro-socials, as fear concerns have 
been found to be more prevalent amongst collectivists (Yamagishi et al., 1998; Sell et 
al., 2002).  The impact of the system was negligible for the other two value 
orientations (Eek et al., 2002) 
 
4.5.4. Reformulation of Utility Functions Under Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
 
Thus, just as the subjective weight function had to be adjusted to reflect individualism 
and collectivism, so must the utility function. To recall, the utility (U) of preserving a 
resource or the benefit to any individual depends on the level of resource preserved 
(L), which is a proportion of the total amount that could potentially be preserved, and 
the value (V) which is the full preservation of the resource, less the cost of the 
individual’s co-operation (K) (Heckathorn, 1998).  From the preceding discussion, the 
following considerations can be made: personal cost (K) is less of a factor for 
allocentrics than idiocentrics for Resource Dilemmas; allocentric utility is transformed 
from that of the individual to that of the in-group; the presence of out-groups are a 
greater factor for allocentrics than idiocentrics and the individual’s U is the same as 
the in-group U, thus the utility function (provided on Equation 1 p.19, reproduced 
below for ease of reference) becomes Equation 7: 
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Equation 6 (1): Utility Function  
 U  =  VL – K  
 
 
Equation 7: Utility Function Under Allocentrism/Collectivism 
 U =  ((V – (UOut-group  x A)) L  –   K/ (1 – A)    
 
Where  U  =  Utility  
 V  =  Full preservation of resource 
 L =  Level of resource preserved 
 D = Number of defectors 
 K =  Cost to individual member 
 A =  Level of allocentrism 
 
The level of free-riders was seen to be a greater problem amongst individualists; 
hence the number of defectors D would be expected to be a greater problem in 
dilemmas where a greater proportion of the population have an idiocentric 
orientation, and F (or the number of cooperators required before the public good is 
produced or the resource is preserved), would be harder to attain in individualistic 
societies than collectivist ones; hence the preservation function 
 
Equation 8: Preservation Function Under Allocentrism/Collectivism 
 L = 1 – (D/NFA) 
 
Where  L =  Level of resource preserved 
 F =  Return for each unit of co-operation  
 A =  Level of allocentrism 
Note:    F*A 
 
4.6. Individualism/Collectivism in Marketing  
 
4.6.1. Consumer Behaviour 
 
Individualism/collectivism and cross-cultural consumer behaviour has only recently 
come to the focussed attention of marketing academics and, of late has contrasted 
individualism and collectivism as broad cultural types (Shavitt & Lee, 2002). Triandis 
(1989, 1995, 2001) warned against this, as the concepts have been criticised as too 
vague and all encompassing (Voronov & Singer, 2002).  Shavitt and Lee (2002) call 
for the use of sub-dimensions of the expansive individualism/collectivism, such as 
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vertical and horizontal categories (Shavitt, Zhang & Johnson, 2002) or self-concept, 
goal-orientation, cognition and relationship value (Lee, Marmorstein & Brislin, 2002). 
 
The influence of individualism and collectivism on persuasion has been investigated.  
Differences have been found in the effectiveness of persuasive appeals, with 
subjects differing along the vertical/horizontal axis (Shavitt et al., 2002).  Vertical 
collectivists preferred status appeals; horizontal ones chose appeals that stressed 
relationships; vertical individualists also opted for status while horizontal ones 
favoured self-reliance and uniqueness appeals and disliked references to status 
(Shavitt et al., 2002).  
 
Some consumer behaviour theorists have investigated the impact of the individualist/ 
collectivist dimension on the influence of reference groups.  Lee (2000) evidenced 
that referent expectations, purchase attitudes, sole- and shared-use purchases and 
affordability were all determined by subjects' levels of allocentrism/ idiocentrism.  
Referent expectations were seen to have greater impact on purchase intentions for 
allocentrics than idiocentrics; moreover referent past experience proved to be vital 
(Lee, 2000).  Thus the effect of a first mover advantage may have a greater impact 
with allocentrics, as they purchase products that are well known and used by their 
referent group and are loathe to change (Lee, 2000).  Lee et al. (2002) found 
collectivists to be closer to their families, ask their advice on products more frequently 
and moreover, take the advice when offered. 
 
Marked differences in the values and lifestyles of idiocentrics and allocentrics were 
found in a study by Dutta-Bergman and Wells (2002).  These authors found 
idiocentrics to have a higher level of personal happiness, self-esteem, internal locus 
of control and financial satisfaction.  Idiocentrics were more likely to eat at 
restaurants, be workaholics, travel abroad, be fashion conscious, have a home 
computer, enjoy sports and adventure, gamble, attend entertainment events, be 
innovative and opinion leaders (Dutta-Bergman & Wells, 2002).  Allocentrics had 
higher levels of health consciousness, were more likely to prepare food at home, 
performed more domestic chores, read more books, were more brand loyal and were 
more resource conscious as they felt less certain about money management (Dutta-
Bergman & Wells, 2002). The preferred medium of allocentrics was television, while 
idiocentrics preferred magazines (Dutta-Bergman & Wells, 2002). 
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 4.6.2. Social Marketing 
 
McCarty and Shrum (2001) have been the predominant contributors in applying the 
two dimensions to social marketing.  They expressed concern that the large pro-
environmental attitudes displayed by consumers towards environmentally friendly 
products and actions contrasted sharply with the lack of action by those same 
people. Thus they believe that the reason for this is that social marketing efforts 
aimed at understanding pro-environmental behaviours have failed to understand 
consumer behaviour in this area as the motivations and antecedents in the field itself 
are fundamentally different to those used in the consumption of goods and services.     
 
McCarty and Shrum therefore identified and researched three “fundamental beliefs” 
or “value orientations” (2001, pp. 93-94) that relate to people’s interaction with the 
world and others and would influence pro-environmental behaviour.  The basic 
values studied were individualism, collectivism and locus of control.  They sought to 
establish if there was a relationship between these values and pro-environmental 
beliefs, namely the inconvenience and importance of recycling.  The findings 
indicated that reducing the perceived inconvenience of recycling was a critical 
mediator for individuals high in individualism, whilst stressing the importance of 
recycling was a considerable mediator for individuals high in collectivism.  They 
recommended that persuasive communication should be designed with the cultural 
value orientation (individualism/collectivism) of the target audience in mind.  Their 
study, however, did not place these values within a framework such as that of social 
dilemmas.   
 
In the search of the literature, a few authors were found who had included 
collectivism or individualism in their studies on the environment, the most recent of 
whom were Kim and Choi (2005).  These authors used structural equation modelling 
to ascertain that the influence of collectivism on pro-environmental behaviour flows 
through Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE). Subjects who were high in PCE 
and collectivism were more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviour (Kim & 
Choi, 2005).  The result is not surprising given earlier evidence that collectivists tend 
to have low self-efficacy and PCE is an important factor in contributing to solving 
social dilemmas.  Pro-socials were also more likely to engage in pro-environmental 
behaviours (Stern, 2000). 
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4.7. Chapter Summary  
 
The long-standing line of research into individualism and collectivism has produced 
an understanding of these dimensions as meaningful moral choices, societal norms 
and cultural value orientations.  Sub-dimensions, such as those of vertical and 
horizontal collectivism and individualism, have shed much light on the variance within 
individualistic and collectivistic societies.  Moreover, these societies are not static; 
their levels of individualism or collectivism changes with social mobility, affluence, 
heterogeneity and increasing levels of economic development. 
 
Social dilemma theory has incorporated these dimensions to some extent.  The 
power of in-groups and increased co-operative behaviour on the part of collectivists 
was noted.  Nevertheless, collectivists demonstrate lower levels of trust and a greater 
reluctance to pay for sanctioning systems.  Generally, research in this area has not 
been cross-cultural in nature; most has investigated three social value orientations in 
Western populations.  The three orientations are conceived as pro-selfs, pro-socials 
and competitors.  Pro-socials and competitors are sensitive to the outcomes of 
others, although for different reasons: pro-socials seek equal outcomes while 
competitors seek to maximise the difference between their own and others’ 
outcomes.  Pro-selfs are more independent and seek to maximise own outcomes 
without any concern regarding the outcomes of others. 
 
Consumer behaviour has only recently focussed on cross-cultural issues and when it 
has, these have been broad.  Recently, use of Triandis’ sub-dimensions of the two 
constructs, idiocentrism and allocentrism, has increased.  In social marketing, current 
research has established the link between pro-environmental behaviour and 
individualism and collectivism. 
 
Chapter 5 delineates research on water conservation. 
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5. Chapter 5: Water 
 
5.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter first reviews the two dominant strategies in water management: 
water supply management and water demand management.  Then the principal tools 
water utilities have used are reviewed: pricing structures and informational 
campaigns.  The chapter then deals with current thinking in environmentalist 
research, followed by a review of marketing efforts in the same paradigm.  It 
concludes with a brief review of water marketing research in South Africa. 
 
5.2. Water Supply Management versus Water 
Demand Management 
 
Traditionally water supply management was the dominant paradigm in water 
strategies.  Ensuring that the public, including business, had sufficient water at any 
level of demand has increasingly been perceived as impossible and self-defeating.  
The era of water supply management has come to an end.  Public and private 
utilities, governments and international water organisations are increasingly aware 
that the former solution is no longer viable (Anton, 1995; Beekman, 1998; Hou, 1991; 
Roy & Tisdell, 1999; Rodgers, 1996).  Indeed, many large water schemes have 
created major problems in themselves (Roy & Tisdell, 1999; Vyas, 2001).  
Furthermore, the increasing cost associated with these projects is progressively 
being counted in terms of environmental impact in the extinction of fish, falling levels 
of natural dams and rivers, displacement of people and deforestation, to name but a 
few, and is attracting less international aid and, in the USA, Federal funding (Dutton, 
1995; Postel, 1986).  Presently the trend of over consumption, waste and pollution of 
current water resources needs to be urgently reversed.  Available fresh water 
constitutes only 0.7% of all water, while the worldwide demand for water is expected 
to increase by an overwhelming 650% in the next 30 years (Roy & Tisdell, 1999).  
Most water is either in the sea, polar icecaps or too deep in the ground to be 
accessed (Roy & Tisdell, 1999). 
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The current imperative is towards water demand management, a strategy 
successfully employed in Southern California and Melbourne, Australia (Beekman, 
1998), although it has been found that of the demand reduction strategies social 
marketing has not featured high on many agendas (Anton, 1995).  Nevertheless, the 
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) in the USA reported in a survey 
that 66% of their members had engaged in moderate efforts in demand reduction 
programmes, even if these were mainly in the drier western states (Dutton, 1995). 
 
South Africa has witnessed similar trends in the move from water supply 
management to water demand management.  South Africa is a water scarce country, 
which has a low rainfall index and a variability that exceeds that of the Sahel (Calow, 
Robins, MacDonald, MacDonald, Gibbs, Orpen, Mtembezeka, Andrews & Appiah 
1997), being the boundary zone between the Sahara in the North and the Sudan.  To 
make matters worse, the country’s average rainfall of 500 mm (well below the world 
average) is afflicted by severe and prolonged droughts, often terminated by severe 
flooding.  As a result, in order to guarantee supplies of water, various South African 
governments have embarked on many expensive and sometimes controversial water 
schemes, the latest of which is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Connolly, 
1999).  To date, two of the four envisaged dams, Katse and Mohale, are completed.  
Two further dams are planned, a policy disputed by several important water 
stakeholders, such as water utilities, NGOs and municipalities (McKay, 2000). These 
stakeholders have successfully managed to get the South African government (and 
in particular, the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry – DWAF) to focus 
on reducing demand for water supplies by changing patterns of water use (Connolly, 
1999; Cowie, 1999; Naidoo, 1999).  Naturally there are opponents to this, because it 
would result in money being diverted from dam building to fixing leaks and changing 
consumer behaviour.   
 
Reducing demand will result in many environmental benefits; most especially it will 
reduce the pressure on freshwater ecosystems in South Africa. Socially, the benefits 
could be high, because it could ensure that everyone has access to clean, affordable 
water and sanitation services (Naidoo, 1999; McKay, 2000). But it is financially, that 
the greatest benefits will be reaped, as it is estimated that implementing water 
demand management in Gauteng alone will save the country roughly R20 billion over 
the next ten years (Connolly, 1999; McKay, 2000). Financial benefits have already 
being realised, as it has been agreed to delay building the two additional Lesotho 
Highlands Water Scheme dams for at least ten years, saving South Africa billions in 
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interest payments (Connolly pers. com, 2002). Indeed, Rand Water estimated in 
1999 that once all four dams of the Lesotho Highlands Water scheme come on line, 
the cost of raw water would be in the region of 181 SA cents a kilolitre (a 1000 litres), 
an increase of 250% on 1997 prices (McKay, 2000), further underlining the need to 
move away from water supply management. 
 
All of these practices are top-down, with very little community buy-in sought.  In a 
Resource Dilemma regarding Chilika Lake in India, state interventions to control and 
maintain the resource through access management systems failed, as these systems 
undermined the community’s traditional management systems (Sekhar, 2004).  Such 
a finding is in line with Ostrom’s (1998) assertion that participation by locals who 
have real stakes in a resource, know it well and understand their future depends 
upon it, will have better resource management strategies than far away authorities.  
Nevertheless, this is only possible when the resource and the community are both 
small. Water in South Africa is no longer seen as a community resource but as an 
individual right and public service. 
5.3. Management Strategies: Price and Public 
Awareness Campaigns  
 
5.3.1. The Economic Value of Water 
 
South Africa, like many countries worldwide, has to discontinue underpricing water 
resources, a practice that has led to water being treated as a free good, by 
consumers, industry and agriculture (Roy & Tisdell, 1999).  Many countries subsidise 
water to such an extent that consumers pay a fraction of the transport costs, let alone 
the purification and dam construction costs (Malla & Gopalakrishnan, 1997).  Indeed 
Postel (1986) reports that Tucson, an American city considered to be progressive in 
its water conservation, increased its water price by only 5% to 8% annually while its 
actual costs increased by 58% (the cost of water from the Federally built Central 
Arizona Project).  A study conducted in Saudi Arabia reported that this country faced 
difficulties as, according to Islamic law, water was considered to be “God’s gift to 
mankind and guaranteed access to water remains free to all in the Muslim 
community” (Surah Al-Anbiyaa, Ayah No. 30 in Abderrahman 2000, p 466, emphasis 
added).  This problem was, however, solved by a Fatwa, which is a religious edict 
issued by a senior imam, and thus it carried a weighty religious authority.  The Fatwa  
declared that access to water, while available to all, should be paid for by those who 
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are able to do so.  Illegal connections are rife in South America, which compound the 
lack of pricing structures to recover the costs of developing, treating and distributing 
water and do not, therefore, provide an incentive for water conservation by 
inhabitants and industry (Rodgers, 1996). 
 
Historically South Africa has been little different.  Water’s economic value is currently 
being increased from virtually nil, due to the new four-tiered pricing system, whereby 
those who use more pay more per litre than consumers who use less (Chand pers. 
comm, 2002). Furthermore, the Department of Water and Forrestry (DWAF) is 
committed to increasing the cost of raw water by 100 percent in order to further give 
water an economic value (Naidoo, 1999). Although the price elasticity of demand for 
water has been generally found to be negative, most studies have witnessed water 
use to be negatively related to price but positively related to income (Avalos & De 
Young, 1995; Frederick, 2001; Malla & Gopalakrishnan, 1997).  The new strategy, 
therefore, should help curb the wealthiest and most excessive consumers, but a 
programme for lower income earners is needed too.   
 
5.3.2. Information Campaigns 
 
Campaigns, both internationally and locally have been used to encourage voluntary 
water conservation by either the alteration of behaviour or adoption of more water 
efficient appliances (Syme, Nancarrow & Seligman, 2000). These campaigns are 
usually mounted at the onset of a drought and are often regarded as a ‘desperation 
measure’ (Syme et al., 2000, p.540).  Voluntary conservation resulting from the 
campaigns is likely to be temporary (Syme et al., 2000) and, as Van Vugt (2001, 
2002) found, individuals with a pro-self orientation are likely to harvest even more 
from a resource when it is perceived to be threatened.  Few readily available formal 
evaluations of water campaigns are available and most are aimed at addressing the 
impact of the campaign (in water reduction) in relation to its PR budget (Syme et al., 
2000).   These campaigns are not, therefore, marketing ones.  Syme et al. (2000) 
decry the lack of individual variable analysis and point out that most evaluators call 
for greater understanding of consumer behaviour without supplying it. Syme et al. 
(2000) do provide some hope for advertising to promote long term behavioural 
change, as they cite a longitudinal campaign run in Melbourne, with subjects recalling 
water conservation practices over six months after the campaign was completed.  An 
American longitudinal study by Trumbo and O'Keefe (2005) found that information 
campaigns were only effective for those with pro-environmental behaviour. 
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 In South Africa, DWAF has a multitude of campaigns to target lower income users 
(Chipp & Morton-McKay, 2002), but most of these usually omit an extensive 
understanding of consumers and their consumption behaviour.  Moreover, most are 
aimed at children, which presuppose that the child has power to change behaviour in 
the home (Chipp & Morton-McKay, 2002).  Most blindly adhere to “getting the 
message out” without trying to understand other variables that drive consumers, 
especially in the consumption of public goods.  Here marketing has the ability to 
contribute greatly.  Not only have marketers developed and extended social dilemma 
theory into a social marketing framework, they have also highlighted the possible 
interaction of this framework and other environmental marketing efforts with key 
variables, such as individualism and collectivism (Wiener & Doescher, 1991, 1994)s. 
 
Syme et al. (2000) call for greater scientific rigour in developing and applying models 
of informational campaigns and behaviour change.  They delineate the following as 
important:  
• Message source: the credibility of the source is important.  Source preference 
is likely to differ between allocentrics and idiocentrics, with allocentrics 
favouring leaders (Triandis, 1989); 
• Message: here particular attention should be placed on message frames.  
Klandermans (1992) pointed out that the frame of reference should be the 
same as that of the target market; hence allocentrics and idiocentrics would 
differ in terms of message frames.  Moreover, framing dilemmas as Resource 
or Public Goods would have implications in terms of Prospect Theory (as 
demonstrated above); 
• Channel: this would be dependent on what media are most effective.  Dutta-
Bergman and Wells (2002) illustrated that allocentrics and idiocentrics have 
different channel preferences. Currently the bulk of South African water 
efforts are directed through schools (Chipp & Morton-McKay, 2002).  
• Receiver and destination: knowledge of consumer behaviour is critical.  The 
target audience needs to be understood (Bator & Cialdini, 2000). 
 
5.4. Environmental Behaviour across Disciplines 
 
Many disciplines have looked at what determines pro-environmental behaviour.  
While many such studies are not directly on water, the subject does fall into their 
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gamut.  Psychologists and sociologists have investigated ‘environmentalism’, defined 
as “the propensity to take actions with pro-environmental intent” (Stern, 2000, p.411). 
 
Stern (2000) provides a Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory of environmentalism to 
encapsulate his multidisciplinary review of what he termed ‘environmentally 
significant behaviour’ literature (see Figure 8, p.89). What is of most interest are the 
variables highlighted in Figure 8: Stern denotes macro-level values, which can be 
construed as individualism/collectivism, although he terms them ‘egoism’ and 
‘altruism’, and ‘perceived ability to reduce threat’, a twin of perceived consumer 
effectiveness (PCE), as causal variables of pro-environmental behaviours.  In the 
consumer sphere, the focus is on what Stern terms ‘private sphere behaviours’ (pp. 
409-411).  In empirical studies, Van Vugt et al. (1996) and Van Vugt (2001) found 
both feelings of belongingness to community, a collectivist characteristic, and 
perceived efficacy to be predictive of environmentally conscious behaviour.  Hence, it 
would seem the expansion of ‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’ to include feelings of 
belongingness or allocentric values to be justified.  In a separate study, Kaplan 
(2000) criticised the altruism approach as contributing to perceived individual 
helplessness and it’s focus on sacrifice rather than life-enhancing solutions leaves 
the impression that virtue must be unpleasant and the realm of ‘dour 
environmentalists’ (p.495). 
 
Stern (2000) does provide a good summary of variables found to be important when 
reviewing environmentally significant behaviours, demonstrated in Table 5 overleaf. 
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Table 5: Major Types of Environmentally Significant Behaviours and Causal Variables 
Source: Stern (2000, p.421) 
 
 
 
Causal Variables 
Environmentally Significant 
Behaviours 
Attitudinal 
General environmental predisposition 
Behaviour specific norms and beliefs 
Nonenvironmental attitudes (for 
example about product attributes) 
Perceived costs and benefits of action 
Environmental Activism 
Non Activist public-sphere 
behaviours 
 
Personal capabilities 
Literacy 
Social status 
Financial resources 
Behaviour specific knowledge and skills 
Private sphere environmentalism 
Consumer purchase behaviours 
Maintenance of household equipment 
Changes in equipment use, lifestyle 
(curtailment) 
Waste disposal behaviours 
“Green Consumerism” 
Contextual factors 
Material costs and rewards 
Laws and regulations 
Available technology 
Social norms and expectations 
Supportive policies 
Advertising  
Other 
Behaviours affecting organisational 
decisions 
Habit and Routine  
- 89 - 
 
 
Figure 8: Schematic Representation of Variables in the VBN theory of environmentalism 
Source: Stern (2000, p.412) 
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5.5. Environmental Consciousness and Marketing 
 
One of the greatest challenges to social marketing is the low involvement consumers 
have towards its efforts (Bloom & Novelli; 1981).  Water falls squarely into this: 
consumers are not involved in its purchase, its consumption or its disposal.  Indeed, 
it falls into what most consumer behaviour researchers would term a ‘routine 
purchase’, one for which little thought is given (Arnould, Price & Zinkhan, 2002).  
Although much research in social marketing has been directed towards pro-
environmental behaviours (Kilbourne & Beckman, 1998; Peattie, 2001), most has 
been product centred: the environmental impact of products, consumer selection of 
environmental products, incorporating the full cost (including that to the environment) 
to product pricing and the elusive animal termed the ‘Green Consumer’ (Peattie, 
2001).   
 
Interest in perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) started as early as 1972 and has 
spanned studies until present (Ellen et al., 1991; Kilbourne & Beckmann, 1998).  
Interest in environmental values started in the early 1990s.  Both De Young (2000) 
and Clancy and O’Loughlin (2002) found the value of frugality as predictive of pro-
environmental behaviours.  Granzin and Olsen (1991), for instance studied personal 
values and witnessed different pro-environmental behaviours related to these. 
Frugality was linked to avoidance of waste; recycling was linked to altruism and those 
who are religious and like helping others donate items for reuse (Granzin & Olsen, 
1991).  Although not studied as such, the notions of helping and religiosity are linked 
to collectivism.  Not surprisingly then, there have been calls for a greater focus on 
macro-level constructs (Kilbourne & Beckman, 1998).  Correspondingly, marketing 
academics have turned to individualism and collectivism, as seen in the work of 
McCarty and Shrum (2001) as well as Kim and Choi (2005), discussed earlier. 
 
5.6. Water Marketing and South Africa 
 
Preliminary social marketing studies into water conservation in South Africa revealed 
that consumers have low self efficacy, a great disbelief in the co-operation of others, 
a belief that water should be conserved and a frustration that structural solutions to 
the problem cannot or have not been enforced (Chipp & Morton-McKay 2002, 2003).  
Thus there is some initial evidence that South Africans are willing to conserve, but 
are largely hampered by individual lack of belief that they can impact on the problem 
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and their collective distrust of the pro-social actions of others.  The studies conducted 
so far, however, were not designed with the social dilemma framework in mind.  They 
were part of a “water audit”, an exploratory analysis of current water conservation 
and practice in Gauteng.  In no way was perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) 
empirically tested, nor were community co-operation levels manipulated to ascertain 
if changing the degree of perceived community co-operation would impact consumer 
behaviour.  It is these issues that the current research seeks to address. 
 
Furthermore, focus group research provided some suggestion of the potential 
moderating influence of individualism and collectivism on water conserving 
behaviours (Chipp & Morton-McKay, 2002).  A large presence of empathy and 
support for fellow community members who suffered hardships when obtaining water 
was apparent amongst the lower income respondents.  This is evidence of a high 
degree of collectivism in this population.  As McCarty & Shrum (2001) identified 
collectivism as an antecedent to pro-environmental behaviour, this cultural trait needs 
to be explored further in order to utilise its potential impact on pro-social behaviours.  
This approach is very much in line with Wiener and Doescher’s directive to explore 
the impact of individualism and collectivism on their social dilemma framework. 
 
5.7. Chapter Summary 
 
Water utilities are no longer in a position to match increasing consumer demand for 
water by upping the supply; this is a costly exercise that has implications for resource 
management.  Hence there has been a move in recent years towards water demand 
management rather than water supply management.  This move correlates with a 
realisation that more effective behavioural influence techniques are needed.  The old 
techniques of price and PR or informational campaigns do not deliver the desired 
results.  Moreover, it is impossible to regulate water demand through price alone as 
water is an inalienable right, enshrined in the South African constitution.  Thus 
consumer behaviour needs to be studied and more refined tools for behavioural 
change developed.  Work in other disciplines reinforces variables outlined in the 
social dilemma and individualist/collectivist literature, as does recent work in 
understanding consumer pro-environmental behaviour by marketers, both abroad 
and locally.  Thus the tentative threads are in place for a greater understanding of 
water conservation in South Africa. Chapter 6 moves onto the research methodology 
of the current study. 
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6. Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
 
6.1. Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 6 outlines the research methodology used in the current investigation.  The 
study’s objectives are covered first, followed by the hypotheses and the proposed 
model.  The discussion then turns to the research design, which is followed by a 
review of sampling.  Next the chapter deals with the measurement instruments 
selected and how these were adapted for use.  The data analysis techniques are 
presented, followed by an overview of the two pilot studies. 
6.2. Objectives 
 
6.2.1. Primary objective: 
 
To establish if the belief that others will cooperate (Faith in Others) regarding level of 
group co-operation and individual perceived consumer effectiveness influence pro-
environmental behaviours, and to ascertain if these relationships are moderated by 
individual value orientation.  This to be done in the context of water conservation. 
 
6.2.2. Secondary objectives 
 
• To determine if individuals, when led to believe that others in their group will 
co-operate, will meet co-operation with co-operation and defection with 
defection.  Thus if consumers witness and hear that others will conserve 
water by engaging in a number of practical actions this will lead to an 
increase in the practical actions they employ and vice versa. 
 
• Similarly, to establish if individuals, who have high perceived consumer 
effectiveness (PCE), will exhibit more behaviours towards conserving water. 
 
• To uncover the interplay of individual value orientation with co-operation 
beliefs and perceived consumer effectiveness. 
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• To develop a model that will test empirically the direction and strength of the 
relationships between co-operation beliefs, PCE, individualism and 
collectivism and pro-environmental actions (water conserving behaviours). 
 
• To ascertain the interplay between value orientation and preference for 
structural solutions. 
 
• To determine if perceptions of resource abundance affect harvesting 
behaviour. 
 
6.3. Research Questions 
 
Against this background, the following research questions are proposed: 
 
 Will individuals co-operate (engage in water conserving activities, such as 
turning off taps) if they believe that others will co-operate, termed faith in 
others (FIO)?   
 To what extent does perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) influence water 
conservation behaviours?   
 How does individual orientation towards collectivism or individualism influence 
the belief in the co-operation of others and one's own PCE? 
 How do all of these variables (PCE, FIO, HC, VC, HI, VI) interact to influence 
behaviour? (Note: HC is horizontal collectivism, VC is vertical collectivism, HI 
is horizontal individualism and VI is vertical individualism). 
 What is the impact of value orientation (idiocentric/allocentric, horizontal and 
vertical) on PCE, FIO, preference for structural solutions?  
 What influence does perception of resource level have on harvesting 
behaviour? 
 
6.4. Hypotheses and Proposed Model 
 
Much of the social dilemma literature reflects that co-operation is met with co-
operation and defection with defection.  Axelrod (1984) was one of the first to 
establish this as the norm of reciprocity.  Berger and Corbin (1992), Wiener and 
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Doescher (1994), Wiener (1993) all reported supportive data that FIO is positively 
related to conserving behaviour, hence: 
 
H1: Consumers' beliefs that others co-operate will influence the number of water 
conserving actions they exhibit; 
 
Respondents with high levels of allocentrism are more likely to co-operate with 
others, particularly those in their in-group (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Van Vugt, 
2002).  They are thus more likely to be pro-social, while respondents with high levels 
of idiocentrism are more likely to be competitive or pro-self (Camac, 1992; Wagner, 
1995).   
 
H2: Consumers' degree of collectivism/individualism will influence their belief that 
others will co-operate; 
 
Respondents will differ along the Vertical/Horizontal dimension.  Vertical 
individualists are the most concerned with competition, hence they are most likely to 
be competitive and not co-operate (Triandis, 1995).  Horizontal individualists are 
more likely to co-operate as they are found to be extremely concerned with equality 
and fairness, hence they think co-operation is the correct thing to do (Triandis, 1995; 
Gärling, 1999).  This will also impact on their behavioural co-operation. 
 
H3a: Consumers' degree of vertical/horizontal allocentrism will influence their belief 
that others will co-operate; 
 
H3b: Consumers' degree of vertical/horizontal idiocentrism will influence their belief 
that others will co-operate; 
 
H3c: Belief in co-operation of others (FIO) and its influence on behaviour will be 
moderated by degree of horizontal/vertical idiocentrism/allocentrism; 
 
Perceived consumer effectiveness has been found in many studies to be influential in 
pro-environmental behaviour.  Ellen et al. (1991), Berger and Corbin (1992), Wiener 
and Doescher (1994) and Kim and Choi (2005) all reported results that support this.  
Hence:  
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H4: Perceived consumer effectiveness will influence the number of water 
conserving actions consumers exhibit; 
 
People high in idiocentrism have been found to have greater self-efficacy (Triandis, 
1989; 1995; McCarty & Shrum 2001) and the impact of collectivism/allocentrism was 
found to be moderated by PCE in terms of its impact on pro-environmental behaviour 
(Kim & Choi, 2005).  Thus idiocentrism/allocentrism will be a moderator of PCE. 
 
H5: Perceived consumer effectiveness and its influence on behaviour will be 
moderated by degree of horizontal/vertical idiocentrism/allocentrism; 
 
Individuals with high PCE have a strong belief in the impact of their own actions; 
correspondingly, they are likely to believe that the actions of others will have greater 
impact too: 
 
H6: Perceived consumer effectiveness will influence consumers' belief that others 
will co-operate; 
 
Affluence has been strongly tied to higher levels of idiocentrism (Triandis, 1995), 
hence, correspondingly levels of PCE and FIO may also be affected: 
 
H7a: Consumers in lower socio-economic backgrounds will exhibit greater degrees 
of collectivism than individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
H7b: Consumers in lower socio-economic backgrounds will exhibit different levels of 
degrees of PCE and FIO than individuals from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds.  
 
Consumer rights emerged in Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002; 2003) as an important 
variable.  The literature suggests that individualists are more concerned with the 
rights of man than collectivists (Triandis, 1995; Voronov & Singer, 2002).   
 
H8: Consumer rights are more important for idiocentrics than allocentrics.  
 
Preference for structural solutions was found in the literature to be greater amongst 
people with low levels of trust in others (Yamagishi, 1992; Ostrom, 1998).  Indeed, 
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low trusters were more supportive of policing and punishment and demonstrated a 
willingness to contribute towards a sanctioning system (Yamagishi, 1992).   
 
H9a: Consumers low in FIO will display greater preference for structural solutions.  
 
Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002) found a high preference for structural solutions 
amongst lower income earners, hence: 
  
H9b: Consumers from Township areas will display greater preference for structural 
solutions.  
 
Perceptions of the level of a resource have been seen to affect harvesting behaviour, 
as harvesting was less in times of crisis (Budescu & Au, 2002), but only amongst 
those who identified with their communities (Van Vugt, 2001).  
 
H10a: Consumers who believe the resource is plentiful will display greater harvesting 
behaviour.  
 
 
A diagram of the proposed model is outlined below: 
 
 
 
Belief in the co-
operation of others 
Perceived consumer 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
Value orientation: 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
Water 
conserving 
behaviours 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Proposed Model 
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6.5. Research Design 
 
Conclusive research seeks to examine specific relationships and test various 
hypotheses (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002).  It is quantitative in nature and has two 
predominant types: descriptive and causal designs (Churchill & Iacobucci, 2002).   
Descriptive designs seek to describe the characteristics of a population or 
phenomenon, while causal designs attempt to ascertain causality (Zikmund, 2003). 
As no variables were manipulated or controlled and causality was not established, 
the current study was descriptive in nature.  
 
 A descriptive survey of schools in the Gauteng area was undertaken.  Schools in 
Gauteng have been frequently used for water interventions.  In order to generate 
awareness, most Gauteng water conservation campaigns and programmes have 
actively concentrated on school children and, despite being “green or social 
marketing in nature”, have taken on an educational focus, by using school visits, 
tours, poster campaigns, water mascots and “train the trainers” workshops.  The 
reasons for this focus on a young audience are: children are a primary market (they 
continually make water consumption decisions); they are perceived as influential in 
parent and sibling behaviour; children do not naturally conserve water and they 
constitute the future market whose outlook will shape the generation to come 
(Strong, 1998; Sha & Haines, 2002).  Moreover, internationally school age children 
are often the target of social marketing interventions (Fullilove, Scrimshaw, Fielding, 
Normand, Sanchez-Way & Richardson, 2002).  The former minister of Water and 
Forestry, Ronnie Kasrils, has said on several occasions that children are the 
mechanism for taking behavioural change into the home. 
 
6.6. Sampling 
 
6.6.1. Universe 
 
The universe was learners at schools in the Gauteng area who are over the age of 
14 in grades seven to nine during the fieldwork.   
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 6.6.2. Unit of Analysis  
 
The unit of analysis specifies at what level the data will be analysed (Zikmund, 2003).  
Individuals, the learners themselves, formed the unit of analysis in the current study. 
 
6.6.2.1. Primary Unit 
A sampling unit is a single element or group of elements subject to selection in the 
sample (Zikmund, 2003).  If the target population must be first stratified into units at 
different stages in the sample, additional terminology must be used for each stage 
(Zikmund, 2003).  The primary unit is the unit of selection at the first stage of 
sampling; in this study this is the school attended. 
 
6.6.2.2. Secondary Unit 
The sample was then selected according to grade at school; hence school grade was 
the secondary sampling unit. 
 
6.6.3. Sampling Frame 
 
Schools were divided into affluent and non-affluent schools.  Classification was done 
on location of school (suburb versus township).  Suburb was seen as a proxy for 
affluence as suburbs contain mainly of private or former Model C schools.  At each 
sample school, classes were selected by grade and learners in each class were 
sampled. 
 
6.6.4. Sampling Procedure 
 
The study employed a nonprobability sampling method, namely quota sampling.  
Probability sampling was envisaged, but obtaining an up-to-date list of all schools in 
Gauteng proved to be difficult.  In nonprobability sampling the probability of any 
particular member of the population being included in the sample is unknown; 
selection of units is arbitrary and dependent on the researcher’s judgement 
(Zikmund, 2003).  Quota sampling is a nonprobability sampling procedure that 
ensures that certain characteristics of a population will be represented in the 
proportion that the researcher requires (Zikmund, 2003).  In the current study, the 
participating schools were divided into high income and low income schools, 
predominantly through geographical location of the school.  Schools in township 
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areas were classified as ‘low income’ and schools in suburban areas were classified 
as ‘high income’.  This division of schools was done in order to ensure a spread of 
individualism and collectivism.  A previous study done by Eaton and Louw (2000) 
was limited to university students and used language to differentiate between 
students to ascertain levels of individualism and collectivism.  Although language 
may have a high correlation with these constructs, social mobility and wealth were 
highlighted in the earlier discussion to foster individualism. Thus the 
Township/Suburb distinction accounts for this more than does language.  Learners 
were sampled as classes and, in order to ensure age parity between the different 
types of school, higher grades were sampled from suburban schools, as in lower 
income schools learners tended to be older in the lower grades (see Table 6, p.99.)   
 
6.6.5. Sample Size 
 
The sample constituted three stages: selection of schools, selection of classes by 
grade and then a census of learners in each class.  Ten schools were selected; five 
of each type, that is high and low income.  Table 6 below lists the schools sampled 
with high income schools highlighted.  The sample size was set at 50 respondents 
per school.  The final sample size was 444, indicating a response rate of 88% (see 
Table 6).  The high response rate was most likely due to the co-operation of the 
principals and teachers who responded positively to the initial contact and covering 
letter (see Appendix 2, p.172) and the school environment in which learners are 
accustomed to answering questions and completing forms in class.  Two schools 
requested additional questionnaires to ensure that no class member felt excluded. 
 
Grade School 
9 10 11 12 Missing 
Grand 
Total 
Response 
Rate (%) 
Erasmus Monareng High School 50     50 100 
Illinge High School 58     58 116 
King David Victory Park 12  35   47 94 
Krugersdorp High School  49    49 98 
La Salle College  25 19 3 1 48 96 
Lethulwazi Comprehensive 
Secondary School 42     42 84 
P.T Xulu Secondary School 33     33 66 
St Martins High School  1 19   20 40 
The Hill High School 24 22    46 92 
Thuto-Lesedi Secondary School 51     51 102 
Grand Total 270 97 73 3 1 444 89 
Table 6: Schools and Grades Sampled 
6.7. Data collection 
 
6.7.1. Fieldwork  
 
Pen and paper self-completion interviews were conducted.  Interviewers were 
recruited from Vista University’s (now incorporated into the University of 
Johannesburg) Geography Honours programme and the University of the 
Witwatersrand’s Business Sciences' Honours programme and trained by the 
researcher.  Vista’s students were able to communicate with second language 
English speakers in their home tongue.  Thus should the learners have experienced 
any problems with the questionnaire, trained interviewers were on hand to assist.  
Interviewers were supplied with an introductory letter (see Appendix 2, p.172). 
 
6.8. Measurement and Research Instruments 
 
The survey focused on respondents’ beliefs regarding the variables outlined in the 
research problem.  Well established scales of the variables concerned were sourced 
and tested on a five point Likert scale.  Churchill and Iacobucci (2002) and Malhotra 
(1999) assert that a five point Likert scale can be considered interval in nature if it is 
represented on a Thurston Equal Appearing Interval continuum or if the categories 
representing each number are clearly indicated on the questionnaire.  As the 
categories were noticeably designated on the questionnaire, the data can be 
considered interval in nature. 
 
6.8.1. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness  
 
For PCE, well established scales were available and used.  Ellen et al. (1991) and 
Berger and Corbin (1992) both used a two item measure that formed the basis of the 
items used in the current study.  Ellen et al. (1991) obtained a Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha of 0.55 with the measure.  They also found it to be distinct from concern for the 
environment through using LISREL IV.  Berger and Corbin (1992) incorporated 
similar questions to those of Ellen et al.’s (1991) PCE, together with other 
environmental items in a study of 1521 Canadians.  In a factor analysis of all items in 
the study, the PCE items loaded on a single factor together, with loadings of 0.5778 
and 0.5393.  Berger and Corbin did not report Cronbach’s alpha for their study.  Lord 
and Putrevu (1998) reported a Cronbach alpha of 0.69 for the three items they used 
- 100 - 
to determine PCE.  More recently, Kim and Choi (2005) had a Cronbach alpha of 
0.74 for an extended scale.  For the current study a composite was created and pilot 
tested on a sample of 23.  The Cronbach alpha was 0.45.  The low Cronbach alpha 
may have been a reflection of the limited variance in the low income sample used for 
the pilot.  Table 7 below illustrates the variations of the scale. 
 
Ellen et al. (1991) 
Berger & Corbin 
(1992) 
Lord & Putrevu (1998) Current Study 
There is not much any 
one person can do about 
the environment 
I don't have enough 
environmental knowledge 
I feel personally helpless 
to have much of an impact 
on a problem as large as 
the environment 
There is not much that 
any one person can do 
about water conservation 
The conservation efforts 
of one person are useless 
as long as other people 
refuse to conserve 
I feel personally helpless 
I don’t feel I have enough 
knowledge to make well 
informed decisions on 
environmental issues 
Nothing that I can do will 
make a difference to 
saving water in this 
country 
  
I expect the environment 
to continue to deteriorate 
until it is almost unliveable 
before enough attention is 
paid to improve it 
It is useless if one person 
tries to use less water and 
other people do not try to 
use less water. 
   I don’t know how to use less water. 
Factor loadings 0.5778 
and 0.5393 
Pilot test 2: alpha 0.45 Alpha 0.55 Alpha 0.69 n = 23 
Table 7: Measures of PCE 
 
 
6.8.2. Co-operation of Others (FIO) 
 
Most previous studies in this area included some indicator of co-operation of others, 
but this was usually only through one or two items.  Ellen et al. (1991) used one item 
“Most people are not willing to make sacrifices to protect the environment” and 
Berger and Corbin (1992) claimed that the statements “the next generation will be 
more careful” and “science and technology will solve environmental problems” 
represented FIO.  The item in the current study: “most people don’t do much to use 
less water” reflected Ellen et al.’s item.  Berger and Corbin’s items were not used as 
it was felt that these did not represent faith in the co-operation of others (FIO) but 
rather faith in the future and science.  Wiener and Doescher (1991) developed a 
scale for co-operation which had a reliability of 0.73.  These items were: 
• In time, most utility customers will permit the installation of load control 
devices 
• Most people are willing to make sacrifices to overcome peak load demands 
 
Wiener and Doecher’s items were fashioned to reflect FIO in the current study: 
- 101 - 
• Most people won’t save water 
• Soon, most people will save water 
• I am sure that most people will sacrifice to save water 
 
When tested in the first pilot study the overall Cronbach’s alpha was 0.438 (n=23). 
 
  
 Scale Mean if Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Most people don't do 
much to use less (reverse 
coded) 
7.87 4.391 .167 .529 
Most people will save 
soon 7.35 4.692 .248 .374 
Most people will sacrifice 
to use less water 7.74 3.474 .404 .061 
Table 8: Item Total Statistics for FIO scale 
 
The final items were then modified after these results and discussions with the 
interviewers to: 
• Most people don’t do much to use less water. 
• Soon, most people will use less water if they can. 
• I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less water. 
 
However, it was felt that these items were not fully comprehensive and aspects from 
Chipp and Morton-McKay (2003) were added.  The further items probed cooperative 
water use, behaviour of communities and schools as noted by respondents (see 
Appendix 1, Questionnaire, p.167.) 
 
6.8.3. Individualism and Collectivism 
 
In terms of individualism and collectivism, Triandis (1995) developed the INDCOL95, 
a scale of 32 items scored on a nine-point scale.  The scale is designed to assess 
the four constructs (eight items each) of Horizontal Individualism (HI), Horizontal 
Collectivism (HC), Vertical Individualism (VI) and Vertical Collectivism (VC).  This 
scale has been widely used cross-culturally and has reported acceptable reliabilities 
of VC 0.72, HI 0.80, HC 0.71 and VI 0.75 (Parkes, Schneider & Bochner, 1999).  
Chiou (2001) used INDCOL95 in a study with students from the US, Taiwan and 
Argentina.  A confirmatory factor analysis established that the four factor model was 
a better fit than the two factor model (Chiou, 2001).  Reliabilities for the Americans in 
the sample were VC 0.74, HI 0.69, HC 0.75 and VI 0.74; the Taiwanese were VC 
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0.83, HI 0.63, HC 0.84 and VI 0.61 and the Argentineans VC 0.70, HI 0.66, HC 0.60 
and VI 0.70 (Chiou, 2001). 
 
Triandis (personal communication, 2003) advised that the scale items be checked for 
cultural understanding before use.  Table 9, p.104, demonstrates how the final scale 
was based on three iterations.  Changes to wording have been highlighted.  The first 
column represents Triandis’ initial items; column two the alteration of items after 
discussion with experts and column three the final items used, based on the results 
of the pilot test and discussions with the interviewers.  Triandis (1989; Triandis, 
Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao and Sinha, 1995; Triandis, Chen & Chan, 1998) recommends 
that multiple measures of the individualism/collectivism construct be used.  
Consequently the final questionnaire was then piloted again and an additional six 
items were added as a cross-check.  These items come from Lewis, Maras and 
Simonds (2000) who developed them for school children in the UK.  Lewis, Maras 
and Simonds (2000) formulated questions along two axes, individualism/collectivism 
and altruism and reported a Cronbach α of 0.65 and 0.39 for each respectively.  The 
items are as follows: 
 
• I prefer to do things by myself (individualism/collectivism) 
• I like working with all the other learners in the class (altruism) 
• I feel happy when my best friend wins a race (altruism) 
• I prefer to play by myself at home (individualism/collectivism) 
• I prefer to work by myself in class (individualism/collectivism) 
• I prefer playing by myself in general (individualism/collectivism) 
• I will give my pocket money to my friends if they need it (altruism) 
• I prefer working by myself in general (individualism/collectivism) 
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Original Items Piloted Items Final Questionnaire 
My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those 
around me I am happy when people around me are happy. I am happy only if the people around me are happy. 
Winning is everything To win is the most important thing in life.  To win is the most important thing in life.  
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group It is better to make the group win than for me to win.  I would give up things so that the group can gain.  
It annoys me when other people perform better than I do I hate it when people do better than me. I don’t like it when other people do better than me. 
It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group I am happy when the whole group agrees.  It is important that I keep my group agreeing on things.  
It is important to me that I do my job better than others It is important to do better than other people.  It is important to do better in my schoolwork than other people.  
I like sharing little things with my neighbours I like sharing little things with my neighbours I like sharing little things with my friends at school 
I enjoy working in situations involving competition I like to compete against other people.  I like events where I can compete against other people, like exams and sport.  
The well-being of my classmates is important to me It is important to me that other people feel okay.  It is important to me that other people are doing well.  
I often do "my own thing" I like to do stuff that is important just for me.  I like doing things by myself.  
If a family member were in financial difficulty, I would help as much 
as I could I will help my family if they need money.  I will help my relatives if they need money, as much as I can.  
Competition is the law of nature To compete against someone is natural.  To compete against someone is natural.  
If a classmate gets a prize I would feel proud I am proud if another member of my class gets a prize.  I am proud if another member of my class gets a prize.  
Being a unique individual is important to me I feel special because I am unique.  It is important to me that I am different to others.  
To me, pleasure is spending time with others I like to spend time with other people.  The best way to spend time is with other people 
When another person does better than I do, I get tense and stirred 
up I get angry if someone does better than me.  I get annoyed if someone does better than me in school.  
Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure Family and community duty is more important than personal pleasure.  Duty to family is more important than personal fun.  
Without competition it is not possible to have a good society Society needs competition.  We need competition because it makes us better.  
I feel good when I co-operate with others It feels good to work well with other people.  I feel good when I work with other people.  
I am a unique person, separate from others I am a unique person, separate from others. I am a unique person, separate from others. 
Some people emphasize winning; I am not one of them Winning is not important to me.  Winning is not important to me.  
It is important to me that I respect decisions made by my groups I will follow whatever decision the group makes.  It is important that I respect community decisions 
I rather depend on myself than on others I am the only person I can depend on.  I would rather depend on myself than on other people. 
Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices 
are required Family duty comes above all else.  Family must stick together, no matter what problems there are 
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others I cannot rely on another person/ someone else. I usually rely on myself, rather than on other people 
Parents and children must stay together, as much as possible Families must stay together.  Family must stay together.  
My personal identity is very important to me It is important that people see my personality.  It is important to me that I am different to other people and my own person 
It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice 
what I want I am happy to make sacrifices to take care of my family.  It is my duty to take care of my family, no matter how hard it is 
My personal identity independent from others is very important to 
me My personal identity (as unique) is very important to me My personal identity (as unique) is very important to me 
I respect the majority's wishes in groups of which I am a member If I am a member of a group, then I will respect the decisions that 
the group makes.  
When I am in a group, I will go along with what most of the others 
want 
I enjoy being unique and different from others I am glad that I am different from other people.  I am glad that I am different from other people.  
It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before 
making a decision I do not make a decision without talking to my friends.  It is important to speak to my friends before I make a decision 
Table 9: INDCOL95 Adaptation of Items 
6.8.4. Behaviour 
 
Water conservation behaviour was measured through activities.  McKay (personal 
communication, 2003) confirmed that all the activities listed were used in water 
information campaigns in the schools.  Spring Day emerged as an irresponsible 
behaviour cited by learners in Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002).  Questions used 
were as follows: 
• Do you ever see dripping taps 
• Do you ever stop taps from dripping 
• Do you ever see leaking pipes 
• I use a hosepipe to clean the car 
• It is okay to wet people on Spring Day or during Spring week 
• It is okay to wet people on hot days 
• It is okay to water gardens with a hosepipe 
 
 
6.8.5. Other Variables 
 
Other questions concerned firstly, the preference for structural solutions: “the 
government must make people use less water”, secondly, attitudes towards 
consumer rights: “everybody must have water even if they cannot pay for it” and 
“water should not be cut off if people don’t pay for it” and thirdly, perceptions of 
resource abundance “South Africa is a water rich country”.  These questions were 
required to test hypotheses eight to ten.   
6.9. Data Analysis 
 
The raw data was cleaned, checked and entered into Excel.  Questionnaires were 
numbered for referencing purposes, thus the exact questionnaire could be located 
and any responses verified.  The data was then transferred into SPSS. 
 
6.9.1. Statistical Techniques 
 
A Cronbach’s alpha, Pearson correlation, multiple regression and MANOVA were 
used.  Cronbach alpha assessed the internal reliability of each of the scales used.  
Correlations were done to establish the presence of relationships along with multiple 
regression analysis, which was used in order to determine the importance of each 
attribute in the model.  Multiple regression involves a single dependent variable, in 
this case water conserving behaviour, and two or more independent variables 
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(Malhotra & Birks, 2003), in this case value orientation, belief in the co-operation of 
others and perceived consumer effectiveness. 
 
MANOVA, multiple analysis of covariance, was used to determine the difference 
between area types, where the categorical independent variables were horizontal 
collectivism and individualism and vertical collectivism and individualism, two 
indicators of high or low perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) and belief in the 
co-operation of others.  The PCE and FIO categorisation were based on mean splits.  
The dependent variable was individual defecting behaviour.  Differences between 
two samples, such as the Surburban and Township were assessed through 
independent sample t-tests. 
 
6.10. Pilot Studies 
 
Piloting of questionnaires is strongly recommended by many researchers, especially 
when the questions have not been widely tested in the country of interest (Churchill & 
Iacobucci, 2002).  Piloting was done twice, as there were two iterations of 
INDCOL95.  Furthermore, the behavioural items, in terms of the learners’, schools’ 
and communities’ positive and negative actions were refined over two iterations.  
These items were initially sourced from Chipp and Morton-McKay (2003) and were 
aimed at measuring perceived co-operation of others and respondent water 
conscientious behaviours.  Two groups of subjects were drawn from the target 
population and the research process was simulated in all respects (from sample 
selection to data collection).  In this way any misunderstandings, language problems 
and interviewer questions were dealt with.  The pilots were as similar as possible to 
the low-income sample, both were non-English because they would have had the 
greatest difficulty with the language.  The groups consisted of 33 and 23 learners 
from low income schools.  The first pilot was conducted at Vosloorus High School, 
where most learners speak seSwati or isiZulu (n= 33).  The second pilot was 
sampled at East Rand School of the Arts, where the predominant languages are 
isiXhosa and isiZulu (n = 23). 
6.11. Chapter Summary 
 
The current chapter reviewed the methodology employed in the current study.  The 
research questions, their associated hypotheses and the proposed model were 
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reviewed and the supporting literature for these was presented.  The research design 
was descriptive in nature and consisted of a quota sample of school learners in 
Gauteng.  Much attention was paid to measurement of the variables of the model, 
with established measures used wherever possible.  These measures were checked 
through two pilot studies.  The second pilot study was felt essential as the INDCOL95 
is sensitive to interpretation by different groups.  A brief review of the data analysis 
process was provided. 
 
Chapter 7 provides the results of the study, the sample obtained, reliability of the 
scales used and hypothesis testing.  
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7. Chapter 7: Results 
 
 
7.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter deals with the results obtained from the survey.  First the sample 
obtained is viewed through descriptive statistics and then each scale used is 
assessed in terms of its reliability.  All changes to scales formed are noted.  The 
validity of Triandis’ INDCOL95 is also established.  The chapter then turns to the 
testing of each hypothesis set out in Chapter 5 and concludes whether these are 
accepted or rejected. 
 
7.2. Sample Obtained 
 
The sample was evenly stratified by suburban and township schools. Some schools 
did have higher response rates than others (as set out in Table 6, p.99).  The 
suburban sample had a slight male and the township sample a female bias. The 
predominant home language spoken in the suburban sample was English, with some 
Afrikaans and Chinese speakers. Six respondents, who were classified as 
English/Other European, gave their home languages as Hungarian, Italian, 
Macedonian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese and Russian. A number of suburban 
learners also spoke an African language. In the township sample all respondents 
spoke the vernacular (see Table 10, p.109).  
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 Suburban Township  
High/Low Income School Count Column N % Count Column N %
Gender Male 110 54.5% 104 45.8%
  Female 92 45.5% 123 54.2%
Language Vernacular/ 
English English/Other language 175 83.3% 0 .0%
  African language 35 16.7% 234 100.0%
Language  Afrikaans 4 1.9% 0 .0%
  Chinese 5 2.4% 0 .0%
  English/Other European 166 79.0% 0 .0%
  North Sotho 2 1.0% 9 3.8%
  Pedi 0 .0% 20 8.5%
  Sesotho 2 1.0% 6 2.6%
  Shangaan 1 .5% 0 .0%
  South Sotho 7 3.3% 41 17.5%
  Swati 0 .0% 2 .9%
  Tsonga 2 1.0% 16 6.8%
  Tswana 5 2.4% 8 3.4%
  Xhosa 3 1.4% 26 11.1%
  Zulu 13 6.2% 105 44.9%
  Ndebele 0 .0% 1 .4%
School  Erasmus Monareng HS 0 .0% 50 21.4%
  Illinge HS 0 .0% 58 24.8%
  King David Victory Park 47 22.4% 0 .0%
  Krugersdorp HS 49 23.3% 0 .0%
  La Salle HS 48 22.9% 0 .0%
  Lethulwazi HS 0 .0% 42 17.9%
  P T Xulu Secondary 0 .0% 33 14.1%
  St Martins 20 9.5% 0 .0%
  The Hill HS 46 21.9% 0 .0%
  Thuto-Lesedi HS 0 .0% 51 21.8%
Table 10: Respondent Demographics 
   
At the level of descriptive statistics, the Township and the Suburban samples had 
different representation across the scales.  The Suburban learners were, on average, 
older (16) and in Grade 10.  In comparison with Township learners they had a greater 
sense of their own efficacy (the lower mean for PCE), and saw their schools as being 
more cooperative but did evidence some defecting behaviours.  Suburban 
respondents scored higher on Horizontal Individualism than any other dimension of 
the idiocentrism/allocentrism construct.  They scored higher on the BEHAV scale, 
meaning that their reported water use behaviour defected was more than for the 
Township group.  Township learners were high on VI and HC.  Suburban schools 
were more co-operative and less defective.  Suburban communities were also less 
defecting in their water conservation behaviour (see Table 11).   
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Suburban (n = 210) Township (n = 234) High/Low Income School 
 Standard 
Deviation Mean Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Age 16 1 15 1
Grade 10 1 9 0
PCE Composite Score 9.11 3.06 11.79 3.27
School Defection Behaviours 20.23 4.98 22.27 6.69
School Co-operation Behaviours 28.77 5.15 24.56 7.10
Community Defection Behaviours 24.52 5.77 31.49 6.87
Horizontal Collectivism (HC) -1.34 3.51 1.35 4.13
Horizontal Individualism (HI) 1.05 3.55 -.80 4.73
Vertical Collectivism (VC) -.75 3.91 .69 3.61
Vertical Individualism (VI) -1.78 4.54 1.75 3.40
Individualism (Lewis et al., 2000) 14.40 3.80 15.26 4.40
Altruism (Lewis et al., 2000) 11.21 1.80 12.11 2.17
Defecting Behaviour (Behav) 13.67 3.80 11.56 4.08
Overall Individualism (INDCOL95) -.77 5.78 1.18 6.75
Overall Collectivism (INDCOL95) -2.16 6.27 2.13 6.61
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Key Scales 
 
Not surprisingly, the community development level between the two locations was 
markedly different, with only 68% of the Township learners reporting that everyone 
has a flushing toilet (91% for the Suburban learners).  A high 30% of Township 
learners believed that it does not cost money to clean water and 42% believed that 
there were no costs involved in transporting water, hence there is no Public Good to 
be contributed towards. Table 12 documents these results. 
 
Suburban Township  High/Low Income School 
  Count Column N % Count Column N % 
No 19 9.5% 73 32.2%COMM DEVEL LEVEL Everyone 
has a flushing toilet. 
  Yes 182 90.5% 154 67.8%
No 13 6.4% 68 29.8%COST OF WATER It costs money to clean water before it goes into 
the tap 
  Yes 191 93.6% 160 70.2%
No 9 4.5% 94 42.0%COST OF WATER It costs money 
to get water from dams to taps. 
  Yes 193 95.5% 130 58.0%
Table 12: Community Development Level and Beliefs about Costs 
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 Most variables are based on a five point Likert scale, ranging from "strongly 
disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5) (see Appendix 1, Questionnaire).  Suburban 
learners had a greater belief in the quality of water they received.  The Township 
learners were firm in the assertion that everyone has a right to water and water 
should not be cut off (see Table 13). 
 
Suburban (n = 210) Township (n = 234) 
 High/Low Income School Standard 
Deviation Mean Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
WATER QUALITY Tap water is 
clean and safe to drink. 4.49 .93 4.07 1.33 
STRUCTURAL The government 
must make people use less 
water 
3.47 1.05 3.77 1.35 
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 
South Africa is a water rich 
country 
2.83 1.15 3.24 1.46 
RIGHTS Everybody must have 
water even if they cannot pay 
for it 
3.63 1.16 4.21 1.10 
RIGHTS Water should not be 
cut off if people don't pay for it 3.04 3.79 1.31 1.36 
PAY People must pay for the 
water they use. 4.11 4.11 1.04 1.20 
Table 13:  Attitudes Towards Water Use 
 
The manner in which the various scales used were generated and checked for 
reliability is detailed in that section. 
7.3. Scale Transformations and Variable 
Respectification 
 
Scales were transformed along the guidelines of their original authors.  Reverse 
coding was required in a total of three instances.  One item of the FIO scale, one 
from INDCOL95 and one from BEHAV (dependent variable) were reversed.  In all 
three instances the items with reverse coding proved to be slightly problematic, 
probably because they contained negatives which would be harder to comprehend 
by respondents.  Once the scales had been checked, variables were created for all 
those that proved reliable.  The following scales were created:  
• HI, HC, VC and VI from the INDCOL95;  
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• PCE (perceived consumer effectiveness); 
• SCHO COOP (the co-operative behaviour of the school);  
• SCHO DEFECT (the defecting behaviour of the school);  
• COMM COOP (the co-operative behaviour of the community);  
• A total INDIVIDUALISM and COLLECTVISM score from INDCOL95;  
• A ‘Indiv’ and ‘Altrusim’ score from Lewis et al.(2002); 
• BEHAV (the number of defecting behaviours on the part of respondents, 
maximum four); 
• FIO (belief in the co-operating behaviours of others) 
 
7.4. Reliability Statistics 
 
7.4.1. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
 
The four item scale had a Cronbach alpha of 0.57, which, although low, is 
approaching the 0.6 criterion set by Malhotra (1999).  It is also an improvement on 
the alpha from the second pilot (α = 0.45, n = 23) and the first (α = 0.19, n = 33).  The 
pilots engendered a change in language used.  In the final survey, an item by item 
analysis reveals that the most problematic item was “it is useless if one person tries 
to use less water and other people do not try to use less water.” (see Table 14, p.113 
below).  Nevertheless, the item does contribute to the overall scale reliability, as 
without it the reliability drops slightly.  A closer examination reveals that respondents 
tend to strongly disagree with all the other items, while agreeing with this one.  Table 
15, (p.113) demonstrates that the first two items “there is not much one person can 
do about water conservation” and “it is useless if one person tries to use less water 
and other people do not try to use less water”, (the communally phrased items) elicit 
less disagreement than the personally phrased items “nothing that I can do…” and “I 
don’t know how to….” 
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Item 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
PCE There is not much that 
any one person can do about 
water conservation. 
7.96 7.297 .424 .436 
PCE It is useless if one 
person tries to use less water 
and other people do not try to 
use less water. 
7.22 8.002 .259 .571 
PCE Nothing that I can do will 
make a difference to saving 
water in this country. 
8.05 7.396 .360 .487 
PCE I don't know how to use 
less water. 8.28 7.757 .368 .483 
Table 14: Item Total Reliability Statistics for PCE 
 
Item Mean Mode Standard Deviation Count 
PCE There is not much that 
any one person can do about 
water conservation. 
2.54 3.00 1.28 444 
PCE It is useless if one 
person tries to use less water 
and other people do not try to 
use less water. 
3.28 5.00 1.35 444 
PCE Nothing that I can do will 
make a difference to saving 
water in this country. 
2.45 1.00 1.34 444 
PCE I don't know how to use 
less water. 2.23 1.00 1.24 444 
Table 15: Item Statistics for PCE 
 
It was decided to keep all the items as this resulted in the highest reliability.  If the 
personal items were grouped together, reliability drops to 0.41 and the communal 
items have a reliability of 0.37 when tested together.  When the sample is spilt into 
high and low income schools, the Cronbach’s alpha for the high income schools is 
0.61 but is 0.39 for the low income schools.  A closer look at the descriptive statistics 
for PCE by school location (see Table 16, p.114) reveals that the Suburban learners 
consistently have a lower mean and standard deviation for all the items.  This means 
that the Suburban learners have greater confidence in their own abilities while the 
Township learners do not.  The mode for the communal items is far higher for the 
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Township sub-sample and even ‘5’ – strongly agree – for the item “it is useless if one 
person tries to use less water and other people do not try to use less water.”  A 
histogram comparison of the two sub-samples for each item appears in Appendix 3, 
p.173.  Box and Whisker plots (see Figure 10 below) reveal a similar distribution, 
albeit in a staggered level between the school types of responses, hence it was felt 
that the scale was usable. 
High/Low Income School Mean Mode Standard Deviation Count 
Suburban 2.19 1.00 1.11 210PCE There is not much that 
any one person can do about 
water conservation. 
  Township 2.87 3.00 1.33 234
Suburban 2.97 2.00 1.34 210
PCE It is useless if one 
person tries to use less water 
and other people do not try to 
use less water. 
  
Township 3.57 5.00 1.29 234
Suburban 2.20 2.00 1.14 210PCE Nothing that I can do will make a difference to saving 
water in this country. 
  Township 2.68 1.00 1.46 234
Suburban 1.77 1.00 .87 210PCE I don't know how to use 
less water. 
  Township 2.66 1.00 1.37 234
Table 16: Comparison of School Type and Item Statistics for PCE 
 
TownshipSuburban
High/Low Income School
4
2
302
190
PCE I don't know 
how to use less 
water.
PCE Nothing that I 
can do will make a 
difference to saving 
water in this country.
PCE It is useless if 
one person tries to 
use less water and 
other people do not 
try to use less 
water.
PCE There is not 
much that any one 
person can do about 
water conservation.
 
Figure 10: Box and Whisker Plot of PCE scale variables 
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7.4.2. Faith In Others 
 
Once the item “Most people don’t do much to use less water” was reverse coded, the 
scale reliability for FIO was calculated.  The Cronbach alpha was a low 0.256. (See 
Table 17 for individual item results).  This was in contrast to the second pilot that 
recorded an alpha of 0.438 (n = 33) and the first (α = 0.56, n = 23).  The final 
survey’s α increases to 0.53 if the item “Most people don’t do much to use less water” 
is removed. 
 
Item Scale Mean if Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
FIO Most people don't do 
much to use less water. 
(Reversed) 
6.58 3.695 -.060 .554 
FIO Soon, most people 
will use less water if they 
can. 
5.62 2.432 .247 -.073(a) 
FIO I am sure that most 
people will sacrifice to 
use less water. 
5.93 2.241 .264 -.138(a) 
a  The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability 
model assumptions. 
Table 17: Item total reliability statistics for FIO 
 
 
These results suggest that the negatively coded item “Most people don’t do much to 
use less water” caused great confusion.  Other studies in South Africa have 
experienced similar problems with negatively coded items (Corder, personal 
communication, 2006).  When the reverse coding is undone, the Cronbach’s alpha 
increases to 0.37.  If the item is omitted, the reliability increases to 0.55.  The 
Township sub-sample has a reliability of 0.426 with the item as is (not reverse coded) 
and an alpha of 0.112 if the item is reverse coded.  Clearly, this sub-sample has 
particular difficulty with the item.  The Suburban sub-sample fares a little better, with 
0.13 with the item as is (not reverse coded) and 0.353 with the item reverse coded.  
Thus, of the two sub-samples, the Suburban learners understood the directionality of 
the question, but the Township learners did not.  The item was not, however, a 
reasonable measure for either sample.  It was decided to omit the item from any 
further analyses. 
 
Suburban/Township comparison of the items demonstrates very little variance 
amongst the Suburban sample (all standard deviations are less than 1).  The 
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Township sub-sample is more optimistic than the Suburban learners about their 
fellow citizens, as their scores on the other two items are higher (see Table 18, 
below) 
 
High/Low Income School 
  Mean Mode 
Standard 
Deviation Count 
Suburban 2.52 2.00 .94 210FIO Most people don't do much to use less water. 
(Reversed) 
  Township 2.46 3.00 1.16 234
Suburban 3.18 3.00 .96 210FIO Soon, most people will use less water if they 
can. 
  Township 3.69 5.00 1.21 234
Suburban 2.69 3.00 .98 210FIO I am sure that most people will sacrifice to 
use less water. 
  Township 3.54 3.00 1.19 234
Table 18: Comparison of School Type and Item Statistics for FIO 
 
Omission of the item “Most people don’t do much to use less water”, while improving 
the overall reliability of the scale (0.55) does not fully satisfy queries with the FIO 
scale.  A Pearson correlation between the remaining two items “Soon most people 
will use less water if they can” and “I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use 
less water” revealed a significant (p = 0.000) correlation coefficient of 0.382.  Thus 
there is a positive relationship between the items.  When an item by item analysis is 
requested for the Cronbach alpha, a negative item covariance is reported.  These 
results confirm the initial concern that the FIO items were too abstract.  Indeed, 
frequency counts of the remaining two items show that most respondents selected ‘3’ 
or neutral (see Appendix 3, p.175, for the frequency counts and histograms of these 
variables). 
 
The Box and Whisker plot (see Figure 11, p.117) reveals three outliers for the 
Suburban schools and little relationship between the scale items.  The only item to 
have any relationship between the two sub-samples was “soon most people will use 
less water if they can.”  Thus, despite the promising results of the two pilots, the 
scale was deemed unusable and the two items were used separately in the analysis.  
The results confirmed concerns that were noted at the outset of the study, namely 
that the items had little practical reality for the learners. 
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TownshipSuburban
High/Low Income School
4
2
150
163
30 321
FIO I am sure that 
most people will 
sacrifice to use less 
water.
FIO Soon, most 
people will use less 
water if they can.
FIO Most people 
don't do much to use 
less water. 
(Reversed)
 
Figure 11: Box and Whisker Plot of FIO Scale Variables 
 
7.4.3. Perceived Co-operation of Influential Others 
 
Items from Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002) were included in the questionnaire for 
this scale.  These items rested on the observed co-operative or defection behaviour 
of influential others, that is, the school and the community.  Each scale was divided 
into ‘co-operative’ and ‘defection’ behaviours.  The Cronbach alphas of these are 
reviewed next.  Only the second pilot study’s alpha results are used as a comparison 
for this scale.  The first pilot had a much abbreviated scale which did not distinguish 
between community and school cooperative and defective behaviour, hence only the 
second pilot’s alphas can be used as a cross comparison. 
 
7.4.3.1. Co-operation of Others: School Behaviour 
 
a) School Defection Behaviour (SCHO DEFECT) 
 
The observed defection sub-scale of school behaviour reported a Cronbach alpha of 
0.64.  An item by item analysis of the scale reveals that the most problematic 
question was “hosepipes are used to water the school garden.”  (See Table 19, 
p.118). The extent to which learners could interpret this behaviour as neutral rather 
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than negative begs the question of whether the item should be included.  Its omission 
increases the Cronbach alpha to a respectable 0.71.  Thus when the variable of 
SCHO DEFECT was calculated, the hosepipe item was omitted.  This confirms that 
the improvements to the scale after the second pilot, which had an alpha of 0.348 
(n=23), were effective. 
 
Item 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SCHO DEFECT The taps at school drip 
and leak. 22.41 28.551 .432 .585
SCHO DEFECT The school has broken 
water pipes. 23.14 28.787 .420 .588
SCHO DEFECT The school has leaking 
water pipes. 22.96 27.358 .508 .565
SCHO DEFECT The school toilets leak. 22.75 28.209 .415 .587
SCHO DEFECT The school toilets are 
broken. 22.65 28.309 .376 .597
SCHO DEFECT Learners leave taps 
running 22.17 29.226 .373 .599
SCHO DEFECT Learners break the 
toilets 22.23 28.036 .441 .581
SCHO DEFECT Hosepipes are used to 
water the school garden 21.27 .70635.947 -.113 
SCHO DEFECT Hosepipes are used all 
day 22.63 32.502 .102 .662
Table 19: Item total reliability statistics for SCHO DEFECT 
  
b) School Co-operation Behaviour (SCHO COOP) 
 
The observed co-operative behaviour on the part of the school was measured in the 
sub-scale of SCHO COOP.  The Cronbach alpha here was 0.75.  An item by item 
analysis of the scale is presented in Table 20, p.119.  The composite measure of 
SCHO COOP was created using all the items.  This reflects that the improvements to 
the scale after the pilot were effective.  The second pilot had an alpha of 0.57. 
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 Item 
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
SCHO COOP Leaking taps are fixed. 23.42 32.398 .542 .699
SCHO COOP Dripping taps are closed 
properly. 23.69 36.873 .270 .749
SCHO COOP Broken or leaking pipes 
are fixed. 23.14 31.331 .584 .690
SCHO COOP The school has flushing 
toilets. 22.75 34.902 .382 .730
SCHO COOP Leaking toilets are fixed. 23.33 29.872 .694 .666
SCHO COOP Broken toilets are fixed. 23.37 30.228 .643 .676
SCHO COOP There is soap in the 
learner's toilets. 24.77 38.639 .129 .775
SCHO COOP There is a basin or 
bucket for learners to wash their hands 22.24 36.902 .296 .743
Table 20: Item total reliability statistics for SCHO COOP 
 
7.4.3.2. Community Behaviour 
a) Community Defection Behaviour (COMM DEFECT) 
 
The observed defection behaviour on the part of the community was measured in the 
COMM DEFECT sub-scale.  The Cronbach alpha here was 0.70.  An item by item 
analysis of the scale is presented in Table 21 below.  The composite measure of 
COMM DEFECT was created using all the items.  Community defecting behaviours 
had a high Cronbach α of 0.816 in the second pilot. 
 
Item 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
COMM DEFECT Taps drip or leak. 20.79 28.296 .449 .663 
COMM DEFECT Most people ignore 
dripping or leaking taps. 20.45 27.656 .468 .658 
COMM DEFECT Most people use 
hosepipes are used to wash cars. 19.78 30.920 .241 .706 
COMM DEFECT Most people use 
the toilet as a dustbin. 21.14 28.583 .377 .678 
COMM DEFECT Water pipes are 
broken or leaking. 20.79 28.562 .414 .670 
COMM DEFECT Most people you 
know brush their teeth while the tap 
is running 
20.08 29.533 .337 .687 
COMM DEFECT Most people wash 
their dishes under a running tap 20.66 29.094 .356 .683 
COMM DEFECT Most people rinse 
their clothes under a running tap 20.39 26.438 .503 .648 
Table 21: Item total reliability statistics for COMM DEFECT 
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b) Community Co-operation Behaviour (COMM COOP) 
 
The observed co-operation behaviour on the part of the community was measured in 
the COMM COOP sub-scale.  The Cronbach alpha here was 0.47.  An item by item 
analysis of the scale is presented below.  The second pilot reported an acceptable 
alpha of 0.63 for this scale (n = 23).  Since the piloting was done on lower income 
respondents, a cross comparison of the two sub-samples was undertaken.  The 
Township sample consistently reflects greater variance in the data (see Table 22, 
below) and the trend across Table 22 and Table 23 suggests that the scale has 
greater reliability amongst the Township sample than the Suburban one.  An item by 
item review (see Table 23) demonstrates that different items fare well and poorly 
across sub-samples.  Thus as a measure of the construct COMM COOP, the items 
need further refinement.  A summated scale for this variable was not created. 
 
 High/Low Income School Mean Mode Standard Deviation Count 
Suburban 3.79 4.00 1.08 210 COMM COOP Most people 
close taps properly. 
  Township 3.47 3.00 1.27 234 
Suburban 3.66 5.00 1.27 210 COMM COOP Most adults 
fix broken or leaking toilets. 
  Township 3.26 3.00 1.31 234 
Suburban 4.28 5.00 1.05 210 COMM COOP People in 
the neighbourhood pay the 
water account. NOTE 
  
Township 3.22 3.00 1.30 234 
Suburban 3.44 3.00 1.12 210 COMM COOP Adults/ 
parents try to use less 
water. 
  
Township 3.46 5.00 1.34 234 
Table 22: Item total reliability statistics for COMM COOP 
 
 
Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted 
Item 
Pilot 2  Final Survey 
Township 
School 
Suburban 
School 
COMM COOP Most people close taps 
properly. .530 .464 .517 .353
COMM COOP Most adults fix broken 
or leaking toilets. .594 .321 .363 .205
COMM COOP People in the 
neighbourhood pay the water account. 
NOTE 
.609 .347 .393 .258
COMM COOP Adults/ parents try to 
use less water. .500 .459.457 .370 
OVERALL ALPHA .630 .473 .487 .395
Table 23:Comparison of School Type and Item Statistics for COMM COOP 
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7.4.4. Individualism and Collectivism 
 
7.4.4.1. INDCOL95 
 
The effectiveness of INDCOL95 was assessed in a number of ways.  The language 
involved was subject to a number of discussions and two pilot tests (see Table 9, 
p.104).  Triandis (personal communication, 2003) recommended standardisation to 
be done within each participant.  He asserted that the reference effect must be 
accounted for, and this would be done through computation of the mean and 
standard deviation per respondent (rather than per variable) and using these to 
calculate a within individual z score.  The reliabilities for the scale based on the pilots, 
the final survey (unstandardised items), Triandis’ standardisation and Z scores are 
presented in Table 24 below. 
 
Alpha Pilot 1 Pilot 2 
Final 
Survey 
Triandis 
Stdisation 
Z-Score 
Horizontal Collectivism 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.31 0.59 
Horizontal Individualism 0.46 0.38 0.60 0.60 0.65 
Vertical Collectivism 0.42 0.63 0.47 0.21 0.51 
Vertical Individualism 0.43 0.55 0.66 (0.69)** 0.27 0.66 
Collectivism  0.74 0.66 0.34 0.69 
Individualism  0.51 0.54 (0.61)* 0.13 0.65 
Table 24: INCOL95 Reliabilities 
Note: *if item “it is important to me that I am different to other people and my own 
person” is removed 
 ** if reverse coded item “winning is not important to me” was omitted 
 
Substantial improvement in reliability between iterations is established, with the 
standardised Z score reflecting the best result.  Triandis’ standardisation appears not 
to have worked for any of the sub-scales apart from Horizontal Individualism.  On this 
basis it was decided to use the Z scores in the computation of the four dimensions.  It 
should be noted that slight difficulty was registered with the reverse coded item 
“winning is not important to me”, but its overall impact was small, so the item 
remained.  See Appendix 3 for item by item tables (p.177). 
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7.4.4.2. Lewis, Maras and Simmonds’ (2000) Measure 
 
The eight items from Lewis et al. (2000) outlined under Chapter 5, had results that 
echoed those in the original study, where the individualism/collectivism items scored 
α = 0.65 there, they had an alpha of 0.72 here.  The altruism items registered a low 
0.39 in Lewis et al. (2000) which is on a par with the current study (α = 0.38).  The 
scale, therefore, appears to be working in much the same way for a South African as 
for the British sample.  The low Cronbach is of concern, yet Lewis et al. (2000) still 
asserted the scale’s usefulness.  Hence the global individualism and altruism 
measures for these items were created with their α of a similar low value.  The main 
purpose of including these items was as a cross-check to see if the INDCOL95 could 
be used amongst South African learners.  A scale’s concurrent validity is ascertained 
to the extent it displays variation in the expected direction with other measures of the 
same construct (Malhotra, 1999).  Thus a Pearson correlation matrix between the 
two measures, INDCOL95 and Lewis et al. (2000), was examined.  Columns entitled 
‘Indiv’ and ‘Altruism’ are of the most interest as it is the intersection of these with 
Triandis’ dimensions that establishes the concurrent validity of the scale.  The ‘Indiv’ 
measure of Lewis et al. (2000) has a positive correlation with both sub-dimensions of 
Triandis’ individualism (HI r = 0.208 and VI = r = 0.165).  Altruism loads significantly 
on HC (r = 0.421) and VC (r = 0.383).  Hence the scales are both reliable and valid 
(see Table 25). 
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  Indiv Altruism HC_Overall HI_Overall VC_Overall
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     Indiv 
N 417    
Pearson Correlation -.043 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .386    Altruism 
N 399 424   
Pearson Correlation -.039 .421(**) 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .454 .000   HC_Overall  
N 379 385 401  
Pearson Correlation .208(**) .002 .053 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .973 .312   HI_Overall 
N 386 392 373 410 
Pearson Correlation .039 .383(**) .479(**) .112(*) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .000 .000 .028  VC_Overall 
N 386 393 377 385 410
Pearson Correlation .165(**) .153(**) .191(**) .058 .191(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .003 .000 .262 .000VI_Overall 
N 375 383 366 377 377
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 25: Correlation Matrix Between Measures of Individualism/Collectivism 
 
 
7.4.5. Individual Behaviour 
 
Measurement of individual socially responsible behaviour is plagued by social 
desirability bias.  Hence the current study elected to place a few key behaviours that 
were not clearly loaded in one way or another, but were included in the informational 
campaigns that DWAF and other water organisations had used.  The initial set of 
items included observations (“Do you ever see taps leaking” and ”Do you ever see 
leaking pipes”) and one reverse coded item (“Do you ever stop taps from dripping”).  
The initial α = 0.51 increased to 0.58 if the reverse coded item was omitted.  Upon 
closer appraisal of the scale, it was decided to rather focus on behaviour rather than 
observation, as viewing other people’s behaviour was more in the realm of co-
operation of others.  By leaving out the two observational items, the scale’s reliability 
increased to a respectable 0.678.  The dependent variable of individual cooperative 
behaviour was thus calculated on the abbreviated scale. 
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7.5. Hypothesis Testing 
 
7.5.1. Definition of Terms 
 
For ease of reading, below is a summation of the terms used in testing the 
hypotheses and the model. 
 
• FIO: Faith in Others – the belief that others will act positively 
• PCE: Perceived Consumer Effectiveness – the belief in the efficacy of one's 
own actions with regard to the environment 
• SCHO DEFECT: Defecting behaviours displayed by the school – perceived 
negative water usage by the school 
• SCHO COOP: Co-operative behaviours displayed by the school – perceived 
positive water usage behaviours demonstrated by the school 
• COMM DEFECT: Defecting behaviours displayed by the community – 
perceived negative water usage by the community 
• HI: Horizontal Individualism – degree to which a person is individualistic and 
non-hierarchical.  These individuals value self-reliance and equality. 
• HC: Horizontal Collectivism – degree to which a person is collectivistic and 
non-hierarchical.  These individuals value conformity to the group, 
relationships with others and equality. 
• VI: Vertical Individualism – degree to which a person is individualistic and 
hierarchical.  These individuals value individual prominence and status and 
are the most competitive. 
• VC: Vertical Collectivism – degree to which a person is collectivistic and 
hierarchical.  These individuals value group norms and classes within society. 
• BEHAV: defecting behaviours displayed by the individual (dependent 
variable). 
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 All the relationships between these variables are indicated in the diagram below will 
be tested in the proposed model is outlined below: 
 
 
(FIO) 
Perceived consumer 
effectiveness 
(PCE) 
Belief in the co-
operation of others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value orientation: 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
• HC 
• HI 
• VI 
• VC • Community 
• School 
• Individual  
Water conserving 
behaviours 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Proposed Model 
 
 
7.5.2. Hypothesis 1 
 
H1: Consumers' beliefs that others co-operate will influence the number of water 
conserving actions they exhibit; 
 
The first hypothesis dealt with the relationship between perceived co-operation of 
others and consumer willingness to co-operate (FIO and witnessed co-operation).  
This was testing using a Pearson correlation coefficient.  Those with high perceived 
co-operation of others should exhibit low defecting behaviour.  Thus a negative 
correlation between the two would be sought.  Although the FIO scale did not emerge 
as intended from the reliability checks, there were still variables available to test the 
first hypothesis.  All the items of FIO were independently entered into a correlation 
with BEHAV, the measure of defecting behaviour.  The correlation matrix is 
presented in Table 26.  Thus FIO ‘soon use less’ and FIO ‘sacrifice’ have the 
following significant negative relationships with defecting behaviour r = -0.132 (p = 
0.007) and r = -0.226 (p = 0.000) respectively.  As there is a significant negative 
relationship between the two FIO items and number of defecting behaviours 
exhibited by the respondents, thus the first hypothesis is supported. 
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**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 26: Correlation Matrix Between Defecting Behaviours and Co-operation of Others 
 
7.5.3. Hypothesis 2 
 
H2: Consumers' degree of collectivism/individualism will influence their belief that 
others will co-operate; 
 
A Pearson correlation matrix was calculated to test the relationship between 
collectivism/individualism and FIO.  As Table 27, p.127, demonstrates, there is a 
positive relationship between individualism and FIO “soon most people will use less 
water if they can” (hereafter referred to as ‘soon use less’) (r = 0.157, p = 0.002) and 
FIO “I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less water” (hereafter referred to 
as ‘sacrifice’) (r = 0.119, p = 0.021).  A much stronger positive relationship is 
evidenced between collectivism and FIO, with “soon use less” (r = 0.243, p = 0.000) 
and FIO “sacrifice” (r = 0.289, p = 0.000).  Thus the hypothesis is supported.   
 
 
 
 (Defecting) Behaviours 
FIO Soon, 
most people 
will use less 
water if they 
can. 
FIO I am sure 
that most 
people will 
sacrifice to 
use less 
water. 
Pearson Correlation -.132(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007   FIO Soon, most people will use less water if they can. 
N 420 433 
Pearson Correlation -.226(**) .382(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
FIO I am sure that most 
people will sacrifice to use 
less water. N 428 431 441
Pearson Correlation -.016 -.065 -.034
Sig. (2-tailed) .737 .179 .473
FIO Most people don't do 
much to use less water. 
(Reversed)  N 428 429 438
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FIO I am 
sure that 
most 
people will 
sacrifice to 
use less 
water. 
School 
Defection 
Behaviours 
School Co-
operation 
Behaviours 
Community 
Defection 
Behaviours 
Lewis et 
al. (2000) 
Indiv 
Lewis et al. 
(2000) 
Altruism 
Triandis 
INDCOL95 
Individualism 
Triandis 
INDCOL95 
Collectivism  
Pearson Correlation .382(**) -.106(*) -.053 .033 .019 .083 .157(**) .243(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .037 .303 .518 .701 .093 .002 .000 
FIO Soon, most people will 
use less water if they can. 
N 431 390 380 385 407 415 369 372 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.040 -.055 .124(*) .038 .188(**) .119(*) .289(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .426 .279 .014 .435 .000 .021 .000 
FIO I am sure that most people 
will sacrifice to use less water. 
N  396 387 393 414 421 375 374 
Pearson Correlation  1 -.389(**) .406(**) .077 .104(*) .032 .003 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .000 .135 .042 .549 .958 School Defection Behaviours 
N   359 365 375 383 344 344 
Pearson Correlation   1 -.330(**) -.053 -.011 -.023 .005 
Sig. (2-tailed)    .000 .311 .833 .668 .926 School Co-operation Behaviours 
N    352 369 374 337 339 
Pearson Correlation    1 .123(*) .145(**) .118(*) .160(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)     .018 .005 .030 .003 Community Defection Behaviours 
N     371 377 340 344 
Pearson Correlation     1 -.043 .258(**) .004 
Sig. (2-tailed)      .386 .000 .934 Indiv (Lewis et al., 2000) 
N      399 353 357 
Pearson Correlation      1 .109(*) .490(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)       .038 .000 Altruism (Lewis et al., 2000) 
N       359 363 
Pearson Correlation       1 .191(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)        .000 Individualism (INDCOL95) 
N        333 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 27: Relationship between FIO and Individualism and Collectivism 
7.5.4. Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
 
H3a: Consumers' degree of vertical/horizontal allocentrism will influence their belief 
that others will co-operate; 
 
H3b: Consumers' degree of vertical/horizontal idiocentrism will influence their belief 
that others will co-operate; 
 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b were assessed firstly in terms of a Pearson correlation matrix 
(Table 28, p.129) in order to investigate the relationships between HC, HI, VC and VI 
and the measures of co-operation of others, that is the two FIO measures. 
 
A firm positive relationship was present between FIO (soon use less) and FIO 
(sacrifice) and HC (r = 0.212 and r = 0.273 respectively; p = 0.000 for both).  The two 
FIO items also had a positive relationship with VC (r = 0.159 for ‘soon use less’ and r 
= 0.212 for ‘sacrifice’, p < 0.01).  The positive relationship was present for VI and 
these items: FIO ‘use less’ (r = 0.137, p = 0.007) and FIO ‘sacrifice’ (r = 0.205, p = 
0.205). 
 
In order to explore these somewhat staggered relationships, the second assessment 
of the hypotheses was done.  As FIO ‘soon use less’ and FIO ‘sacrifice’ 
demonstrated a positive relationship with individualism/collectivism, stepwise 
regressions were run with these as the dependent variables and the dimensions of 
individualism/collectivism as the predictors to see the relative influence of the 
independent variables in relation to each other.  The results of these are presented 
below in Table 29, p.129. 
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FIO Soon, most 
people will use 
less water if 
they can. 
FIO I am sure 
that most 
people will 
sacrifice to 
use less 
water. 
Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)    
FIO Soon, most people 
will use less water if 
they can. N 433  
Pearson Correlation .382(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
FIO I am sure that most 
people will sacrifice to 
use less water. N 431 441 
Pearson Correlation .212(**) .273(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 Horizontal Collectivism (HC) 
N 395 398 
Pearson Correlation .065 -.033 
Sig. (2-tailed) .196 .510 
Horizontal Individualism 
(HI) 
N 401 408 
Pearson Correlation .159(**) .212(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 
Vertical Collectivism 
(VC) 
N 400 407 
Pearson Correlation .137(**) .205(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .000 Vertical Individualism (VI) 
N 391 399 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 28: Relationship between Horizontal and Vertical Collectivism and Individualism 
and Co-operation 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Final Stepwise 
Model 
β Coefficients Significance
FIO ‘Soon use less’ 0.07** 
HC 
VC 
0.165 
0.149 
0.000 
0.000 
FIO ‘Sacrifice’ 
VC 0.180 0.004 
0.12** HC 0.162 0.009 
VI 0.125 0.019 
**Model is significant at 0.01 
Table 29: Stepwise Regression of Horizontal/Vertical Collectivism/Individualism on FIO 
 
 
Table 29 above indicates that there is a relationship between collectivist tendencies, 
and faith in others.  Horizontal orientations tend to be associated with co-operation in 
both models.  Thus support for the hypotheses is found.  
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7.5.5. Hypotheses 4 and 6: Influences of PCE 
 
H4: Perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) will influence the number of water 
conserving actions consumers exhibit (BEHAV); 
 
H6: Perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) will influence consumers' belief that 
others will co-operate (FIO); 
 
The scale of PCE is in the negative and this should be borne in mind when reviewing 
the relationships.  In order to test these hypotheses, a correlation was run between 
PCE, FIO (‘soon use less’ and ‘sacrifice’), SCHO COOP, SCHO DEFECT, COMM 
DEFECT and BEHAV.  The results are shown in Table 30 below.  As this table 
demonstrates, PCE has no relationship with individual defecting behaviours r = 0.012 
(p = 0.8), but a positive relationship with school defection behaviours (r = 0.123, p = 
0.16) and community defection behaviours (r = 0.285, p = 0.000) and a negative 
relationship with school co-operative behaviours (r = -0.212, p = 0.000).  Thus low 
PCE coincides with school and community defection behaviours (as the scale is 
negative) and high PCE coincides with school co-operative behaviours.  PCE also 
had a positive relationship with FIO ‘sacrifice’ (r = 0.158, p = 0.001).  Hence 
individuals high in PCE tend to have low FIO.  Thus hypothesis 4 is not supported at 
the level of the individual.  PCE is, however, related to perceptions of school and 
community defection behaviours.  Some support for Hypothesis 6 is found. 
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  PCE Composite Score 
Pearson Correlation 1 
Sig. (2-tailed)   PCE Composite Score  
N 427 
Pearson Correlation .123(*) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 School Defection Behaviours  
N 387 
Pearson Correlation -.212(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
School Co-operation Behaviours 
  
N 376 
Pearson Correlation .285(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 Community Defection Behaviours  
N 382 
Pearson Correlation .075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .127 
FIO Soon, most people will use 
less water if they can. 
 N 419 
Pearson Correlation .158(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
FIO I am sure that most people 
will sacrifice to use less water. 
 N 426 
Pearson Correlation .012 
Sig. (2-tailed) .803 
Individual Defecting Behaviours 
(BEHAV) 
 N 416 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 30: PCE and its Relationship with Defecting Behaviours and FIO 
 
 
7.5.6. Hypotheses 3c, 5 and 6: Interaction of PCE, FIO and BEHAVIOUR 
 
H3c: Belief in co-operation of others (FIO) and its influence on behaviour will be 
moderated by degree of horizontal/vertical idiocentrism/allocentrism; 
 
H5: Perceived consumer effectiveness and its influence on behaviour will be 
moderated by degree of horizontal/vertical idiocentrism/allocentrism; 
 
H6: Perceived consumer effectiveness will influence consumers' belief that others 
will co-operate; 
 
These hypotheses lies at the core of the proposed model.  The interrelationships 
between PCE, FIO, HC, HI, VC and VI and the impact of these variables and 
behaviour are best investigated through a MANOVA.  MANOVA or multivariate 
analysis of variance enables the impact and interactions of multiple independent 
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variables on single or multiple dependent variables to be assessed (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & Black, 1998).  In an ANOVA the equality of the dependent variable means 
across groups is tested, while in a MANOVA the equality of vectors of means is 
assessed (Hair, et al., 1998).  Most importantly, a MANOVA enables the interaction 
effects between factors (or independent variables) to be ascertained.  Hence should 
the value of the dependent variable at different combined levels of the independent 
variables change, the inter-related impact of the independent variables is revealed.  
A multiple regression enters variables separately into the equation.  A MANOVA was 
deemed more suitable than a multiple regression, as the interaction of the 
independent variables could be determined.  
 
Despite problems highlighted in the reliability results, the two positively worded FIO 
items have demonstrated predictive patterns with other variables, indicating that 
these have predictive validity as a scale.  Based on this accumulated evidence from 
the other hypothesis tests, it was decided to form a scale of the two, as initially 
intended.  The interaction factors, PCE, HI, HC, VI and VC, together with the 
summated FIO, form the independent variables.  An analysis with more than two 
treatments is termed a factorial design (Hair et al., 1998).  A 4 x 2 x 2 factorial design 
was thus conceptualised, with the independent factors as shown in Table 31 below: 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Levels 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
4 HC VC HI VI 
PCE 2 Low High N/A N/A 
FIO 2 Low High N/A N/A 
Table 31: Factorial Design 
 
Respondents were then classified into one of the individualist/collectivist value 
orientations based on their highest score across all four (HC, HI, VC, VI).  Two new 
variables were created.  PCE was split into Hi/Lo conditions, as was FIO, where 
individuals scoring above the mean on both were classified as ‘high’ on that factor 
and those below were classified as ‘low’.  The mean for PCE was 10.5 and 6.7 for 
FIO. 
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The main effects and the interaction effects of the independent variables were 
reviewed.  In factorial designs, the individual effect of each treatment (independent) 
variable on the dependent variable is term a main effect (Hair, et al., 1998).  The joint 
effects of two treatment variables, that is, the difference between the groups due to 
one independent variable fluctuates depending on the level of another independent 
variable, is termed an interaction effect (Hair et al., 1998).  This is thus an indication 
of the moderating influence of one variable on another.  Table 32 indicates the four 
main tests for significant differences among the vectors in the MANOVA calculation.  
All tests calculate an F statistic much like conventional ANOVA.  But, since the 
difference is among vectors and not groups, there are four different theories how this 
may be done: Pillai's Trace; Wilk's Lamda, Hotelling's Trace and Roy's Largest Root 
(Hair et al., 1998).  The variables with significantly different vectors on all four 
measures are illustrated in Table 32.   Significant variables were FIO and 
Individualism/Collectivism as main effects (p = 0.032 and the marginal p = 0.051 
respectively). The interaction of PCE and FIO approached significance at p = 0.071, 
as did the interaction between PCE and Individualism/Collectivism (p = 0.081).  The 
r2 was a 0.109 and adjusted r2 = 0.056. 
 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Noncent. 
Paramete
r 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Model  501.070(e) 15 33.405 2.035 .014 30.530 .959
Intercept  36264.351 1 36264.351 2209.56 .000 2209.562 1.000
FIO_Factor  76.143 1 76.143 4.639 .032 4.639 .574
PCE_factor  .789 1 .789 .048 .827 .048 .055
Indiv_Col_Classification 129.059 3 43.020 2.621 .051 7.863 .638
FIO_Factor * 
PCE_factor  54.008 1 54.008 3.291 .071 3.291 .439
FIO_Factor * 
Indiv_Col_Classification  29.657 3 9.886 .602 .614 1.807 .175
PCE_factor * 
Indiv_Col_Classification  111.701 3 37.234 2.269 .081 6.806 .569
FIO_Factor * 
PCE_factor * 
Indiv_Col_Classification  
10.664 3 3.555 .217 .885 .650 .090
Error  4086.703 249 16.412      
Total  47444.000 265       
  4587.774 264       
a  Computed using alpha = .05 
b  R Squared = .109 (Adjusted R Squared = .056) 
Table 32: Tests of Between Subjects Effects: Dependent Variable  BEHAVIOUR 
 
The plots of the impact of these variables on behaviour as estimated by the model 
are represented in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  As FIO increases, as expected, 
defecting behaviour decreases (see Figure 13).  A large number of defective 
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behaviours are exhibited by those respondents classified as horizontal individualists 
and collectivists (see Figure 14).  Vertical individualists (township schools) are shown 
by the solution to have the lowest levels of defecting behaviour, an unexpected result 
given that these respondents have the lowest levels of community spirit. 
 
High FIOLow FIO Hi/Lo FIO
13.20 
13.00 
12.80 
12.60 
12.40 
12.20 
12.00 
11.80 
Estim
ated M
arginal D
efecting B
ehaviour M
eans
Predicted Marginal Means of Effect of FIO 
on Defecting Behaviour
Figure 13: Profile Plot of the influence of FIO and BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
Vertical IndividualismVertical CollectivismHorizontal IndividualismHorizontal Collectivism 
Indiv_Col_Classification
13.50 
13.00 
12.50 
12.00 
11.50 
11.00 
Estim
ated M
arginal D
efecting  B
ehaviours M
eans
Predicted Marginal Means of Effect of PCE 
on Defecting Behaviour
Figure 14: Profile Plot of the influence of Indiv/coll and BEHAVIOUR 
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 In terms of the interaction variables, the following plots demonstrate that their effects 
were largely as expected (see Figure 15 and Figure 16).  Low FIO coupled with high 
PCE resulted in the most defecting behaviour, high PCE and high FIO saw the most 
co-operative behaviour. Respondents with low PCE were largely unaffected by FIO 
(see Figure 15).    This interaction is termed a disordinal interaction effect.  In a 
disordinal interaction the effects of one treatment are positive for some levels and 
negative for others (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
 
High FIOLow FIO 
Hi/Lo FIO
13.50 
13.00 
12.50 
12.00 
11.50 
Estim
ated M
arginal D
efecting B
ehaviour M
eans
Low PCE
Hi PCE
Hi/Lo PCE
Predicted Marginal Means of the Interaction of FIO 
and PCE on Defecting Behaviour 
Figure 15: Profile Plot of the influence of FIO and PCE 
 
The other interaction variable, PCE and Indiv/Coll, returns some expected and some 
unexpected results.  PCE demonstrates a disordinal interaction with 
individualism/collectivism.  Individuals defect more at higher levels of PCE for all 
individualist/collectivist types apart from vertical individualists, who defect markedly 
less at high PCE and more at low PCE. 
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Figure 16: Profile Plot of the influence of PCE and Indiv/Coll 
 
There is thus some support for hypotheses 3b to 6. 
 
7.5.7. Hypothesis 7: Influence of Socio-economic Background 
 
H7a: Consumers in lower socio-economic backgrounds will exhibit greater degrees 
of collectivism than individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
H7b: Consumers in lower socio-economic backgrounds will exhibit different levels of 
degrees of PCE and FIO than individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds.  
 
An independent samples t-test was used to test hypotheses 7a and 7b.  Table 33 
below demonstrates that the Township learners are significantly different from the 
Suburban learners on all the variables.    Township learners exhibit a greater degree 
of horizontal and vertical collectivism, vertical individualism, a greater faith in others 
(FIO) and a lower degree of perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) (note the scale 
is on the negative).  Suburban learners possess more horizontal individualism, less 
faith in others (FIO) and more PCE (indicated by the lower score).  Thus both sub-
hypotheses of hypothesis 7 are supported. 
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 High/Low Income School N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Signif  
(2 Tailed) 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Suburban 202 -1.3386 3.51389 0.000 .24724
Horizontal Collectivism 
Township 199 1.3531 4.13265 0.000 .29296
Suburban 206 1.0522 3.55438 0.000 .24765
Horizontal Individualism 
Township 204 -.7975 4.72623 0.000 .33090
Suburban 206 -.7489 3.90932 0.000 .27238
Vertical Collectivism 
Township 204 .6872 3.60840 0.000 .25264
Suburban 202 -1.7845 4.54188 0.000 .31957
Vertical Individualism 
Township 199 1.7478 3.40051 0.000 .24106
Suburban 207 5.8647 1.56449 0.000 .10874
Faith in Others (FIO) 
Township 224 7.2589 1.97403 0.000 .13190
Suburban 205 9.1073 3.05797 0.000 .21358Perceived Consumer 
Effectiveness (PCE)  0.000 Township 222 11.7928 3.26954 .21944
Table 33: T-Test of Differences between Township and Suburban Learners 
 
 
7.5.8. Hypothesis 8: Consumer Rights 
H8: Consumer rights are more important for idiocentrics than allocentrics.  
 
The relationship between consumer rights and individualism/collectivism was 
assessed by means of a Pearson correlation coefficient between the two questions 
on right to water and the four levels of individualism/collectivism and the overall 
measure of individualism/collectivism.    A relationship was found to exist, but in the 
opposite direction: collectivists were more concerned with rights (see, for example, 
the statement “everybody must have water even if they cannot pay for it” registered 
correlations of: HC r = 0.194, p = 0.000; VC r = 0.183, p = 0.000 and overall 
Collectivism r = 0.231, p = 0.000).  Vertical individualists do show some concern with 
rights (r = 0.120, p = 0.000) on this question.  The strong association of the same 
cultural value orientations (HC, VC and VI) with lower socio-economic status (see 
Table 33) may mean that the concern with rights is confounded with affordability, 
especially as the question was asked in terms of costs.  The hypothesis is rejected. 
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RIGHTS 
Everybody must 
have water even if 
they cannot pay 
for it 
RIGHTS Water 
should not be cut 
off if people don't 
pay for it 
Pearson Correlation 1 .454(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
RIGHTS Everybody must have 
water even if they cannot pay 
for it N 441 432
Pearson Correlation .454(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
RIGHTS Water should not be 
cut off if people don't pay for it 
N 432 434
Pearson Correlation .194(**) .207(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000Horizontal Collectivism 
N 399 391
Pearson Correlation .031 .032
Sig. (2-tailed) .532 .528Horizontal Individualism 
N 408 403
Pearson Correlation .183(**) .176(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000Vertical Collectivism 
N 407 400
Pearson Correlation .120(*) .121(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .016Vertical Individualism 
N 399 393
Pearson Correlation .101 .109(*)
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .037INDIVIDUALISM 
N 375 370
Pearson Correlation .231(**) .231(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000COLLECTIVISM 
N 375 367
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 34: Correlation between Concern for Rights and Individualism/Collectivism 
 
 
7.5.9. Hypotheses 9: Preference for Structural Solutions 
 
H9a: Consumers low in FIO will display greater preference for structural solutions.  
 
A Pearson correlation was used to assess the relationship between FIO and 
preference for structural solutions, as the question regarding structural solutions: “the 
government must make people use less water” was asked on a scale of ‘1’ (strongly 
disagree) to ‘5’ (strongly agree).  Surprisingly there was a significant positive 
relationship in the reverse direction, as higher FIO coincided with a greater 
preference for structural solutions (r = 0.215, p = 0.000).  Hence this hypothesis is 
not supported. 
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 H9b: Consumers from Township areas will display greater preference for structural 
solutions.  
 
An independent samples t-test was used to determine if there was a greater 
preference for structural solutions amongst Township rather than Suburban learners.  
This was indeed found to be the case.  Suburban had a mean of 3.47 and Township 
learners reported a mean of 3.77 with the difference between the two at p = 0.009.  
Thus this hypothesis is supported. 
 
7.5.10. Hypothesis 10: Perceptions of Resource Abundance and 
Harvesting Behaviour 
 
H10: Consumers who believe the resource is plentiful will display greater harvesting 
behaviour.  
 
A Pearson correlation was used to verify the relationship between defecting 
behaviour and perception of resource abundance.  The question “South Africa is a 
water rich country” was used as a proxy for resource abundance.  There was a 
significant positive correlation between resource abundance and harvesting 
behaviour (individual defection behaviours) as r = 0.114 and p = 0.019.  Support is 
therefore found for this hypothesis. 
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7.6. Chapter Summary  
 
The chapter opened with a review of the differences between the Township and the 
Suburban learners.  These differences confirmed the decision to stratify the sample 
along the dimension of location.  A review of the scales used then followed.  Most 
scales were usable, apart from some problems with reverse coded items and faith in 
others (FIO).  Although the FIO scale demonstrated some problems, analysis using 
the two remaining items at an individual level demonstrated that they worked in 
unison.  Hence the decision was made to convert the two FIO items into a summated 
scale for testing the model. 
 
Hypothesis Relationships in Model 
Supported/Not 
Supported 
Hypothesis 1 FIO influences individual co-operative behaviour Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Collectivism/Individualism influences FIO Supported 
Hypothesis 3a Vertical/horizontal allocentrism influences FIO Supported 
Hypothesis 3b Vertical/horizontal idiocentrism influences FIO Supported 
Hypothesis 3c FIO and its influence on behaviour moderated by HI, HC, VI and VC Not Supported 
Hypothesis 4 PCE influences individual cooperative behaviour Supported 
Hypothesis 5 The influence of PCE is moderated by HI, VC, VI and HC Supported 
Hypothesis 6 PCE influences FIO Supported 
Hypothesis 7a Lower socio-economic consumers will be more collectivistic  Supported 
Hypothesis 7b Lower socio-economic backgrounds will have different levels of PCE and FIO  Supported 
Hypothesis 8 Consumer rights are more important for idiocentrics than allocentrics Not Supported 
Hypothesis 9a Low FIO consumers prefer structural solutions Not Supported 
Township consumers prefer structural 
solutions Hypothesis 9b Supported 
Consumers who believe the resource is 
plentiful will harvest more Hypothesis 10 Supported 
Table 35: Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Table 35 above provides a summary of the findings of the hypothesis testing in 
Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 discusses these findings and their implications, as well as 
provides suggestions for future research and delineates the limitations of the study. 
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 8. Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
8.1. Chapter Overview 
 
The current chapter outlines the research process followed thus far and presents the 
degree to which the proposed model was validated.  A reformulated model in the light 
of the findings is presented.  The results are discussed in terms of their implications 
for the model, the literature and the equations.  Most importantly, the implications for 
the marketing of water conservation are presented.  The limitations of the study, 
suggestions for future research and conclusion is provided. 
8.2. Review of Research Process 
 
The literature enabled a model to be developed that would explain consumer 
behaviour when faced with the Resource Dilemma of conserving water.  A Resource 
Dilemma involves consumers deciding between self- and other-interest when faced 
with the impasse of harvesting for self or sacrificing for the benefit of the group.  
There has been evidence that consumers will conserve when they believe their 
actions have an effect and when others will sacrifice as well.  Nevertheless, under 
both conditions they are faced with the twin problems of free-riding and being 
‘suckered’.  If an individual sacrifices and no one else does, they risk being a ‘sucker’ 
but also endanger the resource.  If everyone else sacrifices and he or she does not, 
he or she could ‘free-ride’ and obtain the best of both worlds. 
 
A descriptive research design was employed where 444 learners from 10 schools in 
Gauteng completed pen and paper interviews.  Questions tapped key areas isolated 
in the literature as vital in the study of social dilemmas: cultural value orientation 
(individualism/collectivism), perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE), faith in others 
(FIO) and co-operative behaviours (saving water).  Learners were selected as they 
are the target for most informational or government advertising campaigns in this 
area.  Hence they should have had a high knowledge of water conservation.  The 
extent to which knowledge and attitudes have converted into behavioural change has 
long been a quandary in social marketing.  Thus investigation of variables associated 
with behavioural choice in social dilemmas, as the preservation of water resources is 
a Resource Dilemma, would shed light on ways to effect greater behavioural change. 
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 8.3. Summary of Research Findings: Implications for 
the Model 
 
An overview of research findings is best presented in Figure 17 below.  Support for 
most hypothesised relationships was found, apart from a direct link between PCE 
and individual behaviour.  There was, however a direct relationship between PCE 
and the behaviour of others.  All relationships were in the expected direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(FIO) 
H 3c: FIO Moderator role between 
value orientation and behaviour for 
individuals not supported 
Perceived consumer 
effectiveness 
(PCE) 
H 5: PCE  Moderator role 
between value orientation 
and behaviour for 
individuals  
Value orientation: 
Individualism/ 
Collectivism 
Hypothesis 2 & 3a, 
b Value orientation 
influence on FIO 
supported 
Water 
conserving 
behaviours 
Hypothesis 6 
(PCE and FIO) 
Supported 
Link Between value 
orientation and 
behaviour found 
Hypothesis 4 
(PCE and Individual) 
No Direct Relationship Found 
– Only Moderator 
• HC 
• HI 
• VI 
• VC
Belief in the co-operation of others 
Hypothesis 1: 
FIO influences Behaviour 
Directly Supported 
 
 
Figure 17: Validated Model 
 
Four hypotheses were supplemental to the model: H8: individualists would be more 
concerned with consumer rights.  H9a respondents low in FIO and (H9b) Township 
respondents would prefer structural solutions to social dilemmas, that is, the 
government should intervene.  H10 consumers who believed the resource was 
plentiful would harvest more.  Two of these were supported: Township respondents 
favour structural solutions and those who believed the resource was abundant 
harvested more. 
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8.4. Discussion 
 
8.4.1. Individualism/Collectivism and its interaction with FIO and PCE 
 
The relationship between FIO, or faith in others, was directly influenced by individual 
value orientation and had a direct impact on individual behaviour.  Respondents who 
had higher degrees of faith in others were more likely to be collectivists and exhibit 
more co-operative behaviours.  This is in line with the literature as researchers found 
that pro-socials were more co-operative (Wagner, 1995) and selecting the group over 
others is a collectivist trait (Triandis, 1995).  What was unexpected was the lack of 
interaction effect found between FIO and individualism/collectivism on individual 
behaviour.  Thus the lack of interaction effect (FIO x Individualism/Collectivism) 
means that each variable (FIO and Individualism/Collectivism) has a separate impact 
on consumer behaviour, meaning that the impact of one does not depend on the 
level of another.  Their influences are separate.  A possible reason for this lies in 
social mobility and growing affluence across the major metropolitan areas of South 
Africa.  If one reviews Triandis’ ecological perspective (1989, 1995; 2001), the 
changing social circumstances should lead to a change in cultural value orientation.  
As a consequence, the Township learners displayed the greatest variability in terms 
of orientations.  They were high in vertical individualism, vertical collectivism and 
horizontal collectivism.  Based on Eaton and Louw (2000) one would expect more 
collectivism amongst speakers of African vernacular languages, which was indeed 
the case, apart from the high rate of vertical individualism.  The diversity of 
orientations implied that these are becoming distinguished in their impact on 
individual behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis two dealt with the direct relationship of individualism/collectivism on FIO.  
A significant relationship was present.  Vertical collectivists displayed extremely low 
co-operation when their FIO was low, while horizontal collectivists and horizontal 
individualist reported high rates of co-operation when FIO was high.  Vertical 
individualists registered very little impact of FIO on behaviour.  The dimension of 
horizontality rests along a belief that all members of society are equal and equal 
outcomes for all is best (Triandis, 1995; Parks & Rumble, 2001) and pro-socials meet 
co-operation with co-operation (Camac, 1992; Parks & Rumble, 2001).  Thus it is not 
surprising that HI and HC believe more in their fellow citizens and respond co-
operatively.  Conversely, individualists take their behavioural cues internally and 
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should, therefore be influenced more by internal drives.  Hence self-efficacy should 
be more important for them, as the study did find.   
 
PCE, although not directly affecting behaviour at an individual level, (H4) acted as a 
moderator for individualism/collectivism.  Thus there is an interaction between PCE 
and individualism/collectivism.  Hence each variable's impact is affected by the 
presence of the other.  This is termed a moderator effect.  Therefore, using more 
than one variable in combination would be more effective in understanding and 
impacting behaviour.  Most importantly, collectivism is associated with low self-
efficacy and high group efficacy (Triandis, 1989; Chiou, 2001).  Collectivists should, 
therefore, be hampered by low PCE when faced with a social dilemma, as Kim and 
Choi (2005) found.  The current study corroborates these results.  Low PCE 
coincides with high rates of defection for horizontal collectivists and vertical 
individualists.  Horizontal individualists were the only group to display high rates of 
co-operation under conditions of low PCE.  Such a result is not unforeseen when one 
considers that horizontal individualists value equality and co-operate because they 
believe it is universally the ‘right thing to do’ rather than because it is a group norm or 
because their action will have a large impact (Gärling, 1999). 
 
A direct relationship between individualism/collectivism and co-operative behaviour 
was present.  Horizontal collectivists defected the most, followed by horizontal 
individualists.  This direct relationship validates the proposed subjective weight value 
function represented in Equation 5, reproduced for ease of reference below: 
 
Equation 9 (5): Subjective Weight Value Function Under Allocentrism/Idiocentrism 
 
 QT = IC (Ws * QSELF) + AC (Wo* QOTHERS) 
 
Where:  Q = Outcome 
 W = Weight 
 IC = Idiocentric orientation  
 AC = Allocentric orientation 
 
 
8.4.2. PCE and FIO 
 
The preservation function rests a great deal on F, which is the number of people 
required before a public good is produced or a resource is preserved.  A related 
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concept to Wiener & Doescher’s (1991) demonstration of the importance of scale, 
reproduced below for ease of reference: 
 
 
Equation 10: Factor of Scale 
 
 U(C,T) > T for some C > n* 
 
Where: U = Amount of utility from resource preservation 
 C  = Number of community members who sacrifice 
 n = number of people in the population 
 n* = Threshold number of people required before 
   the resource is preserved 
 T = Temptation to defect 
 
If less than n* people co-operate, the resource is destroyed and the individual is a 
‘sucker’.  People are wary of conditions where an insufficient number of people will 
not co-operate (n*) and thus are fearful (McCarthy & Hagan, 1998; Simpson, 2003).  
Thus individuals would be tempted to defect when n* is perceived.  Such conditions 
would occur when FIO is low.  The model predicted, and found, low FIO to 
correspond with low levels of co-operation. 
 
The interaction between FIO and PCE is of great interest, as both are required in the 
F function and both are affected by the factor of scale.  The F function represents the 
impact of one individual's action on the production of the public good.  If F is small, 
the number of people required to preserve the resource is large, as the impact of 
individual action is small.  Thus the F function accounts for both actions of others and 
of self, represented in the model as FIO and PCE.  Crucially, the results demonstrate 
an interaction between these two variables (H6) and a corresponding impact on 
behaviour, as the interaction was found to significantly impact on co-operative 
behaviour.  Thus low conditions of both FIO and PCE resulted in the lowest levels of 
co-operation.  The results, therefore, have validated the conceptualised role of F. 
 
The contribution of the model towards understanding F is in the finding that there is a 
significant moderating impact individualism/collectivism by PCE.  As evidenced 
earlier, PCE is required before collectivists co-operate.  Kim and Choi (2005) had a 
similar result.  Thus the F value would vary according to the varying degrees of 
collectivism and individualism that a group has.  Equally importantly, PCE had no 
direct impact on co-operative behaviour.  Thus PCE is needed but not sufficient in 
itself to induce co-operative behaviour.  Similarly, Kim and Choi (2005) found 
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concern for the environment to operate separately from PCE, and PCE only to play a 
role between co-operative action and collectivism.  Thus PCE interacts with 
individualism and collectivism to impact behaviour, but it is faith in others and 
individualistic/collectivistic value orientations that directly impact co-operation.  Just 
as individualists have higher self-efficacy (Triandis, 1995) this variable is not 
important for advertising attention for this market segment.  The most important 
implication of these findings would be that marketers can manipulate the perception 
of F through PCE mainly for collectivists.  FIO is more important for individualists. 
 
The number of defectors D would be expected to be a greater problem in dilemmas 
where a greater proportion of the population have an idiocentric orientation, as was 
found to be the case.  Therefore the conjecture that F (or the number of cooperators 
required before the public good is produced or the resource is preserved), would be 
still harder to attain in individualistic societies than collectivist ones is held, thus the 
preservation function is supported: 
 
Equation 11: Preservation Function Under Allocentrism/Collectivism 
 
 L = 1 – (D/NFA) 
 
Where  L =  Level of resource preserved 
 D = Number of defectors in a population 
 F =  Return for each unit of co-operation  
 A =  Level of allocentrism 
Note:    F*A 
 
 
8.4.3. Reformulation of the Model 
 
The findings above imply a reformulation of the proposed model.  PCE was found to 
be a moderator of individualism/collectivism, as well as to interact with FIO.  PCE did 
not have a direct impact on behaviour.  Individualism/collectivism was found to have 
a direct impact on behaviour, not specified in the original model.  This construct also 
influenced FIO, but FIO did not act as a moderator between individualism/collectivism 
and behaviour.  Both FIO and individualism independently influenced co-operative 
behaviour.  Figure 18 below represents the reformulated model. 
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Figure 18: Reformulated Model 
 
 
8.4.4. Supplementary Results 
 
The question of consumer rights should be discussed in conjunction with preferences 
of Township respondents for a structural solution.  It was hypothesised that 
idiocentrics should favour consumer rights more than allocentrics, as rights rather 
than obligations are a priority for individualists (Voronov & Singer, 2002).  The 
opposite was found: respondents high in horizontal and vertical collectivism and 
vertical individualism corresponded with concern for rights.  This group coincided with 
the Township learners.  The phrasing of the question may be a driving factor here, as 
it centred on cost.  Allocentrics have been found to be more sensitive to the costs of 
a sanctioning system (Van Vugt et al., 1996), as they have lower financial satisfaction 
(Dutta-Bergman & Wells, 2002) and they often have less affluence than idiocentrics 
(Triandis, 1995, 2001).  The Township respondents were less convinced of the 
quality of water they received and were more likely not to perceive costs involved in 
water provision.  Thus it follows that this group believed that water was a right and 
non-payment should not be met with termination of the water service. 
 
The utility function conceptualised in the literature review was seen as being 
influenced by the key variables of personal utility (U), the value of the resource (V) 
the level of the resource preserved (L), the cost to the individual member (K) and the 
level of allocentrism (A).  As allocentrics value outcomes of others more than 
outcomes for self (Triandis, 1995; Gärling, 1999), the cost for this group was thought 
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to be less of a factor.  The findings of the current study, coupled with evidence from 
Van Vugt et al. (1996) demonstrate that costs are an important factor for allocentrics, 
especially if they are monetary in nature.  The sensitivity to cost reverses the impact 
of allocentrism in the proposed utility function under allocentrism/collectivism, as 
monetary cost for allocentrics is important.  Hence:  
 
Equation 12: Utility Function Under Allocentrism/Collectivism 
 
 U =  ((V – (UOut-group  x A)) L  –   K/ (1 – A)    
 
Where  U  =  Utility  
 V  =  Full preservation of resource 
 L =  Level of resource preserved 
 K =  Cost to individual member 
 A =  Level of allocentrism 
 
Becomes the following as individual costs are prohibitive for allocentrics: 
 
Equation 13: Utility Function Under Allocentrism/Collectivism 
 
 U =  ((V – (UOut-group  x A)) L  –   K*A    
 
The implications of this show that when marketing to allocentrics non-monetary 
solutions have to be promoted.  Van Vugt et al. (1996) made a similar observation in 
their study.  Thus the revised utility function, as set out in the Equation 13 above 
should have greater use.  Note, however, that the role of the out-group was not 
tested empirically in the current study and no adjustments can be made to this 
section of the equation. 
 
8.4.5. Supplementary Hypotheses 
 
Just as in Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002), there was a marked preference for 
structural solutions amongst the Township sample.  This group had higher levels of 
collectivism and lower PCE.  As collectivists believe more in the efficacy of leaders 
and have lower levels of individual effectiveness (Triandis, 1996), it is not surprising 
that Township learners elected for a structural solution.  The extent to which the 
same group believed water payment should not be enforced and no value was added 
through the water delivery system highlights important implications for municipalities 
and government.  Framing effects could come into play.  Collectivists will show more 
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restraint in a Resource Dilemma as they do not have to pay, but merely use less (Sell 
et al., 2002).  Moreover, informational campaigns should look towards providing 
information to change beliefs regarding the quality of water and its cost.  
Informational campaigns are the most useful when they are on par with community 
values (Trumbo & O'Keefe, 2005), thus these must be designed with community 
concerns and not simply be 'getting the message out'. 
 
Similarly the need for consumer education comes with the finding that perceptions of 
resource abundance enhance harvesting behaviour.  A large number of learners 
believed South Africa is a water rich country; hence they feel no need to engage in 
any conserving behaviours.  It is up to marketers to disillusion them from this belief. 
 
The most unlooked for finding was the lack of relationship between low FIO and 
preference for structural solutions.  A possible reason for this could be lack of faith in 
structural solutions in general, as enforcement is not very effective currently, as 
Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002) found.  The entire sample was used for this 
analysis:  both Suburban and Township learners who were low in FIO elected not to 
have a sanctioning system.  The Township learners did, however.  This reflects the 
collectivist morality of what is right, the vertical desire for leadership intervention and, 
the lack of importance amongst collectivists for individual freedom.  Triandis (1989, 
1995) demonstrated that individualists value freedom while collectivists value duty.  
The Suburban sample, with its high payment levels and individualistic tendencies, 
may not see the need or desire to have their behaviour controlled by government. 
 
8.5. Implications for Marketing Water Conservation 
 
8.5.1. Market segmentation 
 
Target markets for water conservation drives a need to be segmented along social 
value orientation (individualism/collectivism), as each group has different needs and 
would respond to different media appeals.  McCarty and Shrum (2001) urged 
marketers to design environmental messages around the ‘right thing to do’ for 
collectivists and to reduce personal inconvenience for individualists.  The current 
study highlights that, while the literature finds messages based on morality may work 
for collectivists, collectivism is a moving target in an emerging market.  Township 
consumers were found to be very diverse in their value orientation.  Moreover, 
Suburban consumers scored high on horizontal individualism.  Gärling (1999) 
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demonstrated that perceptions of equality and fairness were important for this group.  
Thus a review of both horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and 
collectivism reveals that the blanket message of ‘right imperatives’ may be more 
applicable to horizontal dimensions than vertical ones. 
 
Greater defection may be expected from individualists, as found to be the case in the 
current research.  A different strategy for these target groups is required, one that 
could focus on status for vertical individualists.  For example, having water 
conservation devices, such as low-flow showerheads could be seen as a status 
symbol, marking the users out as ‘special’ as they are ‘unique’ in the sense that they 
care about the environment.  Such associations would do well for a group who value 
social distinction. 
 
8.5.2. Message Appeals 
 
Dividing individualism and collectivism into sub-dimensions as set out by Triandis 
(1989, 1995) has borne fruit.  Correspondingly the use of other sub-dimensions, such 
as independent and interdependent selves could too.  Utz (2004) framed messages 
to evoke interdependent or independent selves.  Messages of interdependent selves 
increased co-operation even among vertical individualists.  A similar approach could 
be tried in South Africa. 
 
Collectivists need increased levels of PCE.  This of Kim and Choi (2005) has been 
borne out in the current study.  Thus marketing campaigns to target markets high on 
allocentrism should focus on increasing the power of individual action.  Individualists 
required increased levels of FIO, as the current study found allocentrism to be related 
to FIO.  FIO, in turn, has a large impact on behaviour.  Thus the reformulation of 
Wiener and Doescher’s (1991) message frames (see Table 36 overleaf) focus on 
ease of action, high impact of individual behaviour and small scope problems for 
collectivists.  Horizontal collectivists and individualists can be approached more 
through the ‘right thing to do’ avenue. 
 
Allocentrism and FIO could be fostered through marketing campaigns that stress the 
shared nature of the resource and also foster ownership of the dilemma as a 
community problem.  This would build strong in-groups, in which even actors with 
competitive orientations would co-operate, as Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) 
asserted.   Collectivists value relationships, especially horizontal collectivists.  
- 150 - 
Appeals could be formulated on the role of good water practice as an asset to the 
community.  Chipp and Morton-McKay (2002) found a high level of recall for an 
advertising campaign run by a popular disc jockey, who asked the community to use 
water carefully as their brethren in the rural areas had to walk miles to get one 
solitary bucket.  The use of reference groups, therefore, for collectivists would also 
be beneficial, as Lee et al. (2002) discovered.  Thus these implications have been 
taken into account in the annotation of Table 36 below.   
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
VI 
VI 
VC/HI 
HI 
HC/HI 
 
VC, VI 
HC/HI 
Emphasise 
shared resource 
Common fate 
Build 
community 
pride 
Table 36: Adapted Message Frames – Overcoming the barriers to co-operation  
Source: Adapted from Wiener & Doescher (1991, p.43) 
 
 
8.5.3. Problem Diagnosis and Programme Approach 
 
The levels of allocentrism/idiocentrism in a target group is important.  But so is the 
problem itself.  Water as a Resource Dilemma would gain greater co-operation than 
water as a Public Goods Dilemma.  This applies particularly with reference to 
Prospect Theory.  Prospect theory has been validated internationally and 
demonstrates that people are more sensitive to losses rather than gains and would 
sacrifice more to keep a resource than lose it (Sell et al., 2002).  More importantly, 
subjects also harvest less if the resource is in threat and under-harvesting is an 
easier achievement than payment, according to the same theory.  The current study 
found allocentrics to be sensitive to payment; thus conservation may be a better goal 
than account payment.  Once co-operation for conserving behaviours is gained, then 
the authorities could pursue payment.  This follows marketing’s well used foot-in-the-
door technique:  consumers wish to be consistent in their behaviour, so they 
extrapolate co-operation on small requests to entail co-operation on larger ones. 
- 151 - 
 In addition, the value of the F function would be very instructive.  The F function 
outlines the impact of one individual’s behaviour and how many individuals in a 
population are needed to co-operate before the desired level of the resource is 
saved.  Water conservation needs large numbers to comply and the value of 
individual action is accelerating rather than decelerating (Heckathorn, 1998).  That is, 
the more people who co-operate, the greater the impact there is, much in the same 
way as the fewer people who litter, the larger extent of the environment is pristine.  
Thus individuals need to be made aware of this, as the F function in such cases is 
small. 
 
8.5.4. Promotion of Sanctioning Systems 
 
The study did not replicate the international experience of low trusters to opt for 
sanctioning systems.  Nevertheless, there was a desire for a sanctioning system 
among the Township learners, whose payment levels are the lowest.  Eek et al. 
(2002) recorded that intermittent sanctioning systems work best for pro-socials.  
Given the high payment compliance amongst the Suburban learners and the large 
degree of collectivism present in the Township sample, an intermittent sanctioning 
system may work.  The role of marketing in the system would be to broadcast its use 
and the wide reach, hence this could induce the large ‘spillover’ effect.  The ‘spillover’ 
effect reflects increased compliance from individuals not sanctioned, but who know 
that an intermittent system is in place, such as traffic fines for people who speed (Eek 
et al. 2002). 
 
Although outside the gamut of the current study, anecdotal evidence points to poorly 
marketed and received sanctioning systems in townships (McKay, personal 
communication, 2006).  Careful marketing of these systems should build on the 
positive sentiment that exists towards them in principle. 
 
8.6. Limitations of the Study 
 
The greatest limitation of the study lies in the behavioural questionnaire.  Although 
tested over three samples, the final behavioural measure proved to be less effective 
than the measure used in the second pilot study.  Behavioural items were 
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streamlined between the studies, but unfortunately, the lower number of items 
resulted in less efficacy of the scale. 
 
The study was descriptive in nature, hence the manipulation of in-group and out-
group effects could not take place.  This would have served to check the influence of 
out-groups on the utility function under allocentrism and idiocentrism more fully. 
 
Learners were the focus of the current study as they form the basis for informational 
programmes.  The extent to which they can alter behaviour in the home is 
questionable, thus a wide age range in future would be preferable.  Moreover, the 
study was conducted on teenagers.  This age group has particular idiosyncrasies 
regarding identity, ideas regarding self and other and group attachment.  Their 
orientations are, to some extent, in flux.  Thus it would be impossible to generalise to 
a wider population. 
 
8.7. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The current study opens up a myriad of possibilities for future research.  As the 
relationships between the key variables were found, now marketers can concentrate 
on efforts to manipulate these variables and measure the corresponding impact on 
behaviour.  The results of message framing (as laid out above) could be explored 
with the added weight of insights gleaned from individualism/collectivism.  
Collectivists are suggested to be more concerned with fear appeals and more 
motivated by intermittent sanctioning systems.  What would the impact of different 
types of appeals be in our environment?  Thus a host of causal designs are possible, 
especially with regard to the marketing and acceptance of sanctioning systems, such 
as water metering, which are currently being rolled out on a neighbourhood-by-
neighbourhood basis. 
 
The survey should also be extended into the general population to see if the 
relationships hold.  Such a focus may well encourage the government to extend their 
campaigns to a wider audience.  Moreover, the question of costs and payment is a 
pressing one, thus a larger survey of the general populace may aid officials in 
designing strategies to reduce this problem. 
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Attitude theory, as developed in both Psychology and Marketing could provide 
additional depth to the model.  Social marketers, as a whole, have used attitude 
theory extensively in the ‘traditionalist’ school of thought (Alcalay & Bell, 2000).  What 
has been well documented is the ‘attitude-practice’ gap in such approaches, often 
termed KAP or ‘Knowledge – Attitude – Practice’ theory (Alcalay & Bell, 2000).  
Social dilemma theory as well as individualism/collectivism could help explain why an 
attitude – practice gap is present. 
 
8.8. Conclusion  
 
The current study has demonstrated the validity and reformulation of the proposed 
model.  Thus Resource Dilemmas and individualism/collectivism are indeed 
appropriate lenses to view water conservation in South Africa.  Most importantly, the 
key variables of PCE and FIO have been demonstrated to have an impact and 
interact with individualism and collectivism.  These are variables on which marketing 
efforts can focus to effect a positive change in consumer behaviour.  The results also 
demonstrate that PCE is more of an issue and more effective for inducing 
behavioural change among collectivists.  Hence market segmentation should help 
design messages promoting PCE in a certain section of the market.  The study is in 
line with trends in marketing towards more socially responsible and culturally aware 
behaviour.  Both are topics of vital importance in emerging markets.  As marketing 
has been shown here to affect and be affected by both social issues and changing 
cultural values, the next step would be to extend marketing theory and practice along 
both lines.  For instance, multinationals in emerging markets must deal with varying 
degrees of allocentrism and idiocentrism, where personal levels of both traits are in 
flux.  The Township sample’s unexpected levels of vertical individualism point to the 
amplified importance of status appeals.  Multinationals are often also required to 
engage in socially responsible behaviour, a prerogative that is louder in developing 
markets.  Understanding the social processes that engender action in social 
marketing would make sure those efforts are not in vain.  The overall topic is also 
highly relevant.  As calls come for action to collective problems, such as water 
conservation and global warming, marketers need to discover how their efforts can 
best be used towards a solution. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
 
School Of Economic And Business Science 
University Of The Witwatersrand 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Age: ____________ Grade: _________________ Home language_________________ 
 
School_________________________________________________________________ 
Gender: (please tick) 
Male Female 
 
This is not a test or an exam. There are no wrong or right answers. 
Read each statement.  
Decide how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Circle the relevant number. 
For example: 
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Holidays are fun 1 2 3 4 5 
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1 I am happy only if the people around me are happy. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 To win is the most important thing in life.  1 2 3 4 5 
3 I would give up things so that the group can gain.  1 2 3 4 5 
4 I don’t like it when other people do better than me. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 It is important that I keep my group agreeing on things.  1 2 3 4 5 
6 It is important to do better in my schoolwork than other people.  1 2 3 4 5 
7 I like sharing little things with my friends at school 1 2 3 4 5 
8 I like events where I can compete against other people, like exams 
and sport.  1 2 3 4 5 
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9 It is important to me that other people are doing well.  1 2 3 4 5 
10 I like doing things by myself.  1 2 3 4 5 
11 I will help my relatives if they need money, as much as I can.  1 2 3 4 5 
12 To compete against someone is natural.  1 2 3 4 5 
13 I am proud if another member of my class gets a prize.  1 2 3 4 5 
14 It is important to me that I am different to others.  1 2 3 4 5 
15 The best way to spend time is with other people 1 2 3 4 5 
16 I get annoyed if someone does better than me in school.  1 2 3 4 5 
17 Duty to family is more important than personal fun.  1 2 3 4 5 
18 We need competition because it makes us better.  1 2 3 4 5 
19 I am a unique person, separate from others. 1 2 3 4 5 
20 I feel good when I work with other people.  1 2 3 4 5 
21 Winning is not important to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
22 It is important that I respect community decisions 1 2 3 4 5 
23 I would rather depend on myself than on other people. 1 2 3 4 5 
24 Family must stick together, no matter what problems there are 1 2 3 4 5 
25 I usually rely on myself, rather than on other people 1 2 3 4 5 
26 Family must stay together.  1 2 3 4 5 
27 It is important to me that I am different to other people and my own 
person 1 2 3 4 5 
28 It is my duty to take care of my family, no matter how hard it is 1 2 3 4 5 
29 My personal identity (as unique) is very important to me 1 2 3 4 5 
30 When I am in a group, I will go along with what most of the others want 1 2 3 4 5 
31 I am glad that I am different from other people.  1 2 3 4 5 
32 It is important to speak to my friends before I make a decision 1 2 3 4 5 
33 I prefer to do things by myself 1 2 3 4 5 
34 I like working with all the other learners in class 1 2 3 4 5 
35 I feel happy when my best friend wins a race 1 2 3 4 5 
36 I prefer to play by myself at home 1 2 3 4 5 
37 I prefer to work by myself in class 1 2 3 4 5 
38 I prefer playing by myself in general 1 2 3 4 5 
39 I will give my pocket money to my friends if they need it 1 2 3 4 5 
40 I prefer working by myself in general 1 2 3 4 5 
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School 
 
Think about your school.  
Read the questions. 
Decide if they are true for your school or not. 
If it is true all the time circle number 5. 
If it is not true at all, circle number 1. 
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1 The taps at school drip and leak. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Leaking taps are fixed.  1 2 3 4 5 
3 Dripping taps are closed properly. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 The school has broken water pipes. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 The school has leaking water pipes. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Broken or leaking pipes are fixed. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 The school has flushing toilets. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 The school toilets leak. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 The school toilets are broken. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Leaking toilets are fixed. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Broken toilets are fixed. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 There is soap in the learner’s toilets. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 
There is a basin or bucket for learners to wash their 
hands 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Learners leave taps running 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Learners break the toilets 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Hosepipes are used to water the school garden 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Hosepipes are used all day 1 2 3 4 5 
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Community 
 
Think about the people who live in your area or the houses of your friends who live near you. 
Read the questions. 
Decide if they are true for your area or not. 
If it happens all the time circle number 5. 
If it does not happen at all, circle number 1. 
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1 Taps drip or leak. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Most people ignore dripping or leaking taps. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Most people close taps properly. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Most people use hosepipes are used to wash cars. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Most people use the toilet as a dustbin. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Water pipes are broken or leaking. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Everyone has a flushing toilet. Yes No 
8 Most flushing toilets leak. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Most flushing toilets are broken. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Most adults fix broken or leaking toilets. 1 2 3 4 5 
11 People in the neighbourhood pay the water account. 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Tap water is clean and safe to drink. 1 2 3 4 5 
13 It costs money to clean water before it goes into the tap Yes No 
14 It costs money to get water from dams to taps. Yes No 
15 Adults/ parents try to use less water. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 
Most people you know brush their teeth while the tap is 
running 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Most people wash their dishes under a running tap 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Most people rinse their clothes under a running tap 1 2 3 4 5 
 
.
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This is not a test or an exam. There are no wrong or right answers. 
Read each statement.  
Decide how much you agree or disagree with the statement. Circle the relevant number.  If 
you agree, tick 5, if you disagree, tick 1 
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1 
There is not much that any one person can do about 
water conservation. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 Most people don’t do much to use less water. 1 2 3 4 5 
3 People must pay for the water they use. 1 2 3 4 5 
4 
It is useless if one person tries to use less water and 
other people do not try to use less water. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
Nothing that I can do will make a difference to saving 
water in this country. 1 2 3 4 5 
6 I don’t know how to use less water. 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Soon, most people will use less water if they can. 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less 
water. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 The government must make people use less water 1 2 3 4 5 
10 South Africa is a water rich country 1 2 3 4 5 
11 
Everybody must have water even if they cannot pay for 
it 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Water should not be cut off if people don’t pay for it 1 2 3 4 5 
 
N
ev
er
 
N
ow
 a
nd
 
th
en
 
So
m
et
im
es
 
A
 lo
t 
A
lw
ay
s 
 
14 Do you ever see dripping taps 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Do you ever stop taps from dripping 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Do you ever see leaking pipes 1 2 3 4 5 
17 I use a hosepipe to clean the car 1 2 3 4 5 
18 
It is okay to wet people on Spring Day or during Spring 
week 1 2 3 4 5 
19 It is okay to wet people on hot days 1 2 3 4 5 
20 It is okay to water gardens with a hosepipe 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 2: Introductory Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Economic and Business Science 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Tel: 011 717 8080 
Fax: 011 717 8081 
20th October 2003 
 
The Principal: 
Research into water conservation 
 
I am a lecturer and masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand.  My thesis centres 
on social marketing in general and water conservation in particular.  I am currently conducting 
research into how best to promote water conservation in schools. 
 
The study is investigating the influence of concepts of individualism versus concepts of 
collectivism on water conservation.  This research is supported and sponsored by the 
Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF), in a joint initiative with the DoE, under NEEP (the 
national environmental education project). As NEEP targets schools and learners, the input of 
learners in the research is of great importance. Thus, I would be most grateful if you can 
assist me in this research by allowing a group of your Grade 9 learners to complete a survey.  
Naturally, the survey is confidential. 
 
If you have any comments or queries, please do not hesitate to contact me, Kerry Chipp, at 
the School of Economic and Business Science on 011 717 8080 or 082 330 8759.   
 
Thanking you very much for your assistance. 
 
 
 
Kerry Chipp 
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Appendix 3: Reliability Statistics 
 
Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
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 6543210
PCE Nothing that I can do will make a difference to saving water in 
this country.
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Faith In Others 
 
 FIO Most people don't do much to use less water. (Reversed) 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Disagree 23 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Disagree 42 9.5 9.5 14.8 
Neutral 143 32.2 32.5 47.3 
Agree 151 34.0 34.3 81.6 
Strongly Agree 81 18.2 18.4 100.0 
Valid 
Total 440 99.1 100.0   
Missing System 4 .9    
Total 444 100.0    
 
 FIO Soon, most people will use less water if they can. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Disagree 29 6.5 6.7 6.7 
Disagree 45 10.1 10.4 17.1 
Neutral 150 33.8 34.6 51.7 
Agree 121 27.3 27.9 79.7 
Strongly Agree 88 19.8 20.3 100.0 
Valid 
Total 433 97.5 100.0   
Missing System 11 2.5    
Total 444 100.0    
 
 FIO I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less water. 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Disagree 41 9.2 9.3 9.3 
Disagree 85 19.1 19.3 28.6 
Neutral 158 35.6 35.8 64.4 
Agree 87 19.6 19.7 84.1 
Strongly Agree 70 15.8 15.9 100.0 
Valid 
Total 441 99.3 100.0   
Missing System 3 .7    
Total 444 100.0    
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6543210
FIO Most people don't do much to use less water. 
(Reversed)
200
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 Mean =3.51
 Std. Dev. =1.061
N =440
FIO Most people don't do much to use less water. (Reversed)
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FIO Soon, most people will use less water if they can.
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 Mean =3.45
 Std. Dev. =1.125
N =433
FIO Soon, most people will use less water if they can.
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6543210
FIO I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less 
water.
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 Mean =3.14
 Std. Dev. =1.175
N =441
FIO I am sure that most people will sacrifice to use less water.
 
 
Individualism/Collectivism 
 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
HC I am happy only if the 
people around me are 
happy. 
28.20 13.392 .267 .107 .570
HC It is important that I 
keep my group agreeing on 
things. 
28.31 14.045 .260 .102 .568
HC I like sharing little 
things with my friends at 
school 
27.80 14.237 .328 .132 .548
HC It is important to me 
that other people are doing 
well. 
28.00 13.677 .376 .204 .532
HC I will help my relatives if 
they need money, as much 
as I can. 
27.64 14.976 .231 .078 .574
HC I am proud if another 
member of my class gets a 
prize. 
27.95 14.150 .341 .163 .544
HC The best way to spend 
time is with other people 27.93 14.789 .210 .098 .582
HC I feel good when I work 
with other people. 27.94 13.736 .350 .143 .539
Horizontal Collectivism Item Analysis 
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 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
HI I like doing things by 
myself. 28.67 28.509 .112 .059 .578
HI It is important to me 
that I am different to 
others. 
28.67 25.345 .406 .274 .508
HI I am a unique person, 
separate from others. 28.90 24.185 .400 .266 .500
HI I would rather depend 
on myself than on other 
people. 
28.70 25.773 .324 .228 .526
HI I usually rely on myself, 
rather than on other 
people 
28.78 26.415 .344 .231 .526
HI It is important to me 
that I am different to other 
people and my own 
person 
28.62 18.447 .215 .063 .656
HI My personal identity (as 
unique) is very important 
to me 
28.32 27.959 .262 .182 .549
HI I am glad that I am 
different from other 
people. 
28.69 23.768 .505 .410 .474
Horizontal Individualism Item Analysis 
 
 
 Item-Total Statistics 
 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
VI To win is the most 
important thing in life. 24.31 26.023 .411 .317 .541
VI I don't like it when other 
people do better than me. 24.77 27.352 .350 .214 .560
VI It is important to do 
better in my schoolwork 
than other people. 
23.86 26.315 .468 .341 .530
VI I like events where I can 
compete against other 
people, like exams and 
sport. 
23.90 26.598 .478 .287 .531
VI To compete against 
someone is natural. 23.83 29.861 .242 .147 .589
VI I get annoyed if 
someone does better than 
me in school. 
24.86 28.129 .326 .224 .568
VI We need competition 
because it makes us better. 23.77 28.915 .295 .180 .577
VI Winning is not important 
to me (reverse) 24.39 24.788 .133 .043 .690
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Vertical Individualism Item Analysis 
 
 
 
  Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
VC I would give up things so 
that the group can gain. 
27.55 19.539 .009 .029 .488 
VC Duty to family is more 
important than personal fun. 
27.12 17.972 .199 .050 .417 
VC It is important that I respect 
community decisions 
26.96 17.253 .324 .153 .375 
VC Family must stick together, 
no matter what problems there 
are 
26.23 18.068 .309 .312 .390 
VC Family must stay together. 26.24 17.935 .352 .310 .381 
VC It is my duty to take care of 
my family, no matter how hard it 
is 
26.38 12.697 .213 .058 .450 
VC When I am in a group, I will 
go along with what most of the 
others want 
27.79 17.465 .189 .054 .420 
VC It is important to speak to 
my friends before I make a 
decision 
27.24 17.797 .198 .074 .417 
Vertical Collectivism Item Analysis 
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